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ABSTRACT

THE PROCESS OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE RUSSIAN REGIONS:
ECONOMIC BALANCING OR LANDMARK OF "KREMLINIZATION"?
Igor Y. Danchenko
August 5, 2005
Every state, regardless of its size, faces a problem of spatial organization and
distribution of its power over territory, particularly in times of the formation of its
statehood and the establishment of the system of governance. The territorialadministrative reform in modem Russia has taken an unprecedented scale over the
last five years. Recollecting the experiences of the imperial Russia and the Soviet
Union, Putin's reforms aim at elimination of a whole tier of Russia's federative units
- autonomous okrugs - by merging them with adjacent regions. Arguably, the
enlargement of Russian regions and the reduction of their number from the current
eighty-nine would be socio-economically beneficial for regions, and would make
Russia a more symmetrical, and thus a more governable federation.
There appears to be no single clear rationale for the enlargement. Based on
three case studies, I assess the political, economic, and demographic arguments for
the regional enlargement in Russia, and draw conclusions whether the process would,
as the current Russian government contends, indeed benefit the regions, or would it
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benefit the state, both the regions and the state, or neither. Assessing the regional
enlargement in a qualitative and quantitative analysis, I characterize the process in
terms of its top-down or bottom-up qualities, its implications for the regions, and its
contribution to the symmetry of Russian federalism. Russia is a state in the making,
and the analysis of regional enlargement is one of the linchpins of its development.
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EPIGRAPH

YlJaCTOK - BemtKaH Bemh!
3TO - MeCTO CBI1.naHhH
MeIDl 11 rocy.napcTBa.
rocy.napcTBo HarrOMI1HaeT,
liTO OHO BCe eme cymecTByeT!

A plot ofland is a great thing!

A place where I date
The state.
The state reminds
That it still exists! I

Velimir Khlebnikov, Early 1922

I Poem in Russian available online at http://lib.rulPOEZIQ/HLEBNIKOW/long/stih.htm English translation of the
epigraph by Igor Y. Danchenko
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INTRODUCTION

Sound state power structure plays a crucial role in the state's ability to execute
the supreme authority of law and constitutional order, to effectively implement the
decisions of governments and citizens, and to maintain sovereignty. Administrativeterritorial division is an essential element of both unitary and federative states.
Democratic states, and particularly large democratic and multiethnic states, tend to
prefer a federative system that arguably has the most capacity to serve the interests
and needs of the people best. Principles of federalism, usually set up in constitutions,
include the principle of delegation of authority to a sub-state regional unit
(devolution), which is important for optimization of governing large multi ethnic
states and preserving their territorial integrity. Comparative landmass and population
size, ethnic composition, level of economic development, degree of autonomy, and
many other characteristics of units in a federative state constitute the relationships
between the state and its units and among the units. These characteristics and
relationships along with the overall political, social, and economic climate in
federations provide for their symmetry or asymmetry.

All federations attempt to strike a balance in their structure and maintain a
degree of symmetry. Symmetrical federations are considered most stable. Therefore,
federative states are often compelled to reform their territorial federative systems to
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bring their units to the most harmonious possible form. The processes of such
structural reforms are often accompanied by constitutional amendments. Fifteen years
after the breakup of the USSR, the Russian Federation is reconsidering its federative
structure, as its current territorial division and the nature of federal-regional relations
are put to the test. This paper focuses on the unraveling phenomenon of the
enlargement of Russian regions with a focus on the reasons underlying this process.

3

CHAPTER I. CONTEXT OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF RUSSIAN
REGIONS

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS

I suggest that the enlargement of the Russian regions can be rationalized as a
continuous trend of centralization (Kremlinization) of Russia by, first, making the
federation more symmetrical and, second, more center-oriented (monocentric) - up to
a point of establishment of a unitary state. Can the enlargement of regions be better
explained through Russia's federal policies of centralization and making Russian
federalism more symmetrical, or through the notion of regional economic and
political development? This hypothesis is put to a test in studies of enlargement
(merger) in three regions.

There exists a common misperception of Russia as a unitary state and as a
given unit of analysis. It is an atavism from the Cold War era, when Soviet federative
structure was a nominal mask for the top-down one party control system. The first
article of the 1993 Russian Constitution declares the terms Russia and the Russian
Federation equa1.2 Its federative status is often ignored. In fact, "Russia" is a term of
convenience, which describes a complex evolving federal system in the Russian
Federation.
2 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, December 12,1993, Article 1-2. Online at
http://kremlin.ru!cng/articlcs/ConstEng I .shtml

4

The second public misperception of Russia as a state is the notion of its lasting
transition. At present, in light of the allegedly increasingly authoritarian presidential

rule of Vladimir Putin, this transition is viewed as that from a democratic state to an
authoritarian, partially democratic, or other kind of "hybrid" state. However transition
usually implies a starting point, which Russia, as a state, lacks. It is just one of the
fifteen constituencies of the USSR, the country that ceased to exist in 1991.
Throughout the centuries of statehood in Eurasia, Russia has never assumed its
present form, nor has it ever been a democracy or a federation, although some
unsuccessful attempts had been made. It only nominally resembles the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in its internal and external borders (see Map
1, p. 170). In this respect, I argue that Russia is rather a state under construction or at
least reconstruction. Throughout the 1990s, Russia sustained an image and reputation
of a "smaller version" of the USSR, in part due to the inertia of the seventy-year
communist rule, and in part to Boris Yeltsin's belief in the state's invincible and
perpetual mightiness despite economic hardship and challenge of separatism. After
succeeding Yeltsin as president, Vladimir Putin publicly admitted the fact that Russia
was no longer "the USSR," but a much weaker country. 3 Indeed, Russia is a different
state, a new state, and in many respects a twenty first century experiment, much like
the USSR had been in the twentieth.

3 "Putin: Edinstvo Strany - Glavnoe Uslovie Protivodeistviya Terroriszmu," (Unity o/the State is the Main Condition
to Fight Terrorism), Vesti, September 13, 2004, online at www.rtr-vesti.ru and Press Conference by President Vladimir
Putin, Moscow, December 23,2004, Transcript online at
www.kremlin.ru/eng/textispeeches/20041l2/231l806 type82915 81700.shtml, at p. 12-13. Even as Prime Minister in
1999, Putin commented that Russia had been in the middle of its hardest historical perios.
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Considering the above-outlined two misconceptions, this paper attempts to
avoid them. First of all, it studies the Russian Federation, rather than Russia, which
implies that it is not a unitary, but a federative (although some would partially
disagree) state in the process of construction. In particular, it undertakes three case
studies of the proposed attempts to merge subjects of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Constitution distinguishes six types of regions: republics (21),
krais (6), oblasts (49), cities with federal status (2), autonomous oblast', and

autonomous okrugs (lO) - all of which are equal subjects of the federation. 4 The
enlargement of Russian regions is characterized by simplification of the Russian
federative construct through elimination of some of the regions by merger with other
regions. As of August 2005, this simplification has tended to exclusively touch upon
the so-called matryoshka regions - the regions of double status. 5 They are typically
comprised of oblasts or krais loosely affiliated with autonomous okrugs located
within them (see Map 2, p. 171). Created during Stalin's rule in the 1920s-40s, the
latter had been fully incorporated in the territories of the respective oblasts and krais
prior to the independence of Russia in 1991. The 1993 Russian Constitution
pronounced them independent regions within the Federation. Paradoxically, the
okrugs also remain the component parts of larger regions. In addition to mergers of

autonomous okrugs, I will review a number of proposed "regional-enlargementthrough-merger" schemes for Russia in the next section.

Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 65-1.
Originally suggested by Bremmer in Ian Bremmer, Reassessing Soviet Nationalities Theories, Cambridge University
Press, 1992, recent literature on Russian federalism has adopted the term "matryoshka" to describe these complex
federative formations. Matryoshka is a reference to a set of Russian handicraft - a set of wooden dolls. Hollow on the
inside, they can be assembled into one large doll by putting smaller ones inside the larger.

4
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By deductively analyzing the current situation in three regions and attempting
to rationalize their enlargement, I intend to find explanations for the processes of
enlargement. To do so, I undertake three case studies described in the Thesis
Structure in more detail. In this section, I propose the hypothesis and explain the title
of the paper.

Some definition of terms is in order here. Economic Balancing refers to the
degree of balance among the Russian regions in terms of their populations,
economies, and the overall level of harmonious (symmetrical) socio-economic
development. It is widely suggested that the economic balancing of regions by
merging the very poor with the very rich is a process that could benefit all parts in the
enlarged region as well as bring more equilibrium into the federal system. 6

Kremlinization is the term of convenience that I have coined to describe the

on-going process of Putin's reforms, which is reviewed in detail in the next chapter.
The term emphasizes strengthening of the federal tier of government, and particularly
of its executive branch, the Presidency, and Presidential Administration.

As previously emphasized, Russia is a federation. In 1990s, during Yeltsin's
years in office, scholars of federalism and Russian federalism have characterized it as

6

See Maria Kravtsova, "Genotsid Matryoshek" (Genocide of the Matryoshki), Expert, # 12, March 29, 2004, p. 69-72.
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a relatively weak, loosely centralized, and asymmetrical state? As Putin's reforms
progress, this perception seems to be changing: Russia is perceived as a stronger and
a much more centralized state. Despite its centralization, Russia still remains a very
asymmetrical federation of 89 (86)8 constituencies.

There are several possible interpretations to my study in regional
enlargements. If regional enlargement lacks rationale from the regional standpoint, it
may possibly be interpreted as a part of Putin's campaign to strengthen the executive
branch through the decrease of the number of federal units, and the simplification of
the federative construct. If it were indeed so, I would argue that the enlargement of
regions can be characterized as a top-down process, and interpreted as the
continuation of the Kremlinization of Russia. The top-down character of this process
implies that it is conceived and undertaken at the initiative of federal-level political
elites, primarily the President and his administration. However, if I find sufficient
evidence that the regional mergers would have a strong positive impact on social and
economic development of all parts of the enlarged regions without significant
interference from the center, it could be concluded that the enlargement of regions is
a bottom-up process. The bottom-up character of the process implies that is
undertaken at the initiative of regional and local political elites, primarily regional
governors and mayors of large cities. This research may also produce mixed results,
which could be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, if I find sufficient

7 See, for example, Daniel R. Kempton and Terry D. Clark (Eds.), Unity or Separation: Center-Periphery Relations in
the Former Soviet Union, 2002 and Blair A. Ruble, Jodi Koehn, and Nancy E. Popson (Eds.), Fragmented Space in the
Russian Federation, Washington, D.C., Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press,
2001.
888 upon the formation ofPermskii Krai, and 86 upon the unification of the Krasnoyarskii Krai.
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evidence to support both the bottom-up and the top-down scenanos, then the
enlargement could be interpreted from the standpoint of efficient governance as a
rational process with a long-term goal of formation of a more symmetrical federation
by utilizing the existing leverage that Putin's government has gained for a variety of
reasons that are not subject of this research. At the same time, I don't rule out a
possibility of reaching yet a different conclusion about the nature and goals of the
process of regional enlargement.

To summanze, the research question could be broken down into several
questions and formulated as follows. First, is the rationale for the enlargement of
regions largely political, largely economic, both, or neither? Second, is the
enlargement of the Russian regions a state-orchestrated process to reform and
strengthen the federal government and, possibly, Russia's economy, or is this process
undertaken at the initiative of the respective regions and is it grounded strictly in
regional, as opposed to federal, urgent economic necessity? In sum, is the
enlargement of regions a top-down or a bottom-up calculated process, a combination
of both, or can it not be described in these terms? Finally, does the enlargement lead
to formation and consolidation of a more symmetrical, or less symmetrical
(asymmetrical) federative state in Russia? If the relations between the federal power
and the power of the constituencies would become more asymmetrical and skewed
towards the federal government, then the enlargement of regions may signify a
temporary or a permanent shift from a federative system to a unitary state

(Kremlinization). If the asymmetry would be skewed towards the constituencies, it
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may signify the continuation of the existence of Russia as a loose federation with
relatively weak central authority. Also, if the enlargement of regions further enhances
political and socio-economic disparity among regions, it would create a more
asymmetrical federation. If, on the opposite, enlargement would facilitate the
harmonization of regions - greater equality in their political status and by socioeconomic characteristics, the enlargement would result in more symmetry in the RF
(see Scheme 1, p. 165)

THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis structure is as follows. First, the historic background for the
researched topic is set up. It is then followed by a review of relevant literature on
federalism and regionalism in general and on the Soviet and Russian federalism in
particular. Then I discuss the schemes of regional enlargement and federative
construct of Russia proposed by politicians and scholars. The next part of the paper is
its substantive research part, conducted in the form of case studies, both qualitative
and quantitative in nature. I assess the enlargement of Russian regions using
statistical data on population, ethnic composition, gross regional product (GRP),
budgetary balance and other data from a variety of sources, including GosKomStat,
the official Russian statistical department, and based on empirical data from a variety
of sources including scholarly books, magazines, and newspapers, as well as multiple
online sources. I have chosen three cases to illustrate the on-going enlargement
policies. I study the mergers of Perm' Oblast' and Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous
Okrug (KPAO), Tyumen' Oblast' and Khanty-Mansiiskii (KhMAO) and Yamalo-

lO

Nenetskii (YaNAO) Autonomous Okrugs, and Irkutsk Oblast' and Ust'-Ordynskii
Byruatskii Autonomous Okrug (U-OBAO). Some tables also include data from the
City of Moscow, the Republic of Tatarstan, and the Republic ofChechnya, as well as
indicators for Russia's average and Russia's total for comparatively positioning the
studied regions in the Russian Federation (See Map 2-A, p. 172).

In separate chapters, I study the demographic, political, and economic aspects
of regions where merger has been successfully negotiated and where merger is a
focus of regional debate. In the section on the political dimension I examine the role
of the federal center in the enlargement process, the political situation in the regions,
and the possible outcomes for regions as new units of the Federation in case of their
merger and the federal symmetry. The section on economic dimension tests the
validity of the claims of both federal and regional authorities that the enlargement is a
process expected to facilitate economic growth and higher living standards, and
enhance the balance in Russia's budgetary federalism. Finally, I singled out a
demographic dimension in a separate section to assess the role that the skewed
distribution of the population and the gross population decrease possibly play in the
rationalization of the enlargement. Despite the rather small sample, the chosen
regions are geographically and socio-economically diverse, and mergers have been
proposed and partially implemented in all of them.
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I strongly believe that modem Russia "ought to be studied in the process of its
formation, rather than a static construct.,,9 The study of regional mergers, their
dynamics, and end results grants a unique opportunity to assess the current policies
and trends of this formation. The research contributes to the analysis and
understanding of Russia's domestic policy during Putin's presidency through the
prism of the changing nature of Russia's federalism.

In the end I assess underlying reasons for the mergers and their possible
outcomes for the respective regions and for the state. Based on the studies in
enlargement of the Russian regions, I evaluate the degree of symmetry of Russian
federalism and the impact that the enlargement of regions may have on the system of
governance. Since the enlargement is an ongoing process, I do not draw definitive
conclusions. It is unclear whether and how the enlargement would continue.
However, I outline the possible trajectories of development of Russian federalism and
its rationale with respect to enlargement. Finally, I briefly discuss the implications of
my paper for future studies.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a variety of ways to systematize states. There are two major
distinctions in their types. Regime-wise states can be democratic and non-democratic,
with subcategories in both. In terms of territory and the distribution of power and

Pauline Jones Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," Politics and Society, Vol. 30,
No.4, December 2002, p. 532.
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control

functions,

they are divided into unitary states and federations 10,

confederations being a separate type or a subcategory of federations, as a part of
evolutions of federations. 11

Federations undergo certain stages in their development. At some point in
history all of them evolve to and from unitary states and confederations (see Scheme
2, p. 166). This inherent dynamism of their evolution can be attributed to their
structure. Dividing sovereignty between federal and regional levels of government,
federations are forged as compromise forms of political organization. Originally
developed in the United States to implement the Jeffersonian idea of limited
government through preservation of a degree of regional autonomy, federal systems
are routinely adopted by many unitary states with certain characteristics that can
potentially destabilize them.

Some states

include historically independent

constituencies, while others are homes to culturally and ethnically different
communities. Federalism is the most democratic form of political organization
capable of delivering the balance between independence of units and independence of
the state as a whole. This balance is delivered in a dynamic process - federations need
to constantly adjust their federal arrangements according to various internal and
external conditions. Federations are prone to disintegration or centralization if they
fail to make the timely necessary adjustments. Both disintegration and centralization
are evolutionary stages of federal states.

10 Non-democratic (authoritarian) states cannot be genuinely federated. Their federative division is usually
the means for administrative central control. Federative division may be used to mask the centralized nature
of the state system. Primary example of such state was the USSR.
11 Carl 1. Friedrick, Constitutional Government and Democracy, Boston, Ginn and Company, 1950, p. lSI.
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Most federations, like the US, Canada, and Spain, formed historically over
long periods of time, and their adjustment mechanisms are well-developed. The slow
dynamics of their development can be traced centuries back. Other federations, like
the USSR and Yugoslavia (SFRYu), "skipped" many developmental stages. Their
federative structures were imposed by central governments in very short time frames.
Over the last decade of the twentieth century these "imposed" federations
demonstrated unexpectedly great dynamic potential. USSR and SFRYu disintegrated
with the same pace they had been created, and started forming new nation-states at an
even greater pace.

Russia, itself a former federal unit, demonstrates a new pattern of the dynamic
potential of federations - the potential of speedy cyclical change. In little over a
decade since its emergence from the ruins of the Soviet state, it has promptly adopted
a new federal system, and almost simultaneously embarked on a path of
recentralization in order to develop a strong nation-state (See Scheme 3, p. 167). This
seemingly paradoxical vector of development, and the speed with which Russia
follows it, raises a number of questions about the phenomenon of Russian federalism,
prompts to question its form, and, possibly, its existence. Is Russia building a
federation, or is it resurrecting a unitary state?

There are a number of factors that can be useful in tracking the dynamics of
Russian federalism to understand and explain it. One such factor is the degree of

14

federal symmetry in modem Russia, and the means by which it is achieved. Federal
symmetry is relevant to the study of federalism for two reasons. 12 First, it enables
regions of the federation to exercise their constitutional rights assigned to them as a
result of a compromise between the federal and regional governments. Second, they
determine the degree of regional influence in a federation, and in relation to other
regions. I should add that the degree of symmetry is crucial to evolution of
federations towards other forms of political structures. In the extreme scenarios it
may cause the breakup of a federation (Balkanization) or tum it into a unitary state.

Federations can be symmetrical and asymmetrical. Usually, federal
(a)symmetry is used in two respects - socio-economic and constitutional. 13 For
convenience of my study, I distinguish the nature of symmetry in federations as
vertical and horizontal: vertical describes the balance of federal power and the power
of the units (regions, states); and horizontal describes the comparability of regions
among themselves (see Scheme 1, p. 165).

One major groundbreaking article that provides a comprehensive discussion
of the vertical symmetry as an element of federalism is by Charles D. Tarlton. His
study distinguishes three approaches to the understanding of federalism. First, it is a
formal and legal (constitutional) approach, the early proponents of which were
Corwin and Wheare.

14

They study federalism as a legal system, in which neither

12 Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd Ed., McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kingston,
Ontario, 1999, p. 65.
13 Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 326.
14 See, for example, Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.
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federal nor regional governments are dependent on one another. The second approach
is rooted in the classical Jeffersonian notion that good governance in a federation lies
in the distribution of power skewed towards regions and localities (devolution). The
third, advocated by Livingston, is the socio-cultural approach to federalism. It is
based on federal realism, according to which federalism should be studied not
through its own structure but by analyzing the society in the state in which it exists.
According to Livingston, society itself contributes a great deal to the structure of
federalism. Arguing that federalism is a "universal answer to the question of
overcoming problems of diversity and disparity in the interests of harmony and
unity," Tarlton warns that this very diversity and disparity within federations should
lead to both the increase in local autonomy and in the central authority.15 Therefore,
federations are fragile structures, and are prone to disintegration, especially if they are
vertically and/or horizontally asymmetrical. Regardless of the approach to federalism,
Tarlton argues that it is important to analyze it as a system in terms of symmetry and
asymmetry.

Horizontal asymmetry is studied by a number of comparative politics scholars
and scholars of regionalism. Approaching federalism from a comparative perspective,
Canadian scholar Ronald Watts identifies and distinguishes four groups of
problematic characteristics of asymmetrical federations. First, is the difference in size
of the area, population, living standards, and other attributes. Second, is the mismatch
between the existing system and the desires and aspirations of the populace. Third, is

15

Charles D. Tarlton, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation, The Journal of

Politics, Vol. 27, Issue 4, 1965, p. 861-874, at p. 874.
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the mismatch of power among the units of the federation when some can influence
federal policy more than others. This is particularly dangerous when the number of
units is relatively small, for example, in Canada. 16 • A final problem is the lack of a
common language and culture and the absence of mechanisms to protect the rights of
all groups from discriminatory policies and actions. I? Commenting on the third and
fourth outlined characteristics, Watts also argues that the greater the state's
homogeneity, the more power is allocated to the federal government. This upsets the
vertical symmetry in a federated state. Watts' classification is important to my
research on the enlargement of regions. Russia's asymmetrical federalism to some
extent possesses all of the four characteristics outlined by Watts, and all of his
characteristics are laid in the foundation of my analysis.

A substantial volume of research has been devoted to the subject of Soviet and
Russian Federalism. Since Russia is the only federated state of the Former USSR,
some of the pre-1991 literature remains relevant to understanding the present nature
of Russian federalism. The Western scholars, who always viewed Soviet Federalism
as an artificial, if not a fictitious structure, did not define it as asymmetrical. In fact,
the ruling communist elites were so sure of the indivisibility of the USSR, that all
Soviet Constitutions featured an article, which granted the right to secession to all of
the 15 republics - the right which constitutionally justified the breakup of the USSR
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The same view is expressed by Elazar in Daniel 1. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, University of Alabama Press, 1987,

p.244.
17

Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Kingston, Ontario, 1996, at p. 102.
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In

1991. 18 Rather, Soviet federalism was viewed in terms of distribution in the

planned economy (Rajabov) 19, center-periphery relations, elite politics (AriasKing)2o, ethnic and religious nationalism (Roeder),21 the legacy of the Soviet ethnofederalism (Codagnone and Filippovi2, and the crafting of the Soviet identity
(Stern)23. This literature is essential for understanding the theoretical and historical
background of Russian federalism.

There are several approaches to studies in Russian regionalism. Their primary
difference is in the units of analysis and in field of analysis. Stoliarov, for example,
takes a historical and an international comparative approach, studying Russia in
contrast with Germany, Switzerland, and the US, and applying the Western federal
solutions to Russia. Analyzing the history of statehood in Russia, he identifies many
flaws and envisions room for improvement. 24 Tsiunchuk and a number of other
scholars from Tatarstan study the evolution of Russian federalism and argue that the
Soviet and Russian experiences should not be ignored in light of the ongoing
changes. 25 The most recent volume by Orttung and Reddaway, for example, employs
federal districts as units of analysis of a number of political and socio-economic
18 For example, see Article 72 "Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR" in
Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 7, 1977, Available online at
http://www.thisnation.com!librarvlussr.html
19 S. A. Rajabov, Geographic Factors and Certain Problems of Federalism in the U.S.S.R., International Social Science
Journal, February 1978, Vol. 30, Issue 1, p. 88-98.
20 Fredo Arias-King, The Centrality of Elites, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. II, No. I, Winter 2003, p. 150-160.
21 Philip G. Roeder, Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization, World Politics, No. 43, January 1991, p. 196-232.
22 Cristiano Codagnone and Vassily Filippov, Equity, Exit, and National Identity in a Multinational Federation: The
'Multicultural Constitutional Patriotism' Project in Russia, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 26, No.2,
April 2000, p. 263-288.
23 Bernhard 1. Stem, Soviet Policy on National Minorities, American Sociological Review; June 1944, Vol. 9, Issue 3,
229-236.
4 Mikhail Stoliarov, Federalism and the Dictatorship of Power in Russia, London, New York, Routledge, 2003. Also
see G. Allen, "Federalism in Flux," Maclean's, June 24, 1991, Vol. 104, Issue 25, p. 28-33.
25 R. Tsiunchuk, Rossiiskii Federalizm: Istoki, Genezis, Istoricheskii Opyt. Sovremennyi Federalizm: Opyt i
Perspektivy (Russian Federalism: Sources, Genesis, Historical Experience. Contemporary Federalizm: Experience and
Perspectives), Kazan', 1996.
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aspects of Russia. 26 Ruble, Koehn, and Popson undertake a complex quantitative
analysis of Russia through the analysis of its "fragmented space.',27 Thornton and
Ziegler approach Russian federalism by studying larger geographical regions.

28

In many respects the study of Russian federalism is a study of Russian
regionalism in general, and particularly of individual units. The study of the
symmetry of Russian federalism is also regional in its scope and nature. In studying
vertical symmetry, it is essential to extend the analysis beyond the constitution and
other federal laws. Since the degree of vertical symmetry may vary from region to
region as a result of the power-sharing agreements between the Russian Federation
and its subjects, it is important to study each individual case separately. Volumes on
Russian federalism edited by Kempton and Clark and by Ruble, Koehn, and Popson
advocate this approach. "Because of the asymmetric nature of Russian federal
relations - with each subekt having unique powers and responsibilities - the only
viable way to assess the evolution of Russian Federalism is to empirically examine
individual cases.,,29 For the same reason, it is important to study Russian regions
comparatively to assess the horizontal symmetry. Horizontal and vertical dimensions
of the Russian symmetry are very relevant to the study of regional enlargement.

The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations, Edited by Peter Reddaway and
Robert W. Orttung, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
27; Ruble, Koehn, and Popson, 2001.
28 Russia's Far East: a Region at Risk, Edited by Judith Thornton and Charles E. Ziegler, Seattle, National Bureau of
Asian Research in Association with University of Washington Press, 2002. Geographically defined regions roughly
correspond to Russia's division into seven federal districts in terms of their longitude in Eurasia.
29 Daniel R. Kempton and Terry D. Clark, An Introduction to Center-Periphery Relations in, Kempton and Clark, 2002,
Chapter I, p. 7.
26
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It is important to assess the fonn the relations between the Federation and the

enlarged regions are taking. 30 Since the enlarged regions would not be fully
established for a number of years, I can only study the regions in the dynamics of
their mergence. Therefore, I assess their merger as a product of the sum of their
respective parts. This is reflected in the datasets that I have generated to study the
political, economic, and demographic aspects of enlargements.

While Watts outlines the four groups of "problematic characteristics,"
Kempton and Clark suggest

SIX

essential conditions for federalism 31 and six

"beneficial conditions,,32 to federalism. The essential conditions are consensual
voluntary participation of units in a federation (this principle echoes the fonnal
constitutional approach of Corwin and Wheare), a written and flexible constitution,
adjudication between levels of government, federal representation of subjects,
division of power between levels of government,33 and political culture of federalism.
The six beneficial conditions are the center-periphery balance of power, symmetry
among components (which are also Watts'

first and second problematic

characteristics), federal political parties or a non-centralized party system, noncentralized bureaucracy, democracy, and favorable economic conditions.

30 For example, in Permskii Krai, which is scheduled to become the first of the enlarged regions on December I, 2005,
the existing arrangements between the two former subjects and the federal center would not be abolished at least until
2009.
31 Kempton and Clark, p. 20.
32
Kempton and Clark, p. 25-30.
33 Authors note that division of power in a federation cannot be unilaterally amended. Otherwise, they argue, such state
would take a form ofloose confederation (if power is altered by components) or a decentralized unitary system.
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Commenting on Russian federalism, Kempton defines the asymmetry among
the components themselves as problematic as imbalance between the center and the
subjects. 34 He divides the asymmetry into two main groups: in distribution of
resources (political asymmetry) and in terms of legal powers granted by the
federation (constitutional asymmetry). These two groups, in tum, create three main
problems, which are once again related to Watts' four problematic characteristics.
First, donor regions feel they are unjustifiably subsidizing recipient regions of the
federation. Second, recipient regions feel resentment towards the donors because they
believe that the latter are unjustifiably rich as a result of concessions from the center.
Third, the "nested nature of some inter-subekt relationships" complicates federalregional and interregional relations. The third problem is constituted by the infamous
matryoshka system, under which autonomous okrugs are subordinate to the oblasts

and krais, while being constitutionally equal to them.

Enlargement of the Russian regIOns is a novelty, and, while enlargement
through merger is a work in progress, only two regions have successfully merged. 35
Therefore, no significant research has been conducted on this phenomenon. Among
the few, the most notable is a recent study of J. Paul Goode. 36 His insightful article
sets the background for regional enlargement in the Russian Federation in the analysis
of the enlargement of Perm' and Tyumen' oblasts and the debate around it. An author

Daniel R. Kempton, "Assessing Russian Federalism," in Kempton and Clark, 2002, at Chapter 8, p. 202-203.
Another merger, among Kransnoyarskii Krai, Evenkiiskii Autonomous Okrug, and Dolgano-Nenetskii Autonomous
Okrug, has been approved by a referendum on April 17,2005 with the new subject of the Federation to be officially
established on January I, 2007.
36 J. Paul Goode, "The Push for Regional Enlargement in Putin's Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 20, No.3, 2004, p.
219-257. According to Goode, enlargement of regions is a top-down process, in which enlargement is the means rather
than the end result.
34

35
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of a book on internal borders, he focuses his study on the dynamics of the
enlargement in light of the administrative reform of Dmitry Kozak 37 , center-periphery
relations, and the relations among elites in the regions proposed for merger.
Accounting for the complexity of the matryoshka system, interests of certain elites in
government and in business, disparity among regions, and other aspects, Goode is not
conclusive of the reasons for enlargement. However, referencing Thomas H. Rigby's
studies in communist organizational systems, he suggests that the current Russian
Presidential Administration, continuing the institutional legacy of the communist
past, has initiated the enlargement policy, like it did in creation of the federal districts,
to achieve certain goals. 38 "The sensation in today's Russia that it is necessary (even
imperative) to reduce the number of regions without a clear underlying rationale,
ideology, or end point falls squarely within this ruling tradition.,,39 The goal of my
research is to find the underlying reasons for the enlargement by analysis of economic
and political reasons, and thus to complement Goode's research.

Finally, the Constitution of the Russian Federation is an important source of
my research. In addition to empirical and quantitative data, it constitutes the central
piece of my argument. The 1993 Russian constitution determined not only the
federative nature and the overall architecture of the state, but also the rights and
duties of the state, regions, municipalities, and citizens, many of which are very
Kozak, one of Put in's closest aides, is the architect of Russia's administrative refonn. The new law "~b Obshih
Printsipah Organizatsii Zakonodatel'nykh i Ispolnitel'nykh Organov Vlasti Sub 'ektov RF" (On General Principles of
Organization of the Judicial and Executive Bodies of the Subjects of the RF) comes into force in 2005. Its primary goal
is to reorganize the administrative-territorial division on all level of government and to clarify and delineate spheres of
competence at each level by assigning them specific functions. In particular, it transfers most of the fiscal authority
from autonomous okrugs to their host krais or oblasts'.
38 The initially stated goal of the creation of the Federal Districts was to bring regional legislation in compliance with
the federal.
39 Goode, p. 253-254.
37
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relevant in evaluating the arguments for Kremlinization and for economIC
balancing. 4o

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: HERITAGE OF RSFSR AND THE
PARADE OF SOVEREIGNTIES

Throughout its long history, Russia underwent a number of major transitions
in its territorial structure. Peter the Great was the first Russian monarch to introduce a
four-level division - gubernia, province, uezd and volost' - and to bring order to the
Empire. However, the first major regional reform was undertaken under the rule of
his granddaughter, Catherine the Great. She adopted Peter's general hierarchical
division of territory, and divided Russia into 41 gubernii. This structure was inherited
by Bolshevik Russia in 1917, and was gradually transformed into the Soviet Union.
RSFSR became the largest and the only federal unit of the USSR with federative
division within it. Upon the breakup of the USSR, Russia inherited the complex,
multi-tier RSFSR structure. 41

It is essential to understand what is at stake in the ongoing political drive to

regional enlargement. First of all, the enlargement is aimed at the elimination of a
whole tier of units in the Russian federative construct - the autonomous okrugs. It is,
therefore, important to trace the history of the initial formation of the autonomous

The Fundamentals of the Constitutional System, Articles 1-16 and The Federal Structure, Articles 65-79.
For a detailed chronology and discussion of the evolution and dynamics of the Russian territorial division, see Irina
Merzliakova and Alexei Karimov, A History of Russian Administrative Boundaries (XVIJI - XX Centuries), 2001.
Online at http://www.geog.port.ac.uklhist-boundipapers/russia.htm Also see Richard Pipes, The Formation of the
Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism. 1917-1923, Rev. Ed., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1997.
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okrugs - to the time when they were first constructed and to understand the rhetoric

and the reasoning behind their formation.

Before becoming the Father of Peoples (Otets Narodov), Joseph Stalin
proposed his famous "autonomization." He reasoned that the federation of Soviet
Republics is based on "common military and economic interests.,,42 He emphasized
the development of republics individually and within the federal system, and called
for their diversity, and peaceful coexistence in the RSFSR. Further, Stalin proposed a
notion of entities (subjects of federation), which naturally combine a specific manner
of life, a specific ethnic composition, and a certain measure of integrality of economic
territory. While his understanding of ethno-federalism was originally tailored for
larger geographical areas that had enjoyed a degree of autonomy in the late Russian
Empire (Poland, Finland, Tatar-Bashkir Area, Kirghiz Area, Siberia, and others), as
the Union grew stronger, its scale gradually decreased. Ethnic republics and
autonomous areas appeared on the political map of the USSR as a consequence of
Stalin's definition of a nation and the emergence of planned economy.43 Stalin, like
Vladimir Lenin and other Bolsheviks, was convinced that federalism in any form is a
transitory stage to socialism. Under socialism, he believed, the federal or unitary form
of state would be ultimately irrelevant, as states would disappear as a result of a
global revolution. Therefore, Lenin, and later Stalin, proceeded with reshaping the
Russian Empire into a pseudo-federation.

I. V. Stalin, "Organizatsiya Rossiiskoi Federativnoi Respubliki," (Organization of the Soviet Federated Republic)
Sochineniya (Essays), Vol. 4, p. 69.
43 In his rather primordialist understanding, Stalin defined nation as a historically constituted community with four
common characteristics - language, territory, economy, and culture.
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At the time of implementation, even Western scholars praised Stalin's ethnic
policy. Before the end of the World War II, Stem argued that the successful resistance
and counterattack of the Soviet troops is largely rooted in the "extraordinary unity
manifested by all segments of the population," which itself is a result of the
successful crafting of the Soviet policy towards minorities. 44 His article focuses on
the manipulation of the small ethnic groups by the Soviet policymakers armed with
the Marxist conception of class struggle, which renders nationalism, and therefore
self-determination, including territorial self-determination, useless.

The Soviet Union was in many respects an artificial construct based on
communist ideology, one party systemic hierarchy and planned economy. Its collapse
along the borders of its fifteen ethnically defined republics proved the vulnerability of
its artificial federative construct. In fact, the system of the declaratory (de-jure)
federalism de-facto served as a decoration for cumbersome, corrupt, undemocratic,
and inefficient governing. It backfired against its rulers resulting in the greatest
disintegration process of the end of the twentieth century. The USSR's collapse
invalidated Stalin's approach to ethno-federalism: it proved dysfunctional in a more
open and democratic environment. The RSFSR, the only federated and by far the
largest constituency of the USSR was spared. Since the breakup of the Soviet Empire,
it has not only assumed the role of the legal successor to the USSR, but also as the
keeper of its legacy and the strongest partner in modem Eurasia, still able to exert the
Stem, 1944. Clearly, at the time of writing the author was unaware of the scale of repressions inside the USSR, and
of the series of deportations of peoples from their ethnic homelands - Crimea Tatars, Chechens, and other ethnic
minorities.
44
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greatest influence in the fonner Soviet Union space referred to as the near abroad
(blizhnee zarubezh 'ie). Russia not only inherited the traditions of the sovereign rule,

but also the asymmetric ambiguity of the RSFSR's internal structure. As I have
mentioned, contemporary Russia is not the USSR, nor is it the USSR's static and
solid fragment. In the early twenty-first century, Russia's internal space remains
fragmented, and the federal center is aggressively mediating the process of the
enlargement among the 89 Russian regions.

In the years immediately following the declaration of independence of the
RSFSR, the signing of the Federative Treaty, and the adoption of the Russian
Constitution, the federal government signed power-sharing agreements (treaties) with
half of the Russian regions. 45 The delegation of broad autonomy from the center to
regions was a landmark of Yeltsin's presidency. The first treaty was concluded with
Tatarstan on February 15, 1994 to contain the strong independence (and secession)
demands of the Tatar nationalists. It was followed by the so-called parade of
sovereignties: 2 more treaties were inked in 1994,4 in 1995, 17 in 1996, 12 in 1997,
and 6 in 1998. By the time of the Russian financial crisis and default in August 1998,
a total of 42 individual treaties and 46 federal-regional treaties were enacted. 46
Overall, Yeltsin's policy towards federalization in tenns of allowing the subjects to
take "as much authority as they could swallow" prevented further breakup of the
45 Federation Treaty. signed in Moscow on March 31, 1992, declared RSFSR's independence from the Supreme Soviet
authority. Online at http://www.cityline.ru/politikaldoc!fd.html(in Russian}. The Treaty reflected the struggle for
political leadership between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Yeltsin effectively used the regions' aspirations for greater
autonomy and independence against Gorbachev. The Treaty was signed by all of the RSFSR's constituencies except
the Republics of Chechnya and Tatarstan.
46 Full list of Treaties is available in Russian online at http://www.citvline.ru/politikaireg/dogovory.htmIAmong other
regions, three matryoshkas - Perm' Oblast' and KPAO, Irkutsk Oblast' and U-OBAO, and Krasnoyarsk Krai and
Taimyr and Evenkia - signed power-sharing agreements with the Federation.
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state. However, his policy failed to adequately resolve the territorial and political
disputes in the North Caucasus. Chechnya found itself in the position to claim the full
status of Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) upon the return of Chechens deported to
Central Asia during World War II and separation from the Checheno-Ingushskaya
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR).47 The newly established Russian
Federation lacked the political leadership to quell rebellious Chechnya, one of its 89
constituencies, peacefully. The conflict deteriorated into a bloody war as Russia
remained determined to retain the full territory it had inherited from RSFSR. Ten
years into the disastrous military standoff, the status of Chechnya in the Russian
Federation remains uncertain.

In retrospect, it is undisputable that the 1990s Russia was a state of weak
central authority and rule of law. Unable to deal with the growing centrifugal
processes in the country, the "generous" delegation of federal authority might have
been one of the few, if not the only option short of force, to preserve the integrity of
the state through turbulent times of change.

47 While ASSRs were fonned as ethnic constituencies within the RSFSR, SSRs were fonned in large ethnic republics
with international borders as constituencies of the USSR. ASSR could petition for the upgrade of their status to SSR, if
they satisfied the general Soviet requirements for SSRs - ethnic (titular) nationality's population of over one million, a
majority of titular nationality in total ASSR's population, absence of ethnic republic of the given ethnicity elsewhere in
the Union, and existence of international borders in the ASSR. Upon the breakup of the USSR, and secession of the
Georgian SSR, the Chechen ASSR satisfied the requirements. Had it been granted the SSR status, it could then
legitimately seek secession.
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GOSUDARSTVENNOST' AS LINCHPIN OF PUTIN'S DOMESTIC
POLICY

Since Yeltsin' s resignation, the tide of the parade ofsovereignties changed, as
the federal government's policy has been redirected at countering the forces of
decentralization. Putin's first electoral campaign was launched under the slogan of
gosudarstvennost' - the notion of statehood and rule of law, implying the idea of a

stronger state. 48 Putin has taken several practical steps to bring this idea of statehood
to life.

First, upon the beginning of his first term and based on strong national
support, the second Chechnya military campaign was initiated after three years of
uneasy coexistence of the Republic and Moscow. The purpose of the ongoing
campaign was to enforce the Russian rule over the rebellious constituency. Second,
six months into his tenure, in May 2000, the President signed a decree dividing the
federation into seven federal districts ifederal'nye okryga) , and presidential special
envoys (polnomochye predstaviteli, or polpreds) were delegated to each of them to
ensure the compliance of the regional legislation to the constitution and the federal
laws. 49 This new tier of federal government, closely corresponding to Russia's
division into military districts and court districts, and overlapping the economic

48 See detailed discussion on the concept of Putin's gosudarstvennost' in John Squier, Civil Society and the Challenge
of Russian Gosudarstvennost, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 10, Issue 2, Spring 2002, p. 166-182.
49 Institute of polpreds created a new tier of executive power. Unlike Yeltsin' s presidential representatives to regions,
polpreds to the federal districts are positioned higher in the executive branch. They retain closer ties to the president,
and maintain distance from regional governors. For a detailed analysis on Putin's refonns, see James Alexander,
Federal Refonns in Russia: Putin's Challenge to the Republics, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 12, No.2, Spring 2004, p. 233263 and Robert Sharlet, Resisting Putin's Federal Refonns on the Legal Front, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 11, Issue 3,
Summer 2003, p. 335-342.
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districts established during the Soviet period and the interregional economic
interaction of the last fifteen years, was established to ensure the regional compliance
with federal legislation, primarily the Constitution. Federal Districts (FDs) have
become a "virtual scaffolding" for rebuilding the Russian state (see Map 3, p. 173io.
Since 2000, the institute of polpreds, appointed from among the most trusted of
Putin's associates, has grown substantially stronger. Third, the establishment of the
FDs was followed by the reform of the upper chamber of the Russian legislature, the
Federation Council (Soviet Federatsii) by which the governors were effectively
replaced by regional representatives in this federal body. Fourth, in March 2004 the
administrative reform advanced further through the reorganization of the executive
branch as the number of federal ministries was halved. Finally, the biggest cut to the
power of the regions was implemented in September-December 2004, in the
aftermath of the Beslan school terrorist attack. The latest reform replaced the
elections of regional governors by popular vote with the system of presidential
appointment upon the approval of regional legislatures. 51 In addition, large-scale
federal and regional budgetary reform, reform of social security and state benefits,
and reform oflocal (municipal) government are being implemented throughout 2005.

In this context of swift changes in the Russian political power structure, the
enlargement of Russian regions comes as no surprise. Launched in November 2003

50 Hill and Gaddy suggest "Federal Districts are simply another effort to create artificial connections across Russian
territory." In Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the
Cold, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2003, at p. ) 16.
51 A number of scholars argue that federalism form from separate states and confederations in response to security
threats. Possibly, Putin's admission to state's weakness after Beslan has boosted the enlargement drive. See, for
example, Peter H. Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, p. 247. Albert
V. Dicey takes the notion of federalism further and views it as a transitory stage between separate states and unitary
states, in Kempton and Clark, p. 20. Possibly, the enlargement of Russian regions would add validity to his claims.
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with a referendum on the establishment of Permskii Krai by merger of two subjects of
the Federation - Penn' Oblast' and Komi-Pennyatskii Autonomous Okrug (KP AO),
it is planned to continue in 2005. The pilot merger project to fonn Permskii Krai
would be officially completed on December I, 2005 with the "elections" of the
governor and the legislature of the new region.

THE REGIONAL ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

Russia's internal borders inherited from the RSFSR and their refonn have
been a source of debate since the breakup of the USSR. The borders, many argue,
were suitable for the RSFSR as a nominally federative republic and were operational
units under the system of top-down administrative control. 52

There are four major currents in the regional enlargement debate. They are
proponents of unitary state, supporters of the present administration's policies,
advocates of enlargement for personal and corporate gain, and those who oppose
enlargement.

Proponents of unitary state in Russia are usually left-wing parties, nationalist
sentiment of the population, and a significant portion of the population, particularly
those who spent considerable parts of their lives in the USSR and are reminiscent of
the security and stability of life in the centralized communist system. In addition,
52 Gennady Oleinik, the Chainnan of the Federation Council Committee on the Northern Areas and Small Peoples, in
"Ychastniki "Kruglogo StoIa," Posvyashennogo Ykrupneniu Regionov RF, Predosteregaut ot Pospeshnogo
Ob' edineniya Rossiiskikh Regionov (Participants of the "Round Table" on the Enlargement of Russian Regions Warn
Against Hasty Enlargement), RIA Novosti, July 15, 2004. Also see James Alexander, "Federal Refonns in Russia:
Putin's Challenge to the Republics," Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 12, Issue 2, Spring 2004, p. 233-263.
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some representatives of Russian intelligentsia and monarchists view a unitary state as
Russia's salvation. As early as 1990, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a literary Nobel Prize
laureate, contended that "the body of Russia is cracked" and that it should embark on
an evolutionary path towards a unitary state" in order to preserve its statehood.

53

Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma and the Head of
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), has long suggested the simplification of
the national-territorial division of Russia through a transition to purely territorial
division into nine or fifteen gubernias, and consequently - to a unitary state. He
contends that the creation of seven federal districts should be the first step in this
process. Zhirinovskii argued that this change would be aimed at "liquidation of
interethnic disputes, suppression of national separatism, optimization of the economic
development of regions and intensification of interregional ties.,,54 Although
Zhirinovskii mentions the economic argument for enlargement, like most politicians,
he doesn't spell it out. His rhetoric is based on the intrinsic great power chauvinism,
which has been fuelling his electoral votes since the early 1990s. Vladimir Shumeiko,
former Chairman of the Federation Council of Russia, takes a similar approach:
"because of various historic, demographic, geographical, economic, military, and
political causes, only Russia can become a nucleus of the new system of states on the
territory of the former USSR.,,55 To him, the starting point for preparing Russia for its
new historic role of a unifier of Eurasia is the strengthening of the federal power in
Russia through "reduction of the number of constituent parts by merging them."
53 In Vera Brychyova, Oleg Gorbatov, and Elena Korotrova, "Gubemskii Peredel" (Rearrangement ofGubernii),
Moskovskii Komsomolets, July I, 2003.
54 Vladimir Zhirinovskii: Rossiya Idyot k Sozdaniu Unitamogo Gosudarstva. Vmesto 7 Federal'nykh Okrugov Budet
15 Gubemii (Russia Moves Towards the Creation of a Unitary State. 15 gubernii will Subsitute 7 Federal Districts),
March 30, 2004, www.regnum.ru
55 Interview in Kommersant, No 184, October 3, 2000.
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Many current federal-level political figures agree with the course on
enlargement of regions or appear to have taken a neutral conformist stand on the
issue. Both positions are supportive of Putin's administration policy. The latest Duma
elections of November 2003 have turned the Russian Parliament into the rubberstamp
of the executive branch. The executive branch, formally headed by a prime minister is
in fact subordinate to the President and his administration. The centrist propresidential majority in the Duma is represented by the largest Russian political party
United Russia. Its dominance guarantees that almost any legislation, including that

regarding the enlargement of regions, submitted by the President, PM, or ministers
would be approved. However, even some non-centrist politicians support the
enlargement process. Irina Khakamada, former Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma
and an active right-wing po1itician56 , believes that the regions of Russia should be
enlarged to enhance the governance of the country because "the president doesn't
have enough time to meet with eighty-nine regional leaders. ,,57 Khakamada also
recalled the positive experience of the twelve economic associations in 1990s, and
argued that their contours could serve as basis for creating twelve subjects of the
Federation with numerous functions and vast autonomy. However, her former Union
of Right Forces Party (Soyuz Pravykh SiT) co-chairman Boris Nemtsov, who was also
governor of Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast' and deputy premier of Russia, has expressed
the opposite opinion: "enlargement of regions would impede the interaction between

Liberals are regarded as right-wing politicians in the Russian political spectrum. Zhirinovsky's LDPR in fact used to
be a left-wing party until it grew overly confonnist towards the center, which is somewhat neutral and increasingly propresidential.
57 I
. 10
. Regnum News Agency, May 30, 2003, www.rcgnum.ru
ntervlew
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the people and the power; it would be harder to reach the governor of a large
region.,,58

A number of political and economic players have attempted to hijack the
policy of the Putin-Kozak tandem, and harness the enlargement drive to serve their
causes. This group primarily includes oligarchs, their lobbyists, and some powerful
governors of non-ethnic constituencies. The debate particularly heated up since the
introduction of seven federal districts, and a number of new merger proposals
immediately followed. Aman Tuleev, Governor of Kemerovo Oblast', contends that
Russia needs no more than fifty subjects, which are to be formed by merger of
regions of "interconnected and complementing industrial structure" in order to
simplify governance. 59 He further emphasizes that the autonomous okrugs ought to be
merged first. Tuleev's argument is grounded in more or less objective economic
assessment of the federal structure of Russia, pragmatic regional policy, and his
personal goals to facilitate the development of transportation infrastructure at the
expense of the federal government. Such developments would enable him to ship
Kuzbass Basin coal across Eurasia faster and cheaper.

Several more "exotic" plans have been proposed for the future territorial
division of Russia. Vyachslav Bel'dei, Aleksandr Sobyanin, Vladislav Turabov and

Interview in Nizhny Novgorod, June 18,2004, online at www.regnum.ru/news/279976.html.
Aman Tuleev was among the first regional politicians to implement enlargement by creating an economic
organization known as "The Siberian Accords" (Sibirskoe Soglashenie) in 1990. He also advocated the idea of regional
enlargement during his presidential campaign in 2000. Inna Kovina, "Dva Pishem - Odin v Yme, iii Nyzhna Ii Rossii
Administrativno-territorial'naya Reforma," (Writing Two - Keeping One in Mind, or Does Russia Need Administrativeterritorial Reform), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 23, 2004, online at www.rg.ru/2004/03/23/tuleev.htmITuleev is the last
governor who was originally appointed by Yeltsin in mid-l 990s.
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German Khrustalyov are the architects of one of them. They propose to redraw the
existing seven federal districts and create fifteen FDs to be headed by polpreds with
vast authority.6o Among other districts, they particularly advocate the creation of the
Northern Federal District to include St. Petersburg, Leningrad Dblast', Pskov Dblast',
Novgorod Dblast', redistricted Archangelsk Dblast', and new Nenets Krai, Taimyr
Krai, and Kolyma Krai with the district's capital in St. Petersburg. With Khrustalyov,

whom I met when he was the Chairman of the Russian Political Movement
Dbshestvennoe Soglasie (Public Consent), now being the deputy director of Norilsk

Nickel in Moscow (MFK Noril'skii Nickel'), the ultimate objective of the proposal to
redraw FDs in such manner is clear. It is an attempt to lobby for the natural
monopoly's interest. The intention must have been to stop the City of Noril'sk from
integration in Krasnoyarsk Krai and thus to protect the regional nickel oligarchy
under the pretext of development of the Russia's North through its integration.
Noril'sk, a city built in permafrost next to Russia's largest nickel deposits,
subordinates directly to Krasnoyarsk and its charismatic businessman-turnedgovernor Aleksandr Khloponin. 61 Khrustalev's plan to divert the city from the control
of the south is doomed to fail since the enlargement of the Krai through merger of
Taimyr, Evenkia, and Krasnoyarsk will put Norilsk under firm control of the enlarged
regIOn.

"15 Okrugov Rossii," (15 Russia's Districts), Regnum News Agency, April 8, 2004, Online at
www.regnum.ru/news/243722.html
61 Khloponin headed Noril'skii Nickel before he was elected governor of Krasnoyarsk. The City of Niril'sk was
transferred under direct Krasnoyarsk control by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1953.
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The refonns do have some relatively strong opponents, including regional
governors who are reluctant to part with their fiefs and the accompanying federal
privileges and region-based natural monopolies willing to maintain their
advantageous resource bases and market networks. These groups, along with the
remaining right-wing politicians are the only "true" Russian federalists. Many of the
ruling regional elites and businessmen would be unlikely to support the regional and
federal initiatives unless sizeable economic benefits are involved. This holds true for
popular governors of resource-rich regions, for example, governor Yuri Neelov of
YaNAO and Aleksandr Filipenko of KhMA0 62 . Russia's ethnic republics and some
autonomous okrugs (AOs) also express their opposition. It includes the Buriat
republic and AOs that have been expressing their desire to fonn a single Buriat
Republic rather than be merged with ethnic Russian-dominated oblasts and krais. 63
Before the creation of Federal Districts and the introduction of the mechanism of
appointment of governors, other ethnic republics, particularly the Republic of Sakha
(Yakutia) and the Muslim republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan balanced between
the policy of decentralized federalism (devolution) and full independence (secession).
Their position on the enlargement of regions and establishment of unitary state in
Russia has always been outright negative.

Some federal executives also oppose enlareement. Deputy Head of the Central
Administration of the Russian Ministry of Justice for the Republic of Dagestan
(Glavnoe Upravlenie MinYusta) Sabir Davudov suggests that there are too many
I discuss the case of KhMAO and YaNAO in the subsequent chapters.
Buriat constituencies include U-OBAO (in Irkutsk Oblast,), Buriat Republic (Buriatia), and Aginskii Byruatskii AO
(in Chita Ob/ast).
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sensitive ethnic issues involved in the enlargement process, and that the enlargement
should not be a simple "arithmetical" task. 64 Moreover, he contends that the
governance of the large and unpopulated northern regions would actually become
harder should the regions merge. Sabirov's arguments are based on the facts that
Russia is an extremely large multinational state, where certain non-immigrant
ethnicities have been compactly residing in their respective territories for centuries,
and that Russia has its own unique path of development. The notion of the
"uniqueness of Russia" is a common argument used to dismiss both Western
(democratic) and Eastern (authoritarian) paths of development models for Russia.
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Sabirov, however, does not dismiss enlargement based on socioeconomic necessity
and through referendum. Like many, he opposes the Zhirinovsky-style plans to
redraw Russia's internal borders arbitrarily (arithmetically).

Despite strong opposition, Aleksandr Kazakov, the Chairman of the
Federation and Regional Affairs ofthe Federation Council, voiced one such proposal.
Meeting with journalists on May 20, 2004, he proposed to divide Russia based on the
model of Catherine the Great - into twenty-eight gubernii. 66 Among others, he
proposed the creation of North Caucasus (Severo-Kavkazskaya) gubernia to include
the republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia, and
Stavropol' Krai with a capital in Stavropol'. Such proposals are premature, if not
Interview with Sabir Davudov by Regnum News Agency, April
19, 2004, online at
www.rcgnum.ru/ncwsi248767.html
65 To justify Russia's backwardness, or an irrational act, Russians often reference a famous proverb "Umom Rossiu ne
poniat', arshinom obshim ne izmerit. ", It is well summarized in Winston Churchill's famous description of Russia as of
"a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
66 "Novyi Variant Administrativno-Territorial'nogo Deleniya Rossii," (New Variant of the Administrative-Territorial
Division of Russia), Regnum News Agency, May 20,2004, online at www.regnum.ru/news/264405.htmland Aleksei
Pavlovskii and Natalia Svyatoslavskaya, "Ug Rossii Hotyat Podelit' na Tri Chasti," (Russia's South May Be Divided in
Three Parts), Kommersant Volgograd, No 91, May 22, 2004.
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outright dangerous, as they clearly do not enhance the prospects for the peace process
in Chechnya. Further, Kazakov takes a more pragmatic and rational stand and
outlines three issues linked with the enlargement of regions. First, he argues that the
existing number of subjects is simply too large to manage in terms of harmonious
vertical and horizontal federalism. Second, the existence of complex regions with
autonomous okrugs (slozhnosostavnye sub 'ekty) breeds numerous economic, social,
and governance problems. Third, regions should be self-sufficient not only in the
juridical framework of the constitution, but be able to fulfill their federal and regional
functions. 67

Finally, President Putin believes that "merging some regions is justified," and
that "the purpose of merging the two regions (Perm Oblast' and KP AO) is to create
broader opportunities for their economic and social development and increase the
effectiveness of the regional and local authorities' work.,,68 The chief of presidential
administration, Dmitry Medvedev, supports the President's position. Speaking about
the future "face" of Russia, he accentuates that "the idea of the enlargement of
regions is a variant of thoughtful development of the federation within the framework
of the existing Constitution.,,69 Most federal politicians, including the Duma speaker
Sergey Mironov, the Chairman of the Federal Elections Commission Aleksandr
Veshnyakov, and the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Russia Vyacheslav Lebedev
contend that the enlargement is justified as long as it is conducted in compliance with
Sergey Medvedev, "Matryoshka Ukrashaet Federatsiu," (Matryoshka Decorates the Federation), Rossiiskaya
Gazeta, April 1,2004, online at www.rg.ru/2004/04/0Ilregion.html
68 In the Spotlight, October 31,2003, Official Website of the President of Russia. Online at
www.krcmlin.ru/cng/tcxtlthcmcs/2003110/312052 54807.shtm1
67

69 Valery Fadeev, "Sohranit' Effektivnoye Gosudarstvo v Sushestvyushikh Granitsah," (To Preserve an
Functioning State in Present Borders), Interview of Dmitry Medvedev in Expert, # 13 (460), April 4, 2005.
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the federal law and through referendum. Andrei Klimov, one of the drafters of the
merger scheme for Perm' Dblast' and KPAO has suggested that the number of
Russian regions would decrease to 60-65 by 2008 (See Table 1, p. 175).70 That is the
year Vladimir Putin' s second presidential term will expire.

Overall, the openness of the regional enlargement debate is encouraging, as it
would hopefully result in a more balanced and pragmatic policy. However, politicians
are not the only actors in the enlargement process. The overwhelming majority of
them agree that the ultimate decision of the enlargement is made by the citizens of the
respective regions through a referendum. According to the December 2003 VTSIOM
poll, 62 percent of Russian citizens view regional enlargement as a positive idea
while only 17 percent express a negative attitude towards it (see- VTSIOM Survey,
p. 39). I treat this survey data with caution because, as later chapters and conclusions
show, the survey results may be quite inaccurate. I doubt that polls were conducted in
resource-rich regions and in regions of the Southern FD, as their standing on the
enlargement tends to be negative. Moreover, Russia's North Caucasus republics
express their resolve to further break up (in case of Karachaevo-Cherkesia and
Kabardino-Balkaria) or to secede from the Federation (in case of Chechnya), rather
than to merge and form larger constituencies. Russia's ethnic republics may take a
neutral stand on the enlargement as long as it does not infringe their territorial
integrity. 71 The smaller ethnicity-based constituencies - autonomous okrugs - tend to

Tamara Shkel', "Edinaya Rossiya" Pravit Geografiu," ("United Russia" Corrects Geography), Rossiiskaya Gazeta,
April 15, 2004, Online at www.rg.ru/2004/04/l5/edinaja.html
71 Strong proponent offederalism Stoliarov, who also serves as First Deputy Representative of Tatarstan to the
President of the RF in Moscow and maintains ties to Tatarstan's President Shaimiev, suggests "perhaps it would be
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look towards the prospects of enlargement more favorably. Being among the poorest
regions in the Federation, they see little political risk in enlargement, and hope that
their merger with the richer neighboring constituencies would stimulate their
economies.

Attitude of Russians towards the Enlargement of Regions
Positive, because it would cut down the bureaucratic apparatus and enhance
Russia's governance
Positive, because it would provide an opportunity to increase the
effectiveness of solution of economic and social problems locally
Positive, since it would allow to unite peoples of similar cultural and
national traditions
Negative, since it would require amending the Constitution and may
negatively affect the socio-political stability of the state
Negative, since it may further increase the gap between the "rich" and the
"poor" regions
Never thought about it
I am indifferent
Hard to say

%

31
23

8
8
9
18
9
9

Source: "Ukrupnenie Regionov: Podderzhka Rossiyan Garantirovana" (Enlargement of Regions: Support of Russians is Guaranteed),
VTS/oM, Press-release # 41, December 8, 2003
All-Russia Center for Study of Public Opinion (VTSIOM) conducted an express-poll asking Russian citizens the following
question: "What is your attitude towards the decrease in the number of the Russian regions by merger (enlargement) of some of
them~"

The poll has shown the majority of Russians (62 % against 17 %) have a favorable attitude towards this idea. A third of the
respondents believe that it would cut down the bureaucratic apparatus and enhance Russia's governance. Another 23 % envision the
opportunity to increase the effectiveness of solution of economic and social problems locally.
The all-Russia poll was conducted on November 15-16,2003 in 100 inhabited locations in 39 oblasts, krais, and republics
of Russia. 1600 people were polled at location of their residence. Statistical error does not exceed 3.4 %.

necessary to alter the status of some of the constituent parts by merging them in order to fonn larger economic
fonnations." Stoliarov, 2003, at p. 171. Clearly he is not referencing Tatarstan.
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AUTONOMOUS OKRUGS: BRIEF HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS
IN THE FEDERATION

All cases of regional enlargement studied in this paper involve the complex
subjects of the Federation - oblasts or krais and autonomous okrugs. It is essential to
review the nature of autonomous okrugs and their current status in Russia to understand
why they are the first (and possibly the only) regions headed for merger.

Stalin first established autonomous okrugs 72 as administrative-territorial units of
the RSFSR in the 1920-40s to accommodate culturally distinct and compactly residing
ethnic minorities, whose geographic location and population did not satisfy the criteria
for assigning them a status of ASSR or SSR. 73 Stalin considered aboriginal cultures of
some ethnicities inferior and underdeveloped in relation to other cultures of the USSR.
There were two major reasons for this. First, these ethnicities still practiced paganism and
many of them led a nomadic life. Soviet policy was very intolerant towards religion and
promoted scientific atheism, and the emerging authoritarian state was anxious to establish
total control over peoples' residence and movement. 74 Second, according to Marx, their
society had not passed through the evolutionary stages necessary for a socialist revolution
(even the Russian Empire was not "mature" enough for the revolution). Many of the
ethnic groups of the north and Siberia were neither agrarian nor industrial societies due to

72 Originally, autonomous okrugs were named national okrugs (natsional 'nyi okrug). They were renamed
"autonomous" with the adoption of the last Soviet and RSFSR Constitutions. Apparently, this change was instituted to
emphasize relative autonomy of the okrugs and de-emphasize their ethnic component. It remained in constituencies'
names regardless (Komi-Permyatskii, Khanty-Mansiiskii, and other).
73 Their constituencies did not border foreign states, and their titular populations were less than one million, although
they constituted the majority in the autonomous okrugs before the establishment of prison camps and the major
resettlement of other ethnos to the North and to the Siberias.
74 Stalin's policy of education and integration was suppressive and discriminatory towards the traditional cultures of the
autonomous (national) okrugs. Their collectivization, Russification, and Sovietization were conducted by major
propaganda campaigns. See Poster I on p. 169.
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their geographic isolation and harsh environment. Therefore, new Soviet institutions were
required to facilitate their integration. Establishment of autonomous okrugs as subunits of
larger ethnic Russians-dominated regions created such institutions.

The nested nature of the ten AOs in the RSFSR's structure was maintained until
the disintegration of USSR, with Russia inheriting the territorial-administrative structure
of the RSFSR. Fearing further disintegration, it promptly reconfirmed the state's
federated nature, first, in the Union Treaty (Federative Treaty) and then in the
Constitution. AOs gained the momentum to declare their independence from their host
regions to be constitutionally recognized as independent federative units. At the same
time, AOs partially retained special relations with their host regions. These relations,
according to Article 66-4 (see Appendix 4, p.164), "may be regulated by the federal law
or a treaty between the bodies of state authority of the autonomous area (AO) and,
accordingly, the bodies of state authority of the territory or region (krai, oblast ')." AOs
can form equal partnerships with their host regions. Constitutionally, matryoshkas are not
included into one another. This norm was confirmed in the ruling of the Constitutional
Court of the RF, which clarified that "AO's location in krai or oblast' or AO's secession
from it does not affect its legal constitutional status (konstitutsionno-pravovoi status) as
well as on the legal-national system (natsional'no-pravovoe ustroistvo) or the
composition of the RF; AO's location in krai or oblast' does not stipulate acquisition of
its territory, which is a composite part ofthe RF.,,75

Ruling on the status of Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, May 11,
1993, VKS, 1994, # 2-3, p. 54)
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There are now ten AOs in Russia, but only Chukotskii AO is a fully independent
region. The other nine are parts of matryoshkas. There is a total of seven matryoshkas in
Russia. Their number is to decrease to five upon merger of two AOs (Taimyr and
Evenkia) with Krasnoyarsk Krai and one (KPAO) with Perm' Oblast '.

The Constitution does not specify relations among the other five types of regions.
None of them are considered nested within other regions. According to Article 5-1 of the
Russian Constitution, the state consists of "republics, territories, regions, cities of federal
importance, an autonomous region and autonomous areas (okrugs) - all being equal
subjects of the Russian Federation" and, according to article 5-4, equal among themselves
and with relation to the Federation. Despite the established equality among the subjects,
article 5-2 makes the first distinction among the regions. While "republics (states) shall
have own constitution and legislation," the other five types of regions "shall have
charters and legislation." Also, they are not referenced as "states" in parenthesis. This

raises the question of the equality in status: if indeed all regions were equal, why would
they be assigned different names with republics nominally possessing attributes of
sovereign states? Moreover, it raises the question about the meaning of the "state
integrity, the unity of the system of state authority, the division of subjects of authority
and powers between the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and bodies of
state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation, the equality and self-determination
of peoples in Russia," established in article 5-3.
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Indeed, major differences exist in status of the subjects of the federation despite
their declared equality. Inequality among them is often attributed to the Soviet ethnic
policy and planned economy. Present inequality (vertical and horizontal asymmetry) is in
addition the result of the 1990s parade of sovereignties. The early post-Soviet leadership
neglected to take the regional reform to the constitutional level and showed its incapacity
to adequately address the secessionism in the young Federation. Federal asymmetry
deepened across the state, and Yeltsin's poorly formulated regional policy culminated in
the war in Chechnya.

On the political front, regional policy was often conducted independent of federal
policy and in disregard of Russia's Constitution. Some regions developed close ties to the
federal government, while others estranged themselves from federal affairs. On the
economic front, some regions like the City of Moscow and parts of Khanty-Mansiiskii
AO used their competitive advantages to create booming economies, while economy
stagnated and declined in the majority of regions. Poor, cold, and remote AOs have been
among the worst hit subjects of the Federation. Their nested status in other subjects has
inspired proposals to boost their socio-economic standing by merging with the
neighboring regions. Such neighboring regions are usually the former host regions of
AOs, and are often, but not necessarily, more prosperous. In fact, the enlargement of
regions by merger of AOs and their former host regions is the reversal of the parade of
sovereignties. Should all AOs be merged, the Russian Federation would reinstate most of
the pre-1990 RSFSR internal borders.
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In the following chapters I assess the demographic, political, and economIC
aspects of regional enlargement. Subsequently, I assess the changing status of AOs in
light of the regional enlargement. Finally, I outline the implications of the regional
enlargement on Russia's federal symmetry.
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CHAPTER II. DEMOGRAPHICS OF REGIONAL ENLARGEMENT

POPULATION-TO-LANDMASS RATIO

Population of the Russian Empire coupled with its landmass has always created
advantageous conditions for growth and expansion, the single obstacle to expansion
being the harsh climate oflarge areas of Siberia and the Far East. Division of the growing
empire into administrative-territorial units accounted the population as one of vital
regional characteristics. Population size was factored in for military and taxation reasons.
The status of "gubernia" (super region) was originally granted by the state to a territory if
it satisfied certain minimal requirements. It had to contain a town or city (center, capital)
and at least 300,000 men available for conscription. 76 Subsequently, more criteria were
introduced, and constituencies of different status were created in Russia. As I noted
earlier, throughout the Soviet period certain criteria of size of the population, geographic
location, and ethnic composition were applied to determine status of Soviet Republics,
and units within the RSFSR.

Twenty-first century Russia faces a governance dilemma of governing territory or
people, and of the extent to which the multi ethnic composition of the state should be
imbedded in its federative structure. Should the constituencies be symmetrical in terms of
their area, in terms of their population, or in terms of their ethnic composition? The
76

Hill and Gaddy, 2003, p. 107.
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current government tries to accommodate all three characteristics in a more symmetrical
federation. If this observation is accurate, then enlargement of Russian regions may be
the first logical step towards greater federal control and more efficient governance given
the skewed population-to-Iandmass ratio (See Map 4 p. 174).

I argue that the rapid demographic changes in Russia constitute a significant
factor in the current trend of regional enlargement. Inefficient governance in Russia may
be in part attributed to the asymmetry of regional landmass and population (See Table 4,
p. 179). Given the different impact of the demographic crisis in areas of the country,
different size of constituencies, and the growing asymmetry among them, it is
challenging to choose the rational way to efficiently govern Russia. On the one hand, the
dwindling grip of federal authority over Far Eastern landmass arguably poses a security
threat from China, and, therefore, Russians should resettle border territories. On the other
hand, given the climatic conditions, much of Russia's territory is unsuitable for
accommodation of larger and denser communities. Even should the population of Russia
dramatically increase, much of its territory may always remain sparsely populated.

In this chapter, I assess three demographic aspects of Russian regions that I find
important factors, and, possibly, prerequisites for regional enlargement. I first overview
the current demographic situation in the regions proposed for enlargement. Then I
explore the phenomenon of concentration of population in urban centers as a possible
advantage to the realization of the enlargement policy. Third, I analyze the dilution of
titular (which are also indigenous to autonomous okrugs) ethnicities in the autonomous
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okrugs as a consequence of the enlargement policy. Finally, I assess the demographic

aspect of the enlargement of regions as a factor contributing to greater federal symmetry.

DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS OF THE 1990s

Article 27-1 of the Russian Constitution guarantees "the right to free travel,
choice of place of stay or residence" to every person, legally staying in Russia. However,
population movement across Russia is handicapped by a number of conditions rooted in
the state's size and its geographic and climatic conditions. The vestiges of Soviet systems
of propiska and raspredelenie (registration and allocation or distribution of the
population) further exacerbate population immobility. Russia's economy can hardly
sustain the system and the structure it inherited from the USSR. While the old ties of the
planned economy have been broken and many industries have been shut down or
reorganized, only few new ones have replaced them. The economic conditions don't
create enough opportunity across the state's territory. A number of subjects (and parts of
subjects) of the Federation are simply economically unviable without significant federal
and regional aid.

As a consequence of the economic downturn in the 1990s, the population of
Russia has shrunk. It is estimated to have lost around 3.5 million people since the
breakup of the USSR,
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and as many as 0.7 million people in 2004 alone. The current

population is estimated at 143.4 million people, or about 2 million fewer than the last all-

77

"Death Wish: Russia Appears to Be Committing Suicide," The Economist, October 2, 2004, p. 50.

47

Russia census in October 2002 estimated. 78 Lower birth rates, ageing workforce, and
shorter life expectancy are taking their toll on the country.

Millions of Russia's citizens are "trapped" in their constituencies. Those who
migrate prefer to relocate to regional centers or to Moscow, where economic conditions
for employment are more favorable than in the rest of Russia. 79 Lack of incentives to stay
in provinces is leaving much of rural Russia deserted and drives urbanization. Dissolution
of the system of collective farms (kolkhozy) has virtually paralyzed the agricultural sector
of the economy, and abandoned villages leave large plots of land unpopulated and
unutilized. Formerly state-subsidized small and medium-size towns decline and disappear
from maps. Larger cities, even those built in very cold and remote places, still hold primarily because the subsidies are still in place.

Depopulation of Siberia and the Far East and the Drift Westward

The processes of depopulation, limited migration and urbanization have important
implications for the federation and its constituencies. On the security agenda there is the
possibility of Chinese expansion to the depopulated areas of the Far East. The issue has

78 GosKomStat estimates that Russia loses as much as 0,5 % of its population per year despite increase of migration
from Central Asia and the Caucasus and strong economic growth. See "Informatsiya ofSotsial'no-Ekonomicheskom
Polozhenii Rossii-200S" (Information on Socioeconomic Conditions ofRussia in 2005), "Section VII: Demographics,"
GosKomStat, online at www.gks.ru/bdglfree/bOS OO/lswPrx.dIl/Stg/dO I OliO I 0180r.htm
79 According to GosKomStat, regional migration to Moscow has been positive throughout the last decade and stands at
about 50 000 people in 2003. Saint Petersburg demonstrates a much more modest inflow of people. See "Russian
Federation Statistical Appendix," IMF Country Report No. 04/315, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC,
September 2004.
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been exaggerated and has raised major concerns. 80 There is some migration from China
manifested in the Chinese farmers resettling the otherwise vacated and stagnant villages
of Primorskii Krai. 81 Other Russian regions, like KPAO, Karelia, and Komi, have also
been heavily stricken with the demographic crisis. The federal and regional government
has so far been unsuccessful in countering it.

The government lacks the repressive apparatus and the ideology, so the spatial
depopulation can no longer be addressed with raspredelenie. Moreover, the government
is reluctant to offer economic incentives for relocating people from stagnant regions.
Instead, it is doomed to sustain the ageing immobile population in places of their current
residence. However, since it is extremely expensive to maintain life-supporting
infrastructure in the North and the East, the federal government has introduced relocation
programs. These programs designed to move people from the North to Central Russia
have been funded since early 1990s, but remain limited in their scope. 82 If the programs
succeed, the state would be challenged with another problem - governance of
depopulated areas. It is a common belief that, if left ungoverned, the territories would be
resettled by foreigners and that this would eventually lead to loss of some of the Eastern
territories. Elsewhere in Russia, partiCUlarly in the North, depopulation is rapidly
becoming an issue of efficient governance. The question of whether depopulated
territories are worth being governed as separate constituencies with federal representation
remains unanswered.

See, for example, Marina Grekhova and Denis Chuprov, "Malen'kii Kitai" (Small China), Expert-Sibir', No. 33 (47),
November 8, 2004.
81 See, for example, James Brooke, "New Face of Farming in the Russia's Far East. Rich Land Draws Reverse
Migration," The New York Times, July 8, 2004, p. W 1.
82 See Expert, No 26, July 12-18,2004, p. 68-73.
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In the following paragraphs I overview recent changes in the demographics of the
three matryoshkas proposed for enlargement. All three cases fit into the general
demographic trends of the post-Soviet Russia.

Perm Matryoshka

The population of Perm' Ob/ast', including KPAO, decreased from 3,100,000
people in 1989 to 2,819,421 in 2002. The change in population has been different
throughout the region. While the population of the region has decreased by over a quarter
of a million people, the population of the City of Perm' has only shrunk by some 89,000.
An even greater contrast is obvious in comparison of Perm' and KPAO. Between
censuses of 1989 and 2002, the population of KP AO has decreased by 14.2 percent,
while the population of Perm' Oblast' only shrunk by 7 percent. 83 Migration from other
regions of Russia has been insufficient to replenish the numbers lost to the demographic
crisis. Migration increase between 1991 and 2000 has been estimated at +7.3 percent
people for Perm', and --4.5 percent for KPAO.84 Migration from the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) is a fairly recent phenomenon in the region. The overwhelming
majority of foreign labor migrants work in Perm' and other cities of the Oblast'. Rural
areas and KP AO are unattractive destinations for them.

83 Yekaterina Dobrynina, "V Osobo Krupnykh Razmerah. Sliyanie Regionov Nachali s Pemlskoi Oblasti. ProblemyVperedi" (In Very Large Quantity. Merger ofRegions is Started in Perm' Oblast '. Problems Lie Ahead), Rossiiskaya
Gazeta, March 6, 2004. Online at www.rg.ru/2004/03/26/perm.html
84 Migratsionnaya Situatsiya v Regionah Rossii. Vipusk 1: Privolzhskii Federal'nyi Okrug (Migration Situation in
Russia's Regions. Issue I: Volga Federal District), S. Arboletovskii and Zh. Zaionchkovskaya (Eds.), Moscow, 2004,
p. 52-53.
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Irkutsk Matryoshka

All Far Eastern and Eastern Siberian regions are net donors of population as a
result of the Westward population drift. The Eastern "giving zone" stretches from
Kamchatka to Krasnoyarsk and constitutes 60 percent of Russia's landmass while
accounting for only 10 percent of the population. According to Demoscope Weekly, a
Russian demography magazine of the Academy of Sciences, net migration from Irkutsk
Dblast' amounted to 11.5 percent between 2001 and 2003. 85 The figure would have been

higher had Irkutsk been situated further to the East. Located in the center of Siberia, it
collects migrants from most of the constituencies to the East of it. Many migrants don't
stay in Irkutsk, and continue their movement westwards to Krasnoyarsk Krai, Tyumen'
Dblast', and over the Urals to European Russia. Over the last decade, it has been able to

compensate only half of its population loss. U-OBAO has also been losing population. Its
deteriorating agricultural economy is not attractive for migrants, and, in any case, can
hardly sustain growing population. Thus, the population is gradually declining in both
regIOns.

Tyumen'Matryoshka

Unlike Perm' and Irkutsk regions, Tyumen', KhMAO, and YaNAO remained
sparsely populated outposts of the Russian Empire (Tobol'sk) and homes to indigenous
ethnicities of the North until after the introduction of autonomization policy in 1930s.
The figure includes transit migration from other regions to the East of Irkutsk. "Migratsia v Rossii: Zapadnyi Dreif'
(Migration in Russia: The Drift Westwards), Demoscope Weekly, N 185-186, January 10-23,2005. Online at
www.demoscope.ru/ccnter/rass/rassylkaI85.html
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Growth of Western Siberian cities didn't take off until significant oil and gas deposits
were discovered in the 1960s. The oil towns grew extensively throughout the 1970s and
1980s, but their population growth has dwindled after all major oil and gas field had been
tapped. The areas have once again become attractive for migration in the recent years. In
2003 alone, high salaries have attracted 6, 097 people to KhMAO, 427 to YaNAO, and
4,457 to Tyumen'. 86 Although much of migration is seasonal or bears a "transit" or
"flushing" character,87 and the local population is plagued by low birth rates and drug
abuse, the region currently demonstrates a net population increase. As a result of
collectivization, industrialization, and poor environmental conditions, traditional nomadic
lifestyles of indigenous peoples of Western Siberia have been disrupted. The indigenous
(titular) population of deer on which they subsist has declined, and so have their own
numbers.

MERGERS OF REGIONS AS MERGERS OF CITIES

Like houses in Russia that are often only Potemkin facades, regions are also only
colored areas on Russia's administrative map. Russia's space is extremely localized and
is very uneven. "What is painted in one color on the map and is called "the subject of the
Federation," in reality represents city No 1 and city No 2.,,88 These localities and the
difference among them may be unnoticeable as a result of regional statistical estimation.
However, they drastically differ in their development and by a number of other
parameters.

MERT data. As cited in Expert No 26, July 12-18, 2004, at p. 71.
Thousands of people travel to Western Siberia to earn money, and then return to European Russia. Yet thousands
transit through the area en route from Eastern Siberia and the Far East.
88 Vyacheslav Glazychev, "Kapitalizatsiya Prostranstva" (Capitalization a/Space), Expert, No I, January 12-18, 2004,
p. 100-104, atp. 101.
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Over the last fifteen years, population distribution has become increasingly
skewed towards larger cities, particularly Moscow, and some regional capitals. An
urbanized state, especially a mono centric one like Russia, may prove easier to govern.
The level of urbanization in regions and concentration of population in regional capitals
is particularly high in a number of Russia's Northern and Eastern constituencies,
including Perm', Yekaterinburg, Tyumen', Krasnoyarsk, and Irkutsk. In fact, the
oversized Northern cities like Perm' and Irkutsk account for as much as a third of
regional population. Russian regional capitals, shaped by planned economy and the size
of the Soviet military-industrial complex (VPK), often combine the roles of political,
educational, cultural, financial, and manufacturing centers in their regions.

The uneven concentration of human resources and financial capital in regional
centers can be advantageous for the federal and regional governments. This advantage
can be reduced to a simple formula: Those who control the regional capital, control the

region (See Table 5, p. 180). If the state (or regional government) wants to be successful
in pursuit of their agenda, like the enlargement of regions, the control of regions' capital
city may prove significant enough to gain political and financial support in order to swing
the vote in favor of their plan or candidate. It appears to be even easier to accomplish
since the introduction of the new system of appointment of governors and substitution of
position of elected city mayors with appointed city managers in some regional centers.
Thus, the task of the proponents of merger is spatially simplified. It may be enough to
control and merge regional capitals to merge the regions.
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Perm'Matryoshka

There are a total of eight cities in Perm' Oblast' with a population of 50,000 or
more. The single city in KPAO is its capital Kudymkar with 31,914 people. Perm'
Dblast's urban population currently stands at 73.9 percent, and KP AO's at 26.3 (See

Table 5, p. 180). The settlement pattern creates favorable conditions for conducting
referendums in Perm'. Conditions are less favorable in KP AO. With half of the oblast's
population and capital concentrated in three cities - Perm', Berezniki, and Solikamsk,
regional enlargement campaigns could be, and were, largely limited to these three cities.
Given that larger cities are initially quite autonomous within their regions, their
electorates would not be much concerned if their region merges with the neighboring
okrug or not. In fact, most of the population never even suspected that KP AO had been

an independent subject of the federation throughout the 1990s. Since the impact of
merger on these constituencies appears to be minimal, and given the large scale of the
enlargement campaigns in these localities, the positive result of the pilot project of
regional enlargement had been guaranteed. The support of the merger had been
overwhelming in both constituencies.

The merger of Perm' and KP AO may not yield significant economic benefits for
the larger region. However, it will definitely help the newly formed Pernlskii Krai to
slightly increase its population. In 2002, officials in the City of Perm' had to incorporate
neighboring satellite towns and villages into Perm' to maintain the status of a
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"millionaire city" (city with a population of over one million). Upon merger, the
population of the merged region would amount to 2,819,421 people. However
insignificant, the additional 136,076 would reinforce the region's position as fifteenth in
Russia by population. Municipal reforms and labor migration from Central Asia and the
Caucasus may maintain Perm's millionaire status at least until the next census.

Irkutsk Matryoshka

The formula that the control of the largest city entails the control of the region is
not applicable to Irkutsk and U-OBAO. There are seven cities of over 50, 000 in Irkutsk
Oblast '. However, unlike Perm', the regional capital is smaller, accounting for 24.3

percent of the population. U-OBAO is entirely rural. Its capital, Ust' -Ordynskii with a
population of 13,200 has no city status. Both territories are hard to control because of the
even population distribution among the urban areas in Irkutsk Oblast' and
deconcentration of rural population in U-OBAO. With the absence of a single major
center, a referendum on regional enlargement is unlikely to yield numbers similar to
Perm' in terms of both participation and support for enlargement. While Irkutsk is a large
capital city of 593,604 people, alternative centers exist in the region:Angarsk and Bratsk
are both half the size of Irkutsk. The total urban population of Irkutsk Oblast' is 83.7
percent.
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The demographic crisis has had a different impact across ethnicities. The
population of the ethnic republics in the South continued to increase after the breakup of
the USSR despite war in Chechnya and widespread political and economic instability.
Population of Ethnic Russians, which constitute over 85 percent of total Russia's
population, as opposed to about 50 percent in the USSR, decreases. Small indigenous
peoples, residing in autonomous okrugs, have experienced one of the greatest net
population losses in the short-term. Historically small in number, even a minute loss of
population can prove disastrous for their communities.

Studying Soviet federalism, Philip Roeder references the abolition of the KareloFinnish Republic. He predicts "demotion to the status of an autonomous republic" should
it fail to maintain "titular nationality's numerical predominance within a republic and
allow the replacement of the ethnically exclusive cadre by one of more diverse ethnic
composition."s9 Similarly, the enlargement of regions in modern Russia may prove
politically tragic to some of Russia's indigenous peoples. The federal government tends
to put the issue of ethnic self-determination of small ethnic groups secondary to the
landmass and population (and economy) of their autonomous okrugs. The overall neglect
of nationalities issues in Russia was demonstrated by the abolition of the Nationalities
Ministry in March 2004 with its functions of regional economic development transferred
to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MERT). It was reinstated in the
aftermath of Beslan as the Ministry of Regional Development. 90
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Roeder, 1991, p. 224
Some functions of regional economic planning and execution of regional development programs are still retained by

MERT.
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Mergers of regions are diluting national and cultural autonomy of Russia. I would
not argue the respective cultures of the small Northern (indigenous) peoples of KomiPermyaks, Khanty, Mansi, and Nenets would be suppressed in any way. On the opposite,
mergers may give them additional economic security and even insignificantly enhance
their socioeconomic standing. However, the proportional "weight" of their votes in
regional legislatures would decrease along with their overall representation (See Table 3
and 3-A, p. 177 and 178). The cultural uniqueness of indigenous ethnicities of the AOs
will be erased from the political map of the Russian Federation as a result of regional
mergers. Thus, the federative principle of unity in diversity will assume a simpler form.
For the time being, the titular ethnicities of the ethnic republics will retain a degree of
autonomy in Russia, while titular ethnicities of the autonomous okrugs would become
politically marginalized. Thus, the principle of unity in diversity will be partially
sacrificed for the purposes of creating a more horizontally symmetric federative state.

Perm' Matryoshka

According to the 2002 Census data, KP AO's titular ethnicity (Komi-Permyak)
constituted 59 percent of the population. Russians, the second largest ethnicity
constituted 38 percent. Perm' Oblast' is predominantly Russian (87.6 percent) with some
presence of titular ethnicities of the nearby ethnic republics (See Table 3 and 3-A, p. 177
and 178).
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Despite the ethnic character of KP AO's status as a subject of the Federation, the
ethnic factor seemingly played an insignificant role in the enlargement process. A decade
of economic and political crisis has left the region desperate for investment and growth.
According to federal and regional officials, merger with Perm' Oblast' is projected to
increase the socioeconomic well being of KP AO and the enlarged region as a whole. The
Komi-Permyak majority (59 percent) is being diluted in the Russian majority of the
enlarged Permskii Krai. Being the largest ethnicity in the small autonomous okrug,
Komi-Permyaks are now the third largest ethnicity in the region - after Russians with 85
percent and Tatars with 4.9 percent. Since the merger of Perm' and KP AO was
implemented as a pilot project, other poor autonomous okrugs may soon follow.

Irkutsk Matryoshka

In terms of population, U-OBAO is somewhat similar to KP AO. However, its
ethnic mix is different. A sizeable population of ethnic Buriats makes up the second
largest ethnic group after Russians - 39.6 and 54.4 percent respectively (See Table 3 and
3-A, p. 177 and 178). Upon the disintegration of the USSR, Buriat people were among
the first to express their resolve to pursue greater autonomy and independence. Moreover,
they intended to create a single Buriat autonomy (state) by uniting the three ethnic Buriat
constituencies - U-OBAO, Aginskii Byruatskii AO, and the Republic of Buriatia. If
implemented, incorporation of U-OBAO into Irkutsk' Oblast' would handicap the Buriat
ambition to unite, and would probably make it outright impossible in the near future.
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Tyumen Matryoshka

KhMAO and YaNAO are official homes to the indigenous (titular) groups of
Khanty, and Mansi (KhMAO), and Nenets (YaNAO). Unlike titular ethnic groups of
KPAO and U-OBAO, these groups are underrepresented in their constituencies prior to
enlargement. (See Table 3 and 3-A, p. 177 and 178). In KhMAO, Khanty is only seventh
largest ethnicity with less than 1 percent of the total population; Mansi is ninth largest
ethnic group and is on the verge of disappearance. Their total population in the enlarged
region is only 10,561, while Khanty population is larger and stands at 26,694. Nenets has
a relatively large population of 5.2 percent in YaNAO, and is the fourth largest group.
Also, Nenets have sizeable populations in the neighboring regions, particularly in
Dolgano-Nenetskii and in Nenetskii Autonomous Okrugs. However, in the enlarged
region it becomes a marginal ninth largest group.

Enlargement of regions would have no significant impact on ethnic minorities of
Khanty and Mansi, but it will on the ethnic Nenets. They, like Buriats in Eastern Siberia,
would have to give up their aspirations for a unified Nenets region. Dolgano-Nenetskii
AO has already merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Nenetskii AO may merge with
Archangel'sk Oblast '. As in the case of Buriats, regional merger will effectively prevent
the aspirations of the indigenous peoples for a unified ethnic homeland.

ROLE OF DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR IN THE ENLARGEMENT OF
REGIONS
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The Russian population is unevenly distributed across its vast space. The creation
of fewer regions through merger is grounded in the argument that regions should be
governed in an expedient manner. By this logic, sparsely populated areas should not have
federal status of representation in the federal legislature regardless of their economy and
landmass (See Table 4, p. 179). As it is clear from the table, more densely populated
constituencies (Perm') have fewer representatives in legislature per capita, but more
representatives per square kilometer. Ratios change with the change in population density
and in area of a constituency. However, population of Russia is not only unequally
distributed among constituencies. Almost always it is concentrated in particular areas
within them. Thus, representation at the regional level may in fact reflect the actual needs
of a constituency and be balanced and proportionate. At the federal level constituencies
are not necessarily represented because of their population or area size. Often their status
is a result of historical processes and the right of self-determination and autonomy
previously granted to ethnic minorities in the RSFSR.

The demographic situation in the merged regions and in those proposed for
enlargement is quite different. While all constituencies have experienced a demographic
crisis since the breakup of the USSR, Eastern regions (Irkutsk) are the hardest hit.
Population is somewhat sustained by in-migration. Regional enlargement may
significantly increase the region's territory and population in the case of Tyumen'
matryoshka. In fact, its merger would create one of the largest regions of Russia in terms

of popUlation, as well as landmass and per capita income. In two other cases - Perm' and
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KPAO and Irkutsk and U-OBAO, regional population and area increase only marginally.
However, even a small increase may sustain the size of populations until next census.

91

The efficient governance argument may be a strong justification for merger of
Perm' Dblast' and KP AO. KP AO is a sparsely populated and small subject of the
federation. However, the argument may prove strongest for Irkutsk, because of the fact
that U-OBAO is an even smaller and all-rural constituency. If KPAO had borders with
three regions, including Perm' Dblast', U-OBAO is landlocked within Irkutsk Db/ast '.

The federal and regional government can capitalize on spatial concentration of
people in Perm' and, possibly, Tyumen' Dblasts. However, population is more evenly
distributed across Irkutsk and U-OBAO, where both constituencies lack a single center of
regional power. Possibly, the skewed distribution of population in Perm' and KP AO has
allowed the federal and regional governments to manipulate the constituencies more
effectively and cheaply. The spatial distribution of population has helped the authorities
to test the policy of the enlargement of regions in Perm' and KPAO.

Ethnic Russians constitute a numeric majority in at least half of Russia's ethnic
republics. All three cases of the enlargement of regions appear to solidify the numeric
supremacy of ethnic Russians in the autonomous okrugs as titular ethnicities get diluted.
While in the enlarged Permskii Krai Komi-Permyaks will still retain the status of a fairly
large (third largest) ethnicity, their share in the population will decrease from 59 percent
in KPAO to only 3.7 in the Krai. Thus, within Permskii Krai, Komi-Permyaks will
91

Population of oblast ' (or krm) in 2002 = population of oblast' (or krai) + population of okrug in the next census.
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become what Valery Tishkov defines as a "double minority," or a minority at both the
federal and the regiona11eve1. 92 Moreover, Komi-Permyaks will have no subject of the
Federation of their own elsewhere in Russia. The only one they had would be merged
with Perm' Db/ast '.

I have estimated the proportion of ethnic Buriats to drop from 39.6 percent in UOBAO to 3.1 in the enlarged Irkutsk' region. Moreover, merger of Irkutsk and U-OBAO
would make the idea of Buriat unity in the Russian Federation an impossible task in the
foreseeable future.

The issue of dilution of titular ethnicities is least acute in Tyumen', KhMAO, and
YaNAO. Already marginalized indigenous populations would continue to lose their
political power despite the existence of special arrangements between them and the
regional and federal governments.

Mergers of Perm' and KPAO and Irkutsk and U-OBAO seems justified from the
standpoint of horizontal federal symmetry. Merger of Tyumen', KhMAO and YaNAO
may create an oversized and economically strong region. 93 Despite the relatively low
population density and the spatial character of its development, appearance of a merged
region of such scale in Russia can hardly be attributed to the state's goal to rearrange
Russian internal borders in a more consistent symmetrical way.

For a detailed study of the concept of double minorities, see Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict in
and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame, London, Sage, 1997, at p. 241.
93 Tyumen's population after merger would be 3,264,841 people. Over half of Russia's constituencies now have a
population of 800-900000 people. In Aleksandr Potemkin, "Men' she Regionov - Sil'nee Strana" (Fewer RegionsStronger State), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, December 8, 2004. Online at www.rg.rul2004/12/08/rcgiony.html
92

63

I suggest that, if regions merge in all the three cases, the Russian Federation
would demonstrate its disregard for the right of small indigenous populations to selfdetermination. The federal principle of unity in diversity would be undermined, because
the titular ethnicities of the autonomous okrugs would lose the limited access to political
power they were able to enjoy in the RSFSR and in the fifteen years following the
signing of the Federative Treaty. Political clout would no longer complement their
cultural uniqueness and autonomy. This trend signifies change of emphasis in the Russian
federal division from ethno-federalism to administrative-territorial federalism.
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CHAPTER III. POLITICS OF REGIONAL ENLARGEMENT

The principles of the 1993 Constitution provide for Russia's status as a federated
state, and guarantee its ethnic constituencies the right to self-determination short of
secession. Therefore, the state's supreme law stipulates a democratic principle of "unity
in diversity" in the Federation. By guaranteeing "equal" status and representation to all of
its asymmetric constituencies, the weak central state created an extremely asymmetrical
federative political system in the 1990s. The system, created to prevent Russia from
disintegration, was designed unsustainable for normal development of the state. The
federation needed to be rebuilt. This asymmetry was exacerbated by the war in
Chechnya, which put large parts of the Southern Federal District under federal military
rule and brought chaos to the political and economic life of the region. Together with the
economic "baggage" of RSFSR's planned economy, unbalanced fiscal and budgetary
relations between center and periphery, and widespread corruption, the system lacked
minimal cohesion and order.

The asymmetric nature of regions reemerged on the state agenda upon the
recovery from the default of the summer of 1998. The strengthening state required
change in the existing system of federative relations, in which a number of regions
enjoyed vast authority and had multiple benefits but few obligations.
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Russia's federal government failed to resolve the issue of separatism in the North
Caucasus by force. Despite introduction of federal districts and polpreds, it also failed to
effectively contain regional power of ethnic republics and economically strong regions by
peaceful means of renegotiating their power-sharing treaties. Reinstatement of the
supremacy of the Russian Constitution was finally achieved during the first few years of
Putin's presidency. However, this development alone was clearly not enough to maintain
the integrity of the federation and the authority of the federal government. Therefore, the
components of gosudarstvennost' and the rule of law were insufficient to build a strong
state that the government had envisioned. Multiple territorial challenges to governing
Russia persisted.

The system formed under Yeltsin proved to be a rather effective temporary
construct to absorb the shocks of the breakup of the Soviet empire. The threats of further
disintegration in the 1990s were countered with decentralization. However, it is also the
external security that keeps federations together and strengthens them. Russian security
dilemma is neither strictly internal nor external. The threats are of a peripheral nature.
They originate in the spread of militant Islamic ideologies from the South, the ongoing
instability in the Caucasus, and the inability of the federal enter to control remote regions.

The federal government will have more power within a more homogeneous and
symmetrical federation. 94 I suggest that, with that in mind, Putin and his associates have
planned to opt for more symmetry to replace the existing disorder. Thus, the move from
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Watts, 1996, p. 31
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creating symmetry by drawing federal districts is evolving towards the enhancement of
symmetry within federal districts and across the Federation.

Since complete redrawing of borders would have put the system under great and
unnecessary stress and fueled a new wave of secessionism by ethnic republics, the
government has decided to approach the problem of symmetry from the other end. It has
chosen to deal with existing regions by merging the smaller with the bigger and the
poorer with the richer. 95 The enlargement of regions appears to be the easiest solution to
Russia's governance dilemma, and, possibly, as a shortcut to establishment of a more
symmetrical federation.

PERMSKII KRAJ AS A PILOT PROJECT OF REGIONAL
ENLARGEMENT

Lands around Perm' (Perm' Velikaya), which included the present Perm' Oblast'
and Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous Okrug (KP AO), were officially incorporated in
Russia in 1478. KPAO was formed as a national okrug on February 26, 1925, to become
the first national okrug established in the young Soviet Russia. In 1977 its status was
nominally changed to autonomous okrug, and in 1993 it became an independent (from
Perm' Oblast') subject of the Federation. The December 7 2003 referendum reunited
KPAO with Perm' Oblast' by merging the two subjects of the Federation and the
formation of Permskii Krai. 96 Thus, KPAO became Russia's first autonomous okrug in
terms of both attainment and cession of its status (See Table 2, p. 176).
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At present, ethnic republics are not negotiating enlargement.
Andrei Brazhitsa, "History of Komi-Permyatskii Okrug," online at www.gazeta.ru

67

The initial proponents of the idea of merger of Perm' and KP AO are impossible to
identify. Although concepts of redrawing Russia's internal borders have been disputed
since the rise of nationalist tensions in late USSR, they never specified the methods or
sequence of restructuring. Possibly, the idea to single out Perm' and KP AO as a testing
ground and merge them through referendum originated somewhere in the federal
government. In this and subsequent chapters I examine the enlargement process in terms
of its top-down or bottom-up character. After all, the new law on local self-governance
devised by Kozak makes provisions for abolition of autonomous okrugs as federal units.
At the same time, enlargement can ultimately take place only if approved through
regional referendums in the merging regions.

A curious aspect of regional enlargements is the federal government's official
"hands-off' policy.97 President Putin, the Chairman of VTSIK Aleksandr Veshnyakov,
and other top-level state officials have constantly emphasized that the enlargement of
regions is a bottom-up political process. They allege that, although the regional
governments might initiate it, the ultimate decision is the expression of the will of the
populations of the respective constituencies. However, federal involvement is obvious,
especially in the initial steps towards merger.

Upon the establishment of federal districts, President Putin revived the discussion
of restructuring Russia's federal-regional relations and the regional enlargement. He
See, for example, In the Spotlight, October 31,2003, online at
www.kremlin.ru/eng/textlthemes/2003/1 0/312052_54807.shtml President Putin contends "there should be noting
forced about this (enlargement) process."
97

68

urged the strong regions to support the poor and heavily subsidized regions. Federal
initiatives began to materialize at the regional level with the signing of the Agreement on
Realization of Priority Trends in the Treaty on Relations between the Governing Bodies
of Perm' Dblast' and KPAO in 2002. 98 This document triggered the setting up of a trimember administrative work group consisting of federal bureaucrats and representatives
of the two constituencies for working out the expediency of merger. The group also
prepared legislation for merger. Subsequently, a civil coordination council, chaired by a
Federation Councilman's deputy Ivan Chetin, was created to determine the status of
KP AO in the merged region. Later, on June 26 2003, enlargement was supported by a
unanimous vote at the meeting of representatives of all levels of KP AO. The federal
government did not hesitate to start merging its representative bodies of the two regions
before referendums were conducted in the regions. The last important step of the
preparation for the enlargement was the visit of Vladimir Putin. The president made stops
in regional capitals of Perm' and Kudymkar, met with regional leaders, and promised an
extensive federal aid program.

The federal government paid close attention to the merger with President's aide
Vladislav Surkov appointed to supervise the process. The federal center had to ensure
that the referendum would go smoothly and yield a desired result: set the precedent of
regional enlargement through merger of an autonomous okrug with a "parent region.,,99
The referendum on enlargement was thoughtfully scheduled to coincide with the State

"Soglashenie 0 Realizatsii Prioritetnykh Napravlenii Dogovora ob Otnosheniah mezhdy Ogranami Gosudarstvennoi
Vlasti Permskoi Oblasti I KPA0 na 2002 god, " author's personal copy.
99 In May 2003, Validate Sociological Services conducted preliminary opinion polls in all KP AO's districts and
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concluded that as many as 68 percent of the voters would support the enlargement.
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Duma elections on December 7, 2003. This ensured a higher turnout of over 60 % in
Perm' and 70 percent in KPAO. The results were impressive. In Perm' Oblast' as many
as 84 percent of the voters supported the merger. In KP AO this figure stood at an
impressive 90 percent of the voters. 100

There are various reasons why Perm' and KP AO were chosen as a pilot projects
of regional enlargement by the federal government. The primary reason was the
confidence in successful outcome. Indeed, a great number of local, regional, and federal
resources were pulled together to ensure the "yes" vote.

One of the most favorable conditions was the close and fruitful cooperation of
regional elites with each other and the federal government. Both governors were ready to
"sacrifice" their posts for the enlargement project as they would have lost their positions
upon completion of merger. A new governor of the enlarged region would then be elected
(rather, according to the new law, his candidacy would be proposed by the president and
approved by regional legislative body).

The support of the enlargement in Perm' Oblast' was largely the result of its
governor's efforts. Indeed, Governor Yuri Trutnev was a charismatic figure in Perm'
politics, and retains influence to this day. 101 Voters believed that if the governor
advocates for the merger, it must bring positive change, particularly in the economic
100 Starting in 2006, Russian federal elections, regional elections, and referendums will only be conducted in October,
December, and March. The new law, passed in the Duma in May 2005, is aimed at cutting electoral campaign

expenditures. I argue that "synchronization" of elections would implicitly increase turnout fight and fight voter apathy.
Elections results available online at www.regnum.ru
101 Upon the successful completion of the merger, he was appointed the Minister of Natural Resources of Russia in
March 2004, the only former governor in the top echelon of the executive branch ofPutin's government.
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sphere. Curiously enough, seems like many voters in Perm' didn't realize that KPAO had
been an independent subject of the federation for over a decade, and, therefore adopted
the governor's position with ease.

In 2002, KPAO's governor Gennady Saveliev was elected on the promise to
mediate merger of Perm' and KP AO. However, the actual economic benefits that the
merger was to entail were never articulated. Still, the positive outcome of voting in
KP AO was grounded in the hopes for the better economic future. The hopes of the
electorate were especially high in the aftermath of Putin's visit to the capitals of the
merging constituencies one month prior to the referendum. The economic arrangements
and the incentives from the federal center are discussed in the next chapter.

The national (ethnic) aspect of the enlargement was also addressed. On October
30, 2003, seventeen national organizations of Perm' and KP AO circulated a joint

statement urging citizens to take part in the enlargement referendum. Community leaders
of regional ethnic groups, including Komi-Permyaks, stressed the multiethnic character
of Perm' and KPAO. They described the regions as "united by a common ethno-cultural
space, where the greatest resources to be preserved and multiplied were peace and
concord, friendship and mutual understanding."lo2 In addition, thirty-two initiative groups
were formed to campaign for the enlargement. lo3

Posted online by the Regnum News Agency www.regnum.ru/news/174113.html Also available at www.krai.pemuu
"Storonniki Permskogo Krays Sozdali 32 Initsiativnye Gruppy" (Supporters ofPermskii Krai Have Formed 32
Initiative Groups), Regnum News Agency, October 30, 2004. Online at www.regnum.ru/ncw~174Il3.html
\02
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First of all, governors of merging regions lose their posts and are succeeded by
one new (appointed) governor. It is yet unclear how the new legislature of the Perm Krai
will be formed. According to the legislation developed at the time of the referendum, a
new governor of the merged region was to be elected in December 2005. Legislative
bodies of the enlarged regions were to be restructured after the elections for governor.
According to the new system of appointment of governors, a candidacy submitted by the
president should be approved by the regional legislature. If the new legislature shall not
be formed by December, the new governor would be elected. This would make the
governor ofPermskii Krai the last elected governor of a Russian region. 107

The second major governance challenge is the formation of a new legislative
body. Given the size of the current KP AO legislature and the location of the capital in the
City of Perm', it is more accurate to consider the merger of legislatures an acquisition of
the KP AO body by Perm'. (See Table 4, p. 179). While Perm' Oblast's regional
legislature consisted of 40 representatives before merger, KPAO's only had 15. In sum,
the total number of representatives in the new legislature would equal 55. However, the
official laws governing the new legislature stipulate 60 representatives, while the
currently acting legislatures are fighting to raise this number to 80. 108 In addition to the
regional legislature, KP AO shall retain its own municipal legislature (Duma) consisting
of 20 members. Thus, the enlargement will add up to 40 new representatives on both Krai
and former KP AO levels.

107
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The last governor was elected by direct popular vote in YaNAO in January 2005.
It is unclear if a certain number of seats would be reserved for the indigenous Komi-Permyaks.
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According to the ratio of number of people per legislative official and square
kilometers per legislative official, the elimination of KP AO may be somewhat expedient.
However, like elsewhere in Russia, the administrative reform is not decreasing the size of
bureaucratic apparatus. On the opposite, the number of officials per capita will increase
in the larger region (at least compared to Perm' Dblast'). The same ratio would decrease
for KP AO as it becomes a constituent part of Permskii Krai. However, the autonomous
okrug will lose its status as a subject of the federation; its power to dissolve in the greater

Perm' politics. Thus, it is likely to be marginalized even further. According to Kozak's
Reform, Perm' Db/ast' is being redistricted into 294 municipalities.
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KPAO will

become the 295 th municipality of the merged region. In addition, KP AO, as a municipal
administrative-territorial entity will be subdivided into smaller municipalities Kudymkar, and other. Thus, between the merger referendum on December 7, 2003 and
the date of merger of Perm' Dblast' and KPAO on December 1,2005, KPAO undergoes
a transition from being one of eighty-nine subjects of the Russian Federation with federal
representation to one in at least 295 municipalities of Permskii Krai with no direct federal
representation and marginal representation at the regional level.

To summarize the political aspect of the formation ofPermskii Krai, there are two
major sets of issues to be addressed - conditions for successful enlargement, and its
objectives and outcomes.

109 Ol'ga Deriagina, .oNe Lezt' na Rozhon" (Don 'f Askfor Trouble), Novyi Kompan 'ion-Perm', No 20 (361), June 15,
2005.
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There are three conditions that appear vital to successful enlargement. First and
foremost, the displays of mutual resolve for enlargement by executive and legislative
branches of merging regions are important. Political willingness is enhanced if
supplemented

with

cohesive

initiatives

for

enlargement.

Second,

the

federal

government's support of merger by passing relevant orders and adopting laws as well as
provision of incentives is essential. Mergers of regions are impossible without federal
support. Third, thorough organization of referendum campaigns is helpful. Regional and
federal authorities tend to seek support from a wide array of political and social groups from Orthodox Church - to business unions - to civil organizations based on ethnicity,
culture, profession, or territory. To ensure sufficient turnout, it is preferable that a
referendum on enlargement coincides with local, regional, or federal elections.

llo

The

enlargement in Penn' was successful because all three conditions were meticulously
observed.

There are two direct and two indirect outcomes to the referendum in Penn' and
KP AO. First, enlargement enhances horizontal symmetry of the state by merging smaller
"unviable" units with larger and economically sound neighbors. Thus, at least in the case
of Penn', enlargement is a process of acquisition of a small region by a larger region,
rather than a merger of equals. Second, enlargement not only enhances symmetry on the
federal level, but also at the level of federal districts. In the Volga FD it balances Oblasts
(Penn', Samara, Nizhny Novgorod) among themselves and with the strongest of Russia's
ethnic Republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The ethnic Russian-dominated

110 By federal law, 50 percent of eligible voters should vote in a referendum to validate its results. Similar legislation is
exists at the regional level.
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industrial Oblasts become more equal in their size and population. Thus, political
competition is fostered and balance is reached. Disappearance of an ethnically-defined,
albeit small, region from the composition of the Volga FD may give more bargaining
power to its polpred Sergey Kirienko. It may enable him to mount additional pressure on
the increasingly estranged ethnic republics.

The two indirect outcomes deal with the balance among the federal districts and
the federal bargaining power vis-a,-vis ethnic republics. First, enlargement affects
neighboring ethnically defined republics and oblasts with ethnic Russian majority.
Despite traditional political and economic ties between Perm' Oblast' and KP AO,
hypothetically, the latter could have gravitated closer to the ethnic Republic of Komi in
the Northwest. Although Komi and Komi-Permyaks are different ethnicities, they do
share common Finno-Ugric ethnic and cultural roots. The state does not appear to favor
redrawing division into federal districts in favor of titular ethnicities. In order to dissolve
KP AO, it was first placed in the Volga FD, while Komi Republic was placed in the
Northwestern. The merger of Perm' Oblast' and KPAO and the formation of Permskii
Krai has solidified the artificial border between Volga and Northwest. Perm' Oblast'

itself geographically falls into two FDs - Ural and Volga. It was included in Volga FD to
finally kill the ambitions of Yekaterinburg governor Eduard RosseI' to form the Ural
Republic - a union of geographically linked industrial Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg),
Chelyabinsk, and Kurgan Oblasts. 111

III

See, for example, "Sverdlovskii Gubemator Otryoksa ot Ural'skoi Respubliki" (Sverdlol'sk Governor has

Renounced Ural Republic), Kommersant, April 28, 2004. Note that regions with status of "Republics" are all ethnicitybased. Had Rossel' succeeded, the formation of the Ural Republic would have set a precedent offorming majority
ethnic Russian Republics, This would have taken separatism to a new level and threatened the unity of the ethnic
Russian corc of the Federation.
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Penn', and Orenburg oblasts would have had to either join the new region or face
strong political and economic pressure from a wealthy Republic in the East. If fonned,
the republic would have become a very strong union bordering the Muslim Republic of
Bashkortostan in the West, oil provinces of KhMAO and YaNAO in the East, and
independent Kazakhstan in the South. Thus, the inclusion of Penn' Oblast' into the Volga
FD has set off the pull of Yekaterinburg. Therefore, the inclusion of Penn' Oblast' into
the Volga FD and its merger with KP AO has served three goals. First, it has enhanced the
horizontal symmetry among the FDs - Northwestern, Volga, and Ural. Second, it has
enhanced the symmetry within the Volga Federal District itself. Third, it has decreased
the chances of separatism and redrawing of borders in the larger geographic area.

Finally, the second indirect outcome of the enlargement is the enlargement itself. I
argue that after fifteen years of demarcation, it is an important precedent of state
building! If future regional enlargements follow the precedent of Pennskii Krai,
eventually, horizontal symmetry would significantly improve. The containment of
separatism (including ethnic separatism) would spread beyond balancing the ethnic
constituencies at the level of FDs. On the federal level, it would enhance Russia's
chances at successful renegotiation of the status of Chechnya.

It is clear that the regIOn will find itself under more federal control. The

governorship will be a Moscow-appointed position. The Duma will be large, and the
margin of vote for parties to be represented in Duma is likely to increase to 7.5 or more
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percent, giving way to large centrist parties at the expense of small regional, possibly
ethnicity-based, parties. Ethnic diversity, emphasized during the drive to enlargement,
will likely fade in managed democracy and bureaucracy. The political outcome of the
merger has so far achieved dubious results. From the standpoint of politics, the merger of
Perm' Oblast' and KP AO benefits the state as a whole, particularly the federal
government. The merged regions do not gain any political advantages in the enlargement
race.

Irkutsk Matryoshka

Assessment of regional mergers that have not yet taken place is somewhat
speculative. In sections which deal with Irkutsk and Ust' -Ordynskii Autonomous Okrug
(U-OBAO) and Tyumen' and Khanty-Mansiiskii (KhMAO) and Yamalo-Nenetskii
(YaNAO) Autonomous Okrugs, I only overview the nature of problems accompanying
the enlargement. The enlargement debate has been at the center of political agenda in
these regions for several years. The political process that may lead to enlargement of
these regions is the main focus of my research on relations between Tyumen' and Irkutsk
with "their" autonomous okrugs. I also assess the possible changes that it would entail for
the regions and the symmetry of the Federation.

On its surface, the matryoshka of Irkutsk Oblast' and U-OBAO presents a more
solid case for enlargement than Perm' and KP AO. I assess the progress to merger in
Irkutsk through the prism of Perm's experience, analyzed in the previous section.
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Established as a national okrug in 1937, a small rural and agricultural U-OBAO remained
a subunit of Irkutsk Dblast' until 1992. Irkutsk with its strong Soviet-built industrial base
has always dwarfed the okrug. General political and economical data appears to justify
the enlargement: Irkutsk is by far the stronger and larger region in terms of its area,
population, and economy, than U-OBAO landlocked within it.

The enlargement scenario had been originally planned to follow Permskii Krai's
experience. However, the enlargement referendum scheduled for 2004 never took place.
The major cause of the failure lies in the lack of coordination among the regional and
federal elites. As I noted in the analysis of Permskii Krai, enlargement process should be
synchronized in order for a referendum to take place. Commenting on the loss of
dynamism in the enlargement initiative, the chairman of Irkutsk regional legislature
Gennady Istomin notes that "synchronization of action in both Dblast' and Dkrug is as
important as the political will to merge." I 12 Unlike in Perm' and KPAO, Irkutsk and UOBAO have been unable to agree upon the terms of merger.

Legislative representatives of U-OBAO originally backed the enlargement
scheme. Two initiative groups, as opposed to thirty-two in Perm' and KP AO, were
created in U-OBAO to explain the rationale behind proposed enlargement and to
popularize the idea among voters. Subsequently, U-OBAO's legislature backed out,
contending the viability of the proposed status of U-OBAO as a municipality in the

112 "Ob'yedinenie Irkutskoi Oblasti i Ust' -Ordynskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga Mozhet Zatormozit' sa" (Unification of
Irkutsk Db/as!' and U-DBAD May Slow Down), Regnum News Agency, May 14,2004. Online at
www. rcgn l.InLI:\!in_~~:'5L£6()~1). hIm I
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"greater" Irkutsk Dblast '. Seven of the seventeen representatives 113 left the parliament
floor in protest of the change in the U-OBAO's status in the enlarged region. 114 Thus, the
legislature of U-OBAO, a region smaller and poorer than KP AO, expressed its
unreadiness to cede its federal status, and exchange it for a status of municipality.
Paradoxically, should U-OBAO merge with Irkutsk Dblast' and retain its autonomous
status, it would replicate the pre-1991 Soviet practice of incorporation of autonomous
okrugs into oblasts and krais. Clearly, the revival of the RSFSR administrative division is
not in the interest of the federal government, and is not what is expected of the
enlargement. Therefore, balance of the federal and regional interests is yet to be attained.
Otherwise, enlargement would not benefit either the federal government or Irkutsk
Dblast'.

I suggest, that U-OBAO's concerns were not limited to the preservation of greater
autonomy. They also included the lack of federal (and regional) incentives, discussed in
the chapter on economics.

According to the existing initiative, merger ofU-OBAO and Irkutsk would set yet
another example of acquisition as opposed to merger. Given the relative size of the
regions, U-OBAO can't compete for anything but status of municipal autonomy in the
enlarged region. As it has already happened to KP AO, the independent status of UOBAO is to be reduced as a result of incorporation into a region with a clear ethnic

113

Officially, legislature of U-OBAO consists of fifteen representatives. The number seventeen must include the

speaker and the chairman.
114 "V U-OBAO Nachata Rabota nad Novoi Redaktsiei Pis'ma Presidentu RF" (U-OBAO Has Started Work at a New
Draft of the Letter to the President of the RF), Regnum News Agency, May 26, 2004. Online at
www.rcgnum.ru/nG!:Y.~.(26 7532btml
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Russian majority. Russian Duma deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov suggest enlargement is
justified and is not to entail any problems, because there is no risk of separatism. He
contends such risk exists if, for example, Altai Republic and Altaiskii Krai merge. It may
backfire at the Russian Federation because of "strong separatist moods" there. I IS

The sequence of the enlargement process, which was successfully tested in Perm'
and KPAO, has failed in Irkutsk and U-OBAO. Apparently, the failure has indefinitely
stalled the enlargement process: referendum will not take place at least until 2006.

The possible future enlargement of Irkutsk Oblast' and U-OBAO would clearly
solve yet another matryoshka case in favor of the federal government. The federal goals
do not only include greater horizontal symmetry and efficient governance. As in the case
of Permskii Krai, it is also aimed at containing regional ethnic separatism. If U-OBAO
were successfully incorporated into Irkutsk, Buriat aspirations to unite in a single ethnic
region within or without the Russian Federation would be undermined. If another merger
- between Chita Oblast' and Aginskii Buriatskii Autonomous Okrug - were also to be
implemented, the ethnic Republic of Buriatia would be finally doomed to fail its
ambitious plans of the 1990s." 6 As in the case of Perm', the ethnic issues of U-OBAO
would promptly submerge in the everyday governance routine should the enlargement
initiative succeed.

115 HOb 'yedinenie Irkutskoi Oblasti i U-OBAO Ratsional'no i Vygodno, Schitaet Deputat Gosdumy Vladimir
Ryzhkov" (Unification oflrkutsk Oblast and U-OBAO is Rational and Beneficial, Believes State Duma Deputy

Vladimir Ryzhkov), Regnum News Agency, March 17,2003. Online at www.regnum.ru!news!233212.html
116 Like many other ethnic republics, Buriatia declared its independence in early 1990s. Article 60 of the Constitution
of Buriatia defined the region's existence as a manifestation of self-determination of Buriat nation. Separatist moods in
the Republic were quite strong until recently.

81

Siberian regIOns like Irkutsk are highly important to the federal government.
Sheer distance from Moscow - over 5,000 kilometers - allows the region to conduct a
more independent policy. The population is quite skeptical towards federal authority. In
addition to low turnouts at the last Duma and presidential elections in 2003 and 2004,
Irkutsk is more likely to oppose federal initiatives. Latest protests in the region were
organized by the Union of Right Forces in October 2004 to oppose the presidential
initiative to appoint governors. Mocking his policy, protesters suggested appointing
Ksenia Sobchak - a rich celebrity figure - as their new governor. They claimed the
choice to be quite rational, if not ideal, since she is from St. Petersburg, knows Putin, and
is the daughter of his former bOSS.11 7

Despite the economIC incentives, discussed in the next chapter, the state
apparently is unable to exert enough influence on Irkutsk' and U-OBAO to mediate the
enlargement process as it did in Permskii Krai.

Tyumen Matryoshka

Official history of Western Siberia as a part of Russia dates back to 1637, when
the first settlement was founded in Samarovo (present Khanty-Mansiisk). The region
existed as Tobol'sk Gubernia until 1918, when its capital was relocated to Tyumen'. In
subsequent decades the region was reorganized several times. The autonomous (national)

117 Putin worked as a deputy to the governor of the City of St. Petersburg Anatolii Sobchak in early 1990s. Sec, for
example, "V Irkutske Razdavali Listovki s Predlozheniem Naznachit' Gubernatorom Kseniu Sobchak" (Leaflets
Proposing to Appoint Ksenia Sobchak as Governor Were Distributed in Irkutsk), Regnum News Agency, October 28,
2004. Online at w\.I!~regnurn.ru/news/3500()6.htrnl
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okrugs were first created in 1930, when resolution on "Organization of National Unions

in Regions of Residence of Small Northern Ethnos" was adopted. 118 KhMAO and
YaNAO changed their status to autonomous along with the other okrugs in 1977. Upon
adoption of the Russian Constitution (Article 65), the Okrugs gained their independence
from Tyumen' Db/ast '.

The enlargement debate and administrative reform, having touched all
autonomous okrugs, hasn't avoided Tyumen's Northern neighbors. However, having
successfully started, the process

stall(~d.

The primary obstacles to the continuation of the

enlargement are the oil deposits: as much as two thirds of Russia's oil production is
concentrated in these sparsely populated areas (See Table 6, p. 181). Tyumen' Oblast', on
the opposite, is resource-poor, its major assets being agriculture and manufacturing. The
City of Tyumen' has lost much of its clout as a political and administrative center of the
matryoshka to the autonomous capitals of Khanty-Mansiisk and Salekhard. While the
okrugs' coffers are filling with oil rents, the ob/ast's development is slowing down.

However, Tyumen' retains its high rank among Russian regions (See, for example, Chart

1, p. 92). Thus, the enlargement debate is not focused on attaching KhMAO and YaNAO
back to Tyumen' Ob/ast', but, possibly, attaching the ob/ast' to the okrugs. 119

All three subjects of the matryoshka are relatively equal from the standpoint of
federal symmetry. Possibly, each

om~

of them "deserves" to be an independent region.

118 Decree of VTSIK (All-Union Central Executive: Committee) "Ob Organizatsii Natsional'nykh Ob 'ycdincnii v
Rayonah Rasselenia Malyh Narodnostei Severa," December 10, 1930.
119 Yekaterina Kon 'kova, "Matryoshku Hotyat SkJI~it'., (Matryoshka to be Glued Together), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June
4,2004. Online at WW\\'.JMu!2004!06!04!ukrupnenic.htmJ
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Pulling the blanket of political jurisdiction in direction of all three regions simultaneously
cannot result in their successful merger. While the apparent leading region in the past has
always been Tyumen', it is now unclear whether it, as a comparatively poorer region, can
claim the laurels of the parent region.

If merger eventually proceeds as it had been planned in 2002-2003, its benefits
would be reaped by Tyumen' and by the federal government through Tyumen'. The
strength of the oil provinces would be diluted under the control from the capital of the
enlarged region. The enlarged region may become one of the largest, and at least as of
2005 - the richest in Russia. Therefore, I conclude that the enlargement was originally
negotiated without regard to enhanced governance or federal symmetry. Rather, the
nature of reasons for enlargement is economic. I discuss these reasons in the next chapter.

The government appeared quite confident in success of its enlargement policies
throughout Russia when it first "unleashed" the enlargement debate as part of
administrative reform. However, alternative plans of enlargement appeared not only in
form of all-Russia redistricting schemes, but also in opposition to state-sponsored
initiatives. I suggest the process of enlargement stalled in Tyumen' because some
particularly dangerous for central authority plans have publicly emerged. The threat to
federal authority lies in the increase of nationalist attitudes among the otherwise
politically inactive ethnic Nenets. Had their nationalism gained strength, they could have
demanded the creation of a unified etlmic Nenets region in Russia. Considering that large
ethnically defined regions traditionally have status of republics within Russia, and that
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the relations between the federal government and most of the twenty ethnic republics are
complex and tense, the federal government would be likely to oppose any plans of
formation of a new republic. The negative reaction from the federal government would
also be based upon the fact that the territories of the Nenets settlements are rich with
natural resources.

A perfect example of emergence of such scheme was the initiative of the
Association Yamal Potomkam (Yamal to Descendants). It suggested merging all the
Nenets autonomous okrugs - YaNAO, Nenetskii, and Dolgano-Nenetskii (Taimyrskii).12o
Understanding the potential loss of enlargement referendum and tensions with ethnic
Nenets, the government had to respond to the challenge elsewhere. A campaign for
merger of Archangel'sk Dblast' and Nenetskii AO has yet been fruitless. However, it
succeeded in supporting and sponsoring the enlargement of Krasnoyarskii Krai in order
to exclude Taimyrskii AO from the Nenets plans. Thus, the formation of a unified Nenets
region has been contained.

The merger of Tyumen', KhMAO, and YaNAO was abandoned in the summer of
2004, when the three regions signed and ratified a power-sharing agreement among
themselves. 121 The agreement ensures independence of the okrugs from Tyumen' for at
least another five years.

120

"Yamal Gotov k Ob 'yedineniu s Tyumenskoi Oblast'iu" (Yamal is Ready to Unite with Tyumen' Ob/ast'), Regnum

News Agency, February 25,2004, Online at www.regnum.ru/news/222426.html
121 "Dogovor 0 Razgranichenii Polnomochii mezhdu Organ ami Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Khanty-Mansiiskogo
Avtonomnogo Okruga, Yamalo-Nenetskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga, i Tyumenskoi Oblasti" (Treaty on Power-Sharing
among Bodies orState Power orKhMAO, YaNAO, and Tyumen' Oblast'), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, July 22, 2004.
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By merging matryoshkas the federal government preempts the possible future
mergers of ethnically defined constituencies and formation of new subjects of the
federation with status of (ethnic) republics. Now, for example, KPAO would have to
reinstate its independent status to merge with Komi Republic, which is now highly
unlikely. The federal government will take every step possible to integrate and reintegrate
autonomous okrugs with their former parent regions. Similarly, Buriats would be unable
to unite should U-OBAO become an integral municipal autonomy of Irkutsk Oblast '.
Ultimately, the federal government exercises the control over mergers because the
proposed enlargement schemes should gain support of the government and the progovernment majority in the Duma prior to regional referendums.

POLITICAL FACTOR IN THE ENLARGEMENT OF REGIONS

The analysis of the political side of the enlargement in three regions of Russia has
revealed no clear political benefits £or the enlarged regions. In fact, the only winning
party is the federal government. By diluting ethnic autonomy and preventing the crossfederal district integration, the division of the state, by all means, becomes more
symmetrical in the first two case of Perm' and Irkutsk. The case of Tyumen', where a
major factor in the proposed enlargement is probably its resource wealth, is different.

In a process of acquisition, rather than merger, former autonomous okrugs are

being reduced to municipal autonomies. On the one hand, they are becoming units of
municipal (local) administrative-territorial division. On the other hand, they retain a
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degree of cultural and linguistic autonomy.122 Should all okrugs merge with their former
parent regions, a number of ethnically defined regions, as well as the overall number of
regions, would decrease from 31 to 21 (See Table 1, p. 175). At the same time, horizontal
symmetry may be enhanced. The okrugs' loss of constitutional status may increase the
federal bargaining power vis-a-vis Chechnya and other ethnically defIned Republics of
the Russian Federation in the near future.

The enlargement of regions involving autonomous okrugs is a state-orchestrated
process aimed at de-emphasizing the multi ethnic character of the Russian Federation
inherited from the RSFSR. Enlargement makes the federative structure of Russia less
reflective of its multiethnic character as ethno-territorial divisions are substituted with
administrative-territorial divisions. This transition shifts the political focus further away
from ethnic (nationality) issues in the politics of federal-regional relations. In the process
of rebuilding of the Federation, the federal government adopts the tactic of "masking" the
unresolved ethnic questions and the future challenges of the nationalities policy, and the
enlargement of regions is one such measure. 123

It is clear that, should the present line of gosudarstvennost' policy continues, no
substantive power-sharing agreements would be negotiated between the Russian
Federation and its constituencies. The only exception is Chechnya, where reaching
m This kind of autonomy is not political in nature. Rather, it is national cultural autonomy, the principles of which
were formulated in the "Kontseptsiya Gosudarstvennoi Natsional'noi Politiki RF' (Conception oj'the State National
Policy oj'the RF), adopted by Presidential Decree No 909 on June 15, 1996. According to Article 26-2 of the
Constitution, it is a right of all citi7ens and groups of citizens to preserve their native language, their beliefs, maintain
their cultures and traditions. Moreover, article 69 of the Russian Constitution specifically guarantees the rights of the
small indigenous peoples in the RF.
m In a similar manner, the federal government now disguises the reinstated Nationalities Ministry (MinNats) as the
Ministry of Regional Development (Ministerstvo Regional'nogo Razvitiya). See, for example, Fiona Hill, "Governing
Russia: Putin's Federal Dilemmas," New Europe Review, January 2005.
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agreement is urgent. I suggest that the ultimate goal of the federal government is to
address the constitutional status of Chechnya, but only once the rest of the Federation is
rebalanced and the threat of Russia's disintegration is minimized. Politically, the
enlargement of regions, and the decrease of the number of the ethnically defined
constituencies represented at the federal level is a distinct step in this direction.
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CHAPTER IV. ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL ENLARGEMENT

The main argument of proponents of the enlargement of the Russian regions lies
in the economic sphere. As I mentioned in the section on the enlargement debate, federal
government, centrists in the Duma, and a number of political factions and actors across
the political spectrum contend that mergers of some regions would improve the overall
economic situation in the larger regions. Once enlarged, regions would complement each
other's economy and develop more dynamically. Moreover, since most of the executed
and proposed plans involve mergers of poor regions with rich regions, it would also
eliminate a number of poor regions, which are not self-sufficient in terms of their income,
from the structure of administrative division. Rich regions are said to balance
socioeconomic standing of poor regions.

Therefore, according to Russia's leadership, the ultimate product of mergers
would be a more horizontally symmetrical federation. In this section I first overview the
regional asymmetry of Russia and the constitutional provisions for state's economy. Then
I focus on the evolution and current trends of fiscal federalism emphasizing oil as a factor
in the current state-federal relations. Finally, I assess the impact of regional enlargement
on the economic well being of regions, and draw tentative conclusions.
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ECONOMIC ASYMMETRY OF RUSSIAN REGIONS

It is important to assess the economy of the Russian regions to understand the

rationale behind the enlargement. For this purpose, I use four major sources. It is the data
and analysis of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian
Federation (Ministerstvo Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiya i Torgovli (MERl), State Statistical
Committee of the Russian Federation (Gosydarstvennyi Komitet Statistiki Rossiiskoi
Federatsii (GosKomStat), Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (Ministerstvo
Finansov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (MinFin), and the Expert Rating Agency (Ekspert RA).

I use several parameters to assess the economic situation in the regions. The major
indicators are gross regional product (GRP) and GRP per capita. However, GosKomStat
- arguably not the most reliable source, compiles GDP data. Beliaev, for example, doubts
the reliability of this indicator for two reasons. 124 First, prices in Russia can be distorted
as a result of the Soviet planned economy approach, which often includes unjustified
subsidizing of whole sectors of the economy. Second, a large chunk of the economic
activity is in the "shadow.,,125 Beliaev suggests considering the (intensity of) foreign
direct investment (FDI) instead as a variable to evaluate the regional economic climate.
Since my quantitative material is illustrative by nature, I rely on the GRP data of MERT
in my tables, use the Expert RA surveys to complement it, and use a number of other
sources, which include budgets of the Federation and its regions.

124 Mikhail Beliaev, Putin's Russia: Is It a Doable Project? Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 12, Issue I, Winter 2004, p. 13-39.
Clifford Gaddy, Senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, suggests to use "growth of industrial output" as a measure
of regional economy.
125 For a detailed study on this issue, see Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, Russia's Virtual Economy,
Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
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I start with assessmg the overall socioeconomic climate of Russia based on
Ekspert RA eighth annual rating of the investment climate in Russia's regions Russia "Investment Rating for Russia's Regions, 2002-2003,

,,/26

which is illustrative of the

current asymmetry across Russia's vast territory. Researchers of the Agency suggest,
"Russia will never accomplish the national task of doubling the GDP unless similar
ambitious goals are also set at the regional level." Today, fewer than a quarter of Russia's
regions are ready for this task. Expert RA's specialists determine regions' attractiveness
to investment by examining them along the lines of investment risk and investment
. 1 127
potentIa.

While the research concludes that "the investment climate in Russia is stabilizing,
and the number of marginalized regions is declining while the number of "middle-class"
regions is growing," they also note that "only smaller regions, the autonomous subjects of
the federation (okrugs), are exceptions to these general positive trends." In addition, the
research concludes that performance of regional officials "makes the difference,
especially when it comes to investment climate." (See Chart 1, p. 92).

Available online at the "Gateway to Russia" website http://www.gatewav2russia.com!st!art 2183l±J2hn
See Maps of Changes in Potential and Risk Indices 1997/98,2002/2003 and Map of Investment Rating of the
Regions of Russia, 2002-2003, Online at http://www.gatcway2russia.com/st/art 2183~
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I partially disagree with Ekspert's findings. It is quite clear that all seventeen
regions in the chart have two advantages over the majority of other regions. They either
possess a strong manufacturing base (a legacy of the USSR) or substantial deposits of
marketable natural resources (primarily oil, gas, diamonds, gold and other scarce metals
and minerals). It may be reasonable to suggest that bad performance of other endowed
regions can be attributed to their leadership, but the leading positions of the listed
seventeen regions in the Federation are a consequence of their respective endowments. 128

The Expert study describes an interesting find of the "wave effect," which may be
used as an argument for regional enlargement. It suggests, "investment climate is not
only defined by local authorities, but also by neighboring regions." In terms ofpattems, it
suggests "the Russian investment climate gets increasingly worse as one moves east and
south; the waves of economic development expand in concentric rings from Russia's
investment core.,,129 The pull weakens the further the region is from the investment core.
Therefore, if the observation is accurate, then the poorer regions adjacent to richer
128 A small number of regions, for example, Yaroslavskaya Oblast', have succeeded in diversifying economy and
attracting investment However, such cases are exceptional.
129 The investment core includes North-Western and Central Russia.
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regions, like KPAO to Perm', are destined to prosper from their economic pull. However,
while KP AO is among the ten poorest regions, Perm' Oblast' is among the top ten
regions in Russia in terms of the performance of its economy. Pull doesn't always take
the desired economic effect.

Thus, merger is not a necessary tool of enhancement in socioeconomic standing
of regions. Moreover, sometimes pull of investment core doesn't exist because the core is
distant. To facilitate the pull, regions should be merged across borders of other subjects
of the Federation. Since it is impossible to merge, for example, Koryakskii AO and the
City of Moscow, the wave effect argument presents a weak rationale for enlargement.
Koryakskii AO's only choice for enlargement is merger with Kamchatskaya Oblast,.130
Since Kamchatka is a very poor region itself, it is hard to picture that the wave effect
would take place there. It is unlikely to foster short and medium-term economic growth
in merger of poor regions.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR ECONOMY

The advocates of the enlargement of regions suggest that it facilitates the creation
of a single economic space: it unites the economies, which had previously been confined
within their regional borders. In fact, regional enlargement does make a somewhat
plausible argument in terms of the economy of scale, because larger territory nominally
constitutes larger economy. However, this argument for enlargement is quite weak if
approached from the constitutional standpoint.

130

Referendum on merger is scheduled for October 2005.

93

Article 8-1 of the Russian Constitution provides for the single economy. It
guarantees the "provision for the integrity of economic space, a free flow of goods,
services and financial resources, support for competition, and the freedom of economic
activity in the Russian Federation." It is supported by article 74-1, which prohibits
internal customs, customs duties, and other obstacles to free movement of goods,
services, and assets. Indeed, internal borders (among the Russian regions) are nominal.
No customs offices or other obstacles to free movement of goods and services exist.
Moreover, despite the existing constraints referenced in the chapter on demographics, the
Constitution guarantees free movement of people in article 27. Therefore, a simple
merger of some of the regions does not lead to significant enhancement of economic
mobility.

It is a common misconception that Russia has undergone massive privatization,
and that it is ruled by oligarchies. Even before the imprisonment of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky on charges of tax evasion and fraud and partial renationalization of his oil
company YUKOS, Russia was not privatized to the degree that it seemed. While the
majority of the production assets indeed changed state for private ownership, the resource
base of production and manufacturing, as well as much of the transport infrastructure is
still lstate-owned, including property in federal and regional domains. Article 72-1-C of
the Constitution establishes "joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects
of the Russian Federation (over) issues of possession, use and disposal ofland, subsoil,
water and other natural resources." Therefore, property under regional jurisdiction is also
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under federal jurisdiction, and VIce versa. In addition, the federal and regional
governments retain stakes in most of the natural monopolies - oil, gas, diamonds, and
energy. These stakes are coupled with the administrative regulatory power of granting
production licenses and permits, collecting taxes, and controlling monopolies.

In the USSR "autonomy was a way to retain resources at home to avoid
redistributive consequences of all-union policies".l3l In principal, the conditions for
regional leverage over the resources on their territory were even more favorable in the
years following the collapse of the USSR when regions gained even more autonomy and
the richer ones were able not only to retain reSDurces, but alsD tD benefit from them.

Article 9 of the ConstitutiDn declares "Land and Dther natural resDurces shall be
utilized and protected in the Russian Federation as the basis

Df

life and activity

Df

the

people living in cDrresponding territDries." The key phrase here is "cDrresponding
territDries," which implies that regions have no DbligatiDn tD share their natural
geolDgical endDwment. However, it is the federal state that retains Dwnership

Df most Df

the subsoil resources, especially those dubbed "strategic."

Despite the clauses of articles 9 and 72, another constitutional norm granting the
benefits of the natural resourc(:s to the people residing in the endowed region, the federal
government has been revising the regime of the use of natural resources. The first step of
bringing natural resources back under the jurisdiction and ownership of the Federation
was the 1998 ruling of the Constitutional Court that "forests were the public prDperty
131

Roeder, 1991, p. 219.
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Df

the multinational people of the RF.,,132 Thus, the Constitutional Court's decision
interpreted the articles 9 and 72 in favor of the federal government. Although the
Constitution may be interpreted in Constitutional Court rulings and by federal laws, it can
only be changed through a referendum, which was never conducted.

The next step in reclaiming the constitutional rights of the subjects of the
Federation will be the adoption of the new law on mineral resources (subsoil natural
resources), probably by the end of 2005. 133 The draft version of the law rephrases article
9 of the Russian Constitution by substituting the term "corresponding territories" with
"the territory of the RF." Regardless of phrasing, the ultimate purpose of the adoption of
this law is to solidify the federal nature of ownership of natural resources primarily by
stripping the regions of their constitutional rights to prioritize the use of natural resources
for own benefit. 134 Thus, the enlargement of regions is an unnecessary process if its
purpose is the redistribution of the control over natural resources among enlarged
regIOns. The natural resources would be put under the sole jurisdiction of the state,
enabling it to regulate rents and direct their flow. The principle of joint jurisdiction will
be applied from top-down. The federal center alone will determine and assign the
functions that regions will assume in regulating natural resources.

132 Ruling on the Issue of Constitutionality of the Forest Code (Lesnoi Kodeks) of the RF, Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation, January 9, 1998, in VKS RF, No 2, 1998, p. 5-18.
133 Law on Mineral Resources (draft version), the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation, March 5,
2005, Newer versions may be available in Russian online at www.mnr.gov.ru
134 President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev takes the same stand on this issue. See, for example, Mintimer Sahimiev,
"Nedra Dolzhny Rabotat"' (Subsoil Mineral Resources Should Work), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 1,2005. Online at
www.rg.ru/2 00 5iit~iQ I !" h~!ilDjcv .htQll
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FACTOR OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY IN FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY

Less than a decade ago, Russia's federal government was bankrupt. President
Yeltsin was forced to sell the state stakes in major industries to organize a solid elections
campaign and stay in power. In 1996 this policy gave rise to the notorious Russian
oligarchs. The situation in the country has changed. Since early 2000s, the Russian
federal budget maintains surplus. The state created a Stabilization Fund, which
accumulates money at twice the pace it was expected. Russia is paying its foreign debt,
which in 2005 decreased to about 30 percent of the GDP from over 50 percent a few
years before. After the default of 1998, Russian GDP has rebounded and has been
growing at a rate of as much as 7 percent per year. Most of these positive changes in the
Russian economy originate in the state's enormous oil wealth.

Twenty-first century Russia is an energy superpower. It exports as much oil as
Saudi Arabia, or about one third of OPEC's oil exports. In 2004, it produced 457.8
million tons of oil, and exported 257.4 million tons, or 56.1 percent of that amount. 135
Russia's current relative weB being, and its power, may be largely attributed to its
resource wealth, primarily oil and gas, but also to diamonds, and other mineral
resources. 136 The distribution of mineral deposits (and locations of extractive industries)
is confined to a relatively small number of regions and is skewed to the coldest and least
populated areas of Siberia. However, even regions with relatively small deposits of oil

135 "0 Sostoyanii Rynka Nefti v 2004 Godu" (On the Conditions of Oil Market in 2004), GosKomStat, January 2005.
Online at www.gks.ruiscriptsifree/lc.exe?XXXX03F.l.1O.1/0501s0R
136 See, for example, Fiona Hill, Energy Empire: Oil, Gas, and Russia's Revival, London, The Foreign Policy Center,
September 2004. Available online at !.J..t!r1:1ibrookings.cduivicws!articlcs/FhiIl/20040930.pdf
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and gas and other valuable commodities are quite advantageously positioned with respect
to the resource-poor regions. The few exceptions of resource-poor regions that are
economically prosperous are the unnaturally oversized regions - the Cities of Moscow
and St. Petersburg, both indeplmdent subjects of the federation, and, possibly, the City of
Nizhny Novgorod, whose large economically lagging region, however, burdens it. The
only reason why regions lih Khanty-Mansiiskii, Yamalo-Nenetskii, Chukotskii and

Dolgano-Nenetskii Autonomous Okrugs, Republics of Tatarstan and Yakutia, and, for
that matter, Perm' Oblast' have secured their high positions in the socio-economic and
investment rankings of the Russian regions is their "natural" richness. Therefore, the
effective reforms initiated by "strong" and "uncorrupted" regional leaderships should be
perceived as secondary factors to their success.

Table 6 (p. 181) demonstrates the competitive edge of the naturally endowed
regions. As early as 2001 when oil prices were only beginning to grow, the resourcerelated revenues in YaNAO's budget exceeded 30 percent, KhMAO's were almost 20
percent, and Tatarstan's were about 15 percent. At the time, an average share of resourcerelated revenues in regional budgets stood at around 6.5 percent. Given that a significant
portion of revenue comes from sources indirectly related to resource economy, the
figures are quite high. Dependlence of such regions on their resources is very high. The
share of resource-related budgetary revenue for the City of Moscow, the best-performing
Russian region, stands at only 0.2 percent. At the same time, Moscow, and some other
regions are homes to a variety of Russia's major enterprises. The resource-rich regions
only have significant presence of production companies. Their economies are
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undiversified and heavily dependent on oil and other resources. Naturally, they cherish
their only sources of wealth.

Equity is an integral part of federations. It may be divided into two components:
social solidarity (cohesion) on the federal level and conformity of expenditures to local
preferences and ideas of equity within regions. 137 Rich regions are reluctant to share their
resources with the poor regions or the federal government. The federal government and
the poor regions, on the opposite, are interested in creating conditions under which the
endowment of some provinces - translated into taxes and economic growth - is put to the
use and benefit of the federated state and all of its constituencies. Since it is impossible
for the state to overcome the geographical and geological constraints of resource
distribution, it seeks to employ all legal (and, possibly unlawful) means to reclaim the
natural resource rents.138 Its aggressive redistributive policy is implicitly fueled by
resentment of poorer regions vis-a-vis their resource-rich neighbors, over which they
have no political leverage. They argue that the natural resources should not give a
competitive advantage to

tht~

populations that "happen to reside" in the naturally-

endowed regions, and that the rents from the mineral wealth should be collected by the
federal government in full and then fairly redistributed among the subjects of the
Federation. Thus, a greater balance among the poor and the rich regions would be
achieved.

m Alastair McAuley, The Detenninants of Russian Federal-Regional Fiscal Relations: Equity or Political Influence?
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No.3, 1997, p. 431-444, at p. 432.
138 For example, see Clifford G. Gaddy, Perspectives on the Potential of Russian Oil, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 45, No.5, July 2004, p. 346-351.
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In recent years, the extent of regional leverage over the regional mineral wealth
has indeed shifted. Of many taxes that have shaped the budgets of resource-rich
provinces, a single most important tax is the tax on the extraction of mineral resource
(Nalog na Dobychu Poleznylh Iskopaemykh - NDPI). The early-adopted versions of the

Russian Tax Code permitted [legions to retain NDPI in full. In early 2000s, following the
latest spike in oil prices, the federal government realized that it had been losing
significant revenues from oil production and export. To claim a greater share of these
revenues, taxation law was amended to increase the rents and divert them to the federal
budget, and, starting in 2005, all of the NDPI is transferred directly to the federal budget.
There are two "losers" of the diversion process - the private producers and the regional
and municipal budgets of oil and other resource-rich provinces. The most common
argument made in support of federalization ofNDPI is that it is a form of rent, and, since
the subsoil mineral resources: are the property of the state as a whole, it should be
centralized. Since it is property of the state as a whole, no particular population (or ethnic
group) would have a prerogative to utilize natural resources. Rather, rents belong to the
population as a whole. 139

However, the state doesn't have monopoly over the extraction and sale of natural
resources. With an exception of the Russian state natural gas company Gazprom and the
oil company Rosneft', they are produced by a number of private enterprises. Large
resource monopolies, which became known as oligarchies in the late 1990s, tend to
dominate regional production, refining (processing), and distribution markets. Head of

139 See, for example, A. D. Andriakov, "Kak Podelit' Pirog?" (How to Share the Pie?), Interview at Radio Mayak,
August 19,2004. Online at www.radio01ayak.ru!schcdulcs!6821I6793.ht011
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Russian Antimonopoly Service (FAS) Igor' Artemiev admits, "Regions are divided into
spheres of influence among a few resource companies.,,140 He contends that regional
monopolies should not have access to new resources, and that other companies - those
without close ties with regional political elites - should dilute monopolies. The draft law
on Mineral Resources contains a clause, which would restrict regional monopolies from
bidding on new deposits if they already hold over 80 percent of exploration and operation
licenses in the region. Indeed, certain companies have clearly monopolized regional
markets in the 1990s. LUKoil dominates in Komi Republic, Nenetskii AO, Perm'
Dblast', and Volgograd Dblast'. Former YUKOS subsidiaries dominate in Tomsk
Dblast'. Sibneft' dominates in YaNAO and has booked exclusive right to perspective
fields in Chukotka. Even state··owned Rosneft' holds a dominant position in the Northern
Caucasus and Krasnodar Krai.

141

The enlargement of regions along with the measures proposed by FAS may prove
effective in curbing the regional monopolistic dominance, although it would be hard to
alter it. In Perm' Dblast', LUKoil's already effectively controls oil fields, refineries, and
distribution chains. Merger of Perm' and KP AO is likely to only increase the company's
monopolistic standing. It already holds rights to the few oil fields in KP AO, and the
merger will effectively merge not only LUKoil holdings in Permskii Krai, but also all
three of the LUKoil's main Russian on-shore fields - Permskii Krai, Komi Republic, and
Nenetskii AO (see Table 6, p. 181). However, oil reserves of Perm' are only about three

Aleksandr Beliakov, "Minprirody Ne Otdast Nedra Regional'nym Monopolistam" (Minsitly of Natural Resources
Will not Give Resources to Monopolies), Vedomosti, No 177 (1217), September 29,2004.
141 Similar pattern may be found in other extractive industries: in coal industry ~ Tulaugol' in Tula Oblast' and SUEK
in Eastern Siberia; in diamond industry ~ Alrosa in Yakutia.
140
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percent of tapped Russian fields. They have been exploited SInce 1950s, and the
production is not going to increase.

Irkutsk' Oblast' and U-OBAO presents a case similar to Perm' and KPAO. As
noted, U-OBAO is a resource-poor agricultural region, while Irkutsk, on the opposite, is
heavily industrialized and somewhat rich in resources: major aluminum production plant
in the second largest City of Bratsk; Kovykhta gas field is among the East Siberian most
promising deposits to be tapped by TNK-BP and Gazprom; one of Russia's great
Northern Rivers, Angara, is dammed by hydroelectric power stations, generating most of
the region's electricity. Merger would not alter the operation of regional monopolies. The
budgetary extractive industry-related income would increase to 3.3 percent, which is an
insignificant figure even in relation to Permskii Krai and Russia's other resource-rich
regions, making this factor an insignificant goal for enlargement.

The situation is different in the Russia's "oil treasury" of Tyumen' Oblast',
KhMAO, and YaNAO. Merger of this matryoshka would facilitate greater competition
among Russia's large oil and gas companies represented in the region. It is likely to
decrease the level of monopolization in the Western Siberian oil production. However,
there is a major downside to this merger. The enlarged region would account for as much
as 67.7 percent of Russian oil production, as opposed to only 2.2 percent in Permskii
Krai. The regional budgetary revenues from oil would average at over 25 percent, while
the figure would remain at 6.3 percent in Perm'. Thus, the merger of the Tyumen'
matryoshka would create an extremely powerful region.
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Consequentially, the

enlargement plans are likely to fail, as they did in the case of the creation of the Ural
Republic. The federal government wouldn't want to create an industrial region in Russia
powerful enough to dictate its terms to the Federation and to conduct independent
domestic and foreign policy.

Unless the federal government finds mechanisms to effectively keep rich okrugs
in line, their merger would not be likely. The mounting state pressure is noticeable in the
YUKOS affair. Minister of Finance Aleksey Kudrin suggested to the government of
KhMAO to share the 52.3 billion of expectt:d YUKOS' tax return with the Federal
government.
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Kudrin requested 35 billion rubles, or two thirds of the sum to be

transferred to the Federation to form the fund for balance of the revenues of the regional
budgets. 143 Another 7 billion were requested for the federal budget as a two-year
returnable loan. KhMAO has agreed but took a counter action. On March 16, 2005
KhMAO's governor Aleksandr Filipenko announced that the okrug would establish a
stabilization fund, similar to the one which operates in the Federation. 144 Fiscal federative
relations involving oil revenues are quite complex, and may serve as obstacle to the
federal policy of regional enlargement.

Describing provincial strategies in their relations with the federal center, Solnick
suggests that "in the case of the federal bargaining, a bloc of territories able to act
together can make a far greater credible threat of disrupting state affairs than any single
142 "Minfin i Sub'ekty Federatsii Delyat Milliardy YUKOSa" (Ministry of Finance and the Subjects of the Federation
Divide YUKOS' Billions), NeJtegazovaya Vertikal', August 9, 2004. Online at http://ngv.ru/lenta sign.hsgl?id=51252
143 Balance of regional budgets of the subjects of the RF is detennined as a share of regional revenues to regional
expenditures. In 2004 at least 40 deficit regional budgets needed to be balanced with federal money.
144 "V Khanty-Mansiiskom AO Sozdaut Stabilizatsionnyi Fond" (KhMAO to Establish Stabilization Fund), News
Agency Regions.Ru, March 16,2005. Online at www.regions.ru/newsartic\e/news/id!l764444Jltml
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territory acting alone.".145 The creation of such regIOns would have threatened the
balance between the federal and regional power. I am afraid that a similar unwanted
result could actually be achieved had Tyumen' Dblast' merged with KhMAO and
YaNAO. Larger regions may create more favorable conditions for monopolies to
negotiate at the regional level as there would be fewer administrative barriers. However,
monopolies would become more visible for polpreds, FAS officials, and the tax
authorities on the "canvas" of a larger

constitu(~ncy.

Appointment of governors may also

be one of mechanisms to keep the merged region in line with the federal policy.

In terms of both horizontal and vertical symmetry, the enlargement of Tyumen'
would have created a disproportionately large: and economically strong subject of the
federation. The toughness of Putin's vertical of executive power would be put to test if
constituencies as large as Tyumen' matryoshka were formed.

While the Russian budget has maintained a surplus as a result of the high oil and
gas prices, few subjects of the federation were able to extract similar benefits from this
advantageous situation. The exhaustive list of the benefiting regions is limited to a dozen
resource-endowed territories, major refining <centers, the city of Moscow - also the
financial capital of Russia, and the federal government. In addition, the booming oil
industry generated growth in linked industries, which means that the heavily
industrialized regions generally wealthier than the majority of Russia's regions regardless

145 Steven L. Solnick, "'The Political Economy of Russian Federalism," Problems of Post-Communism, NovcmberDecember 1996, Vol 43, Issue 6, p, 13-26.
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of commodity prices are often also the beneficiaries of the oil-fuelled business climate.

146

Therefore, Russia's oil-fuelled economic recovery is not a panacea for the regional
economic troubles. In fact, it only enhances the economic asymmetry among the regions,
and further marginalizes the poor, cold, agricultural, and politically unstable
constituencies. The exhaustive list of these depressive regions includes all of Russia's
autonomous okrugs, except naturally endowed KMAO, YaNAO, and Evenkia (since
2004).147

The positive economIC effects of direct federal interference to redistribute
resource rents and breakdown monopolistic markets may be limited in Perm' and Irkutsk,
but may have impact Tyumen'. However, it is not in the state's best interest to create an
oversize naturally-endowed region in Western Siberia, unless the federal government is
confident that it would be able to influence and veto the region's decisions through
mechanisms of appointment of governors, party list-based elections, as well as
centralization of resource rents.

Centralization of resource rents and dilution of monopolies may spark strong
opposition in regions. While it is improbable in the enlarged Perm', Irkutsk, and even in
Tyumen', it is quite possible in other constituencies. Ethnic republics like Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, and Yakutia are heavily dependent on resource rents, and their political

146 For example, Clifford Gaddy has established a strong correlation between the increase in oil output and
manufacturing of railroad cars, Impact of oil-spurred growth is evident in many Russian enterprises, which were net
loss-makers as late as early 2000s, and are now showing strong signs of recovery,
147 Another exception is Chukotka, the only autonomous okrug to win its full independence, and, therefore, unaffiliated
with either a krai or an oblast', Despite the small population and relative abundance of resources, it runs a high budget
deficit and was declared bankrupt in 2004,
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elites have strong connections with regional oligarchies. These regions may put up a
fierce political fight for their right to use their natural resources.

Also, enlarged constituencies, like Tyumen' Oblast' and Krasnoyarskii Krai may
offset the competitiveness of the naturally endowed ethnic republics on the level of the
Federation. Moreover, dilution of monopolies in the enlarged Tyumen' may be
understood as FAS' threat to republican monopolies - as signal to ethnic republics to
open their monopolized markets to outside companies.

In addition to increased taxation, the federal government has invented two
schemes to divert oil profits and destroy regional monopolies. First is revision of
privatization results, which was effectively deployed to dismantle and renationalize the
YUKOS Oil Company in the infamous back-tax case initiated in 2003. The second has a
more limited and indirect effect. Instead of outright nationalization, it facilitates
distribution of rents over a greater territory through merger of resource-rich with the
resource-poor regions.

DIVERSIFICATION OF REGIONAL ECONOMY AND ENHANCEMENT
OF CONNECTIVITY OF RUSSIA

Enlargement schemes are not limited to balancing the difference of resource
abundance among merging regions, but also pursue two important regional goals. First,
enlargement of regions is aimed at diversification of economies in greater regions.
Second, it enhances the connectivity of the Russian state as a whole by connecting the
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existing and potential areas of spatial development within the enlarged regions. In the
subsequent paragraphs I discuss the underlying reasons for the need to diversify regional
economies and enhance connectivity of the state and the possible effects that the regional
enlargement may have on diversification and connectivity.

Diversification as Panacea against Resource Curse at Regional Level

Russian economIC development has two major constraints - the SIze and
geography of the country, including the location of mineral deposits, and the heritage of
Soviet economic planning (or Gosplan)148 for the location of manufacturing sites. The
most precious and strategic deposits of Russia are dispersed throughout the large and cold
area of Siberia. Soviet manufacturing was also scattered across the country. In the areas
developed immediately before and during the World War II, and in the postbellum
decades production sites were often complemented with manufacturing. However, many
of the areas created by Gosplan's decrees in the Soviet Union's later years never
developed a diversified economy. They grew and overgrew, remammg resource
appendices of manufacturing sites located in other areas.

The RSFSR's autonomous okrugs were parts of greater regions, which - at that
scale - combined both production and manufacturing, or agriculture and manufacturing,
providing for some diversification of economy in larger regions. Thus, in case of a bad
148 Gosplan is an acronym of "Gosudarstvennoe Planirovanie" or "State Planning."' It was a state planning agency
responsible directly to the Soviet supreme authority, Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, for
drafting and implementing five-year economic plans.
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harvest or exhaustion of a resource, or relocation of industry, the regional economy was
still able to perform reasonably well without outside help. With time the regional
boundaries lost their meaning as a result of redistributive policies and distorted prices of
the planned economy. After all, economies at regional level didn't require diversification,
because of the nature of ownership and high centralization.

Upon the disintegration of the USSR, the system of planned economy fell, and
ties among the all-Union and RSFSR constituencies broke. Although the RSFSR (Russia)
didn't disintegrate, its structure grew ever more complex. Some ethnic republics
attempted to gain independence (Chechnya, Tatarstan, Buriatia); autonomous okrugs
seceded from their host oblasts and krais and established themselves as independent
federal constituencies. The largely production-oriented economies of the AOs lost the
connectivity with the manufacturing sector traditionally located in administrativeterritorial components (oblast', krai). Thus, economies of the former matryoshka regions
lost the little integrity that they had within the greater Soviet economy. At present, their
economies remain undiversified.

The federal government justifies the proposal to merge some regions, including
those studied in this paper, by economic reasons. Speaking days before the referendum
on the merger of Perm' Oblast' and KP AO, President Putin remarked, "life has shown
that the division into two separate regions was not economically justified.,,149 In a later
interview, Putin once again stressed, "Many regions are not economically viable on their

149

In the Spotlight, October 31, 2003, \vww.krcrnlin.ruieng/text/therncsi20031 I 0/312052 54807.shtml
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own.,,150 Indeed, ideally, regions should be viable as economically viable regions are
least dependent on the federal government. Moreover, it is desirable that regions are
"fairly equal in population and wealth or at least balanced geographically or numerically
in their inequalities if non-concentration is to be maintained.,,151

The Russian economy is both concentrated and dispersed. In terms of
concentration, production is confined to geographical location of resources, and
manufacturing (non-resource industry) is confined to industrial areas developed by
Gosplan for reasons including security threats - WWII and the Cold War. At the same
time, the industrial areas - at least in the northern and eastern parts of Russia are located
at considerable distances from each other. Often they are completely detached from the
"mainland" throughout the year or during winter months. It is virtually impossible and
probably outright useless to integrate such industrial pockets. Combination of resources,
manufacturing, and transportation is simply an unachievable task for the economy at such
location. Despite the logic of this realistic assessment, the enlargement of regions is said
to bring diversification to even most underdeveloped and remote areas by moving
regional administrative boundaries.

I argue that redrawing of boundaries would not diversify regional economIes.
Diversification of many of the Russia's northern areas - including the autonomous
okrugs studied in this paper - would not be enhanced unless the federal government

redeploys mechanisms of Gosplan. Such redeployment would impede economic growth
150 Excerpts from the President's Live Television and Radio Dialogue with the Populaiton, December 18,2003, Official
Website of the President of Russia. Online at www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2003/12!18! 1200 57480.shtml
151 Elazar, 1987, p. 170.
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and reverse the country's progress towards market economy. Yuri Perelygin of NorthWest Center for Strategic Development contends, "Manufacturing in the Far North is
associated with high costs."

152

This position is thoroughly explained by the Brookings

scholars Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy. In "The Siberian Curse" they suggest the
population should "evacuate" the north for Russia's warmer and more developed
European part to decrease Russia's "traditional" inefficiency of maintaining large cities
and factories in the North. There is no antidote to the climatic conditions of the North:
even should the global warming make the climate milder, it would create a whole new set
of climatic problems like floods and droughts. For now, attempts to sustain and develop
the existing infrastructure would remain a perpetual obstacle to Russia's development.

Russia is not ready to part with Siberia - by relocating population and switching
to rotation shift method of exploiting its riches. In search for a solution Perelygin
suggests, "Only widespread application of modem technologies can make it (economy of
the Russia's North) competitive." If the government intends to apply modem
technologies in the North, they are certainly most needed in the natural resource sector.
Economic diversification would not create competitive industries outside of the resource
sector - largely due to the high costs of production in the North. It can only be created
artificially - by merging regions.

Economic diversification is pronounced as one of the goals of regional
enlargement, and is relevant to discussing the enlargement of regions in all the three

152 Interview with Yuri Perelygin, Scientific Head of Center for Strategic Development "North-West." In Mariya
Kravtsova, "Sevemyi Vyvoz" (Northern Shipping-Out), Expert, No 26, July 12-18, 2004, p. 68-73, p.7\.
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studied cases. As noted in the previous chapters, there is a stark contrast between the
economies of the oblasts and "their" autonomous okrugs. The economies of the former
are heavily industrialized (machine building, VPK, energy generation, etc.). The
economies of the latter are resource and agriculture-oriented. The degree of regional
economic differences is supported by the data on emissions (see Table 7, p.lll).

Table 7. Emissions of Polluting Substances into the Atmosphere in Selected Russian
Regions, 2003
Emissions of Polluting Substances
into the Atmosphere (thousands of
tons)

19,829

Russia Total

..•.....•...........................

1,509

Central Federal District

97

3, 143

Volga Federal District

270
723 (721)

2

5,664
3,421 (72)
2,435

iinlrlu,([j'ing Khanty-Mansiiskii AO
i

land Yamalo-Nenetskii AO

914

5,609
Irkutsk Oblast'

18)

including Ust' -Ordynskii Byruatskii AO
Source: Osnornye Pokazateli Okhrany Okruzhaushei Sredy po Regionam Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Basic Indicators of Environmental
Protection by Regions of the Russian Federation), GosKomStat, 2003. Online at
http://ww\~sru!BGD!liTdB ouan!lswPrx.dIl!Stg/0050.htln

The amount of emissions differs from region to region. Moscow's low figure is
largely a result of movement of production to the Moscow Dblast " a separate region.
However, the whole Central Federal District only emitted 1, 509 thousands of tons - a
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small amount compared to 5, 664 thousand tons in the Ural and 5, 609 thousand tons in
the Siberian Federal Districts. These figures demonstrate that most of the heavy industry
is located East of Moscow, and more than half of it to the East of the Ural Mountains.
The Republic of Tatarstan is another odd case. Despite its sizeable petro-chemical
complex, emissions only amount to 270 thousand tons. This may be the result of the
costly application of cleaner technologies. Like Moscow, the Republic is a rich region,
and can allocate substantial financial resources to decrease emissions.

Pollution data within the FDs and in individual regions demonstrate the degree of
industrialization. The contrast between the oblasts and the okrugs is remarkable. In the
newly formed Permskii Krai, KP AO emitted only 2 thousand tons in 2003 while Perm'
emitted 721 thousand tons. Similarly, U-OBAO emissions were 2 thousand tons versus
518 thousand tons in Irkutsk. Emission figures are significant in two of the three
Tyumen' matryoshka regions. In YaNAO and KhMAO environmentally outdated
technologies of oil and gas production and extensive flaring of the extraction byproducts
of crude oil cause most of the region's pollution, which accounts for over half of the
emissions in the Ural FD. Tyumen' Oblast's emissions stand at unimpressive 72 thousand
tons.

The small amounts of emissions in KP AO, U-OBAO, and in Tyumen' Oblast'
testify to the non-industrial nature of their economies. KPAO's economy is dominated by
logging and supplying timber to the processing plants in Perm'. U-OBAO is a small

agricultural region - to the extent the climatic conditions allow agriculture in the area.
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Tyumen' Oblast' has a diversified economy: machine building and metal-working
industry accounts for about 45 percent of its industrial output, followed by timber and
woodworking industry with 10 percent. Other sectors include agriculture and small and
medium-size enterprises. 153 The divide of regions by the production and processing and
manufacturing specialization of their economies is apparent. Agriculture and logging may
be harmful to the environment, but they produce little emission. On the opposite,
extensive oil production, refining, petrochemical, and heavy machinery industries are
notorious for the amount of pollution.

The contrast in regional economIC specialization, and the state of regional
economy in general can be inferred from the data on major enterprises based in regions.
Oil production is another factor complementing the data on enterprises (See Table 6, p.
181). The list of Top 100 Russian Enterprises compiled by AK&M Rating C{!nter in 2003
features three companies headquartered in Perm', two in Irkutsk, and one in Tyumen'.
Moscow, for example, is headquarters to six of the top 100 enterprises, Republic of
Tatarstan - to five. KPAO, U-OBAO, KhMAO, and YaNAO, as well as war-tom
Republic of Chechnya headquarter none. Regional creditworthiness ratings of the eightynine Russian regions are distributed correspondingly. Moscow tops the list, Tatarstan is at
place thirteen, and Perm' and Irkutsk at places nine and forty correspondingly. KPAO, UOBAO, and, for that matter Chechnya, are at the very bottom of the list - seventy-nine,
eighty-two, and below eighty-seven (87, 88, or 89) correspondingly. Despite absence of
headquarters of major Russian enterprises, creditworthiness rating is outstanding in the
m "Naibol'shii Yklad v Ekonomiku Tumeni Ynosyat Predpryatia Mashinostroeniya i Metalloobrabotki" (Machine
building and Metal-working Industries are the Greatest Contributors to Tyumen's Economy), Region-Tyumen'
Broadcasting Company, February 28, 2005. Online at www.tyumcn.rfn.ru!rncws.html?id~·1 9225&cid-(2
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Tyumen' matryoshka. Tyumen' Dblast' is ranked four, KhMAO - three, and YaNAOfive. Their top investment ranking is the result of the on-going Russian oil boom. The
amount of oil production and the presence of production companies in these regions are
the key to understanding their competitive edge and high ranking.

In 2004 the depleting oil fields of Perm' and Tatarstan yielded only 2.2 and 6.5
percent respectively. Chechnya produced only 0.4 percent contrary to the myth that the
war in Chechnya is the war for oil. Irkutsk produced 0.02 percent while KPAO, UOBAO, and Moscow produced none. Tyumen' Dblast " also suffering from the depletion
of the few existing fields produced only 0.3 percent, while its northern counterparts
produced over 67 percent of Russia's oil- 55.8 and 11.6 percent in KhMAO and YaNAO
respectively.

Tyumen' matryoshka has significant operations of all Russian oil giants, except
LUKoil. Rusia-Petroleum, TNK-BP, and Gazprom dominate the developing Irkutsk oil
production. Tatneft', Tatarstan's regional oil monopoly produces most of the Republic's
oil. All Chechen oil is produced by Grozneft', a subsidiary of the state-owned Rosneft',
and by illegally operating small enterprises (not accounted for in statistics). Significant
presence of a number of competing oil giants in the Tyumen' matryoshka accounts for its
high creditworthiness and the overall good performance of their economies, as was
previously noted. Production in other regions featured in Table 6 (p. 181) - Perm',
Irkutsk, Tatarstan, and Chechnya is largely monopolized.
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Hypothetically, regional enlargement has several implications for the regional
economies. First, they would be more diversified: the resource sector would be balanced
by the non-resource sector. Second, regional monopolies in the resource sector would be
diluted. Third, regions would be less prone to income shocks if world oil prices fall.

Income Shocks and De-Monopolization of Regional Economies

The International Monetary Fund (lMF) has established a high correlation of
"regional revenues and expenditures with oil shocks.,,154 The current stability of regional
incomes and economic growth has only lasted for the last five years. In January 1999,
when global oil price fell below nine US dollars per barrel, Russian economic outlooks
were grim. If it hadn't been for the devaluation of the ruble against dollar, oil producers
would have slipped into a major crisis, dragging whole regions, and possibly the country
in a deeper crisis. In fact, oil shocks affect the Russian economy as a whole. Low oil
prices change the pattern of federal transfers to all Russian regions. I suggest the cyclical
nature of oil taxes, and the correlation between oil prices and economic growth have
alerted the federal government and triggered concerns. One of the set goals of regional
enlargement is diversification of the economy of the resource-rich regions and economic
development of the generally poor. Theoretically, it should enhance the viability of
regions when commodity prices are low, since diversified economies can absorb shocks
easier. Also, markets of undiversified regional economies are prone to monopolization

154

"Russian Federation: Selected Issues," IMF Country Report No 041316, Washington, DC, Septembt:r 2004, at p. 87.
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and monopolistic deals, and regional enlargement is seen as one of the ways to dilute
monopolies and foster competition.

lss

Diversification of Regional Economies

In addition to shock absorption, an alleged advantage of regional enlargement is
diversification. Gosplan largely shaped economies of the state and its regions in the postWWII period. Despite richness in natural resources, regions wouldn't have grown and
developed the way they have since the structure of their economies was planned, and
each of them served a specific purpose in the state-controlled economy. Diversification
was never the goal of the state, so it had neither been planned nor encouraged.

MERT, having briefly assumed functions of nationalities and regional affairs in
2004, drafted a total of twenty programs of regional development. Of the twenty, only
one was designed for an autonomous okrug - KP AO. IS6 Based on the decret: No 196/l-p
of the head of KPAO's Administration dated April 29, 2003 - six full months prior to the
enlargement referendum, it was obviously designed to facilitate the success of the latter.
Governor Saveliev kept the promises to his constituency to lead the okrug to merger with
Perm' Oblast' and to invest in economic development.

155 Nikolai Vinogradov, "Osobyi Put' Razvitiya Nesyr'evyh Regionov" (Special Path o/Development of
the Non-Resource Regions), Nezavisimaya Gazeta No 222 (3335), October 13,2004.
156 "Pasport Programmy Ekonomicheskogo i Sotsial'nogo Razvitia KPAO na 2004-2006 godu i na Period
do 2010 goda" (Passport of the Program for the Economic and Social Development of KPAOfor 20042006 and till 2010), MERT, April 9, 2004.
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The KP AO development program sets the goal of raising of standards of living in
the okrug to Russia's average, doubling personal income by 2010, increasing the GRP l.5
times and the industrial production 3.6 times (in relation to the 2002 level). The outlined
ambitious goals are to be achieved by attracting nine billion rubles in investments,
diversification of the resource-based economy, and optimization of social infrastructure.
Particular emphasis is made on infrastructural development and diversification. It
includes construction of a railroad, gas pipelines, and 84 kilometers of paved and 178.2
kilometers of gravel roads. The diversification of the logging industry of KP AO includes
raising the coefficient of timber processing to 60 percent. All these measures are the price
of the regional enlargement that the federal government pais to make it possible.

The program, clearly aimed at ensuring the result favorable to the Kremlin's
policies, is to create artificial economic growth where, by the laws of free enterprise,
there should be none. I argue that the existing logging industry is sufficient, and transfers
from the federal budget should sustain the region. Significant investments in the
infrastructure and diversification of the economy would cause job losses elsewhere in the
greater Perm'. The diversification of logging into timber processing in KP AO is likely to
result in shortages of raw materials for the timber processing plants located south of
KPAO in Perm' Oblast'. Of the top twenty paper mills in Russia, three are located in
Perm,.157 Of them, Kamskii Paper Mills already operates below its capacity. Russian
paper industry has a scattered character, and investing in processing in KPAO would only
increase it.
Solikamskbumponn, ranked 8t \ Kamskii Paper Mills Plant, ranked 18 t\ and Pennskii Karton, ranked 19th . Mills are
ranked by their potential capitalization. "Russkii Biznes ~ Strategii" (Russian Business - Strategies), Expert, No 48,
December 20-26, 2004, at p. 50.
157
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It is important to bear in mind that much of the industry has been inherited from

the USSR: the Russian economy is largely based on the Soviet-built infrastructure and
production capacities. Soviet economy always operated as a structure the relationship
within which can be described as core-periphery. This relationship still survives. To put it
in simple terms, periphery supplied raw materials and finished products to be
subsequently distributed across the country by Gosplan. What is often omitted in
observations is that periphery has its own periphery, i.e. Perm' and KPAO. Let's call it

"periphery of periphery." The relations between periphery and "periphery of periphery"
are specific in each case. In case of Perm' and KP AO, there always existed a supplydemand chain. The full chain can be described as a symbiotic relationship of core - to
periphery - to "periphery of periphery." In case of timber industry in Perm' and KP AO it
would be market - processing - supply of raw material. Bypassing the middle link in this
relationship is virtually impossible. If the "periphery of periphery" assumes functions of
periphery, it inevitably harms the interests of periphery. Breakup of the existing
production - manufacturing - export (to other regions and abroad) chain is undesirable
and meaningless. This statement is even more accurate towards an enlarged region, parts
of which should work for common goals. They certainly shouldn't compete by
duplicating each other.

This example of logging industry in KP AO and Perm' illustrates how the federal
center takes an economically irrational step to achieve its political ambition. MERT's
program for the development of KP AO till 20 lOis motivated by political reasons, and is
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unjustitied economically. Investing in diversification ofKPAO, MERT acts like Gosplan:
by setting illusory goals without regard for the laws of free enterprise.

Following the example of KP AO, U-OBAO has drafted its own economIC
development plan, which the federal government would have had to adopt ifit wanted the
okrug to merge with Irkutsk. However, the plan's acceptance did not proceed as smoothly

as in the case of KPAO. U-OBAO insisted on investment of 8 billion rubles in the
okrug's economy. Most of the money would have been spent on the most important

components of its economy - social sphere and development of rural infrastructure.

158

Thus, the program was not aimed at diversification and covered only the okrug's urgent
needs. Irkutsk Oblast' itself, although fully capable to invest in its own infrastructure,
followed the example of U-OBAO and drafted an extensive list of demands. They
included construction of oncology center, reconstruction of Irkutsk airport landing strip,
and return of 15.5 percent of Irkutskenergo (regional energy generation and distribution
company) shares from the federation to the region. 159 Apparently, the federal government
did not accept the terms. Otherwise, the enlargement process would have been more
synchronized, and would have taken less time.

One of the goals of the enlargement of Tyumen', KhMAO, and YaNAO is
possibly also economic diversification. However, unlike in the case of Perm', its aim may
be to divert investments from the oil-rich Northern provinces and channel them south to
158 "Administratsiya UsC -Ordynskogo Okruga Vydvinula Uslovia Ob'edineniya s Irkutskoi Oblast'iu" (U-OBAO's
Administation has Proposed Conditions of Unification with Irkutsk Oblast '), Regnum News Agency, March 26, 2004.
Online at www.regnum.ru/ncws/237807.html
159 Mikhail Mazur, "Sliyanie s Ogovorkami: Zakonodateli lrkutskoi Oblasti Soglasny Ob'edinyatsa s Ust'-Ordoi, Na
Vygodnykh Usloviah" (Merger with Reservations: Legislators of Irkutsk Oblast' Agree to Unite with Ust '-Orda on
Favorable Terms), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, April 23, 2004. Online at www.rg.ru!2004/04!23!Qb·cdincllic.html
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Tyumen'. Valery Fyodorov, director of the Center of Political Affairs (Tsentr
Politicheskoi Kon 'unktury), suggests that enlargement of regions would increase the flow

of rents to non-resource part of Tyumen' matryoshka. 160 Echoing the argument of Hill
and Gaddy, he suggests that oil money goes to support of useless inirastructure of towns
in the areas where the only population should have been shift crews on the oilfields.
Whether this understanding of the purpose of the regional enlargement is meticulously
evaluated at the federal level is unclear. However, it is obvious that neither KhMAO nor
YaNAO are ready to part with their significant oil revenues without promises of
substantial concessions from the center.

Formation oflarger constituencies through merger of the small unviable ones with
the economically strong is only justified from the standpoint of horizontal symmetry.
However, it is only justified in statistical terms. In Russia, where gaps in development are
great not only across regions, but also within regions, such balance of constituencies
would only mask the great spatial economic disparity of the state. Russia is a country of
great inequity, with some small areas experiencing economic boom, and other lagging
decades behind.

State-directed artificial diversification of economy resulting from the enlargement
of regions would help reach none or few objectives of economic development. Federal
incentives in form of investments are temporary. They would only sustain economies of

160 "Kontrolirovat' Vsu Territoriu" (Control All the Territory), News Service Gazeta.Ru, May 28,2003. Online at
www.gzt.ru
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the poor regions for the duration of enlargement process. Thereafter, the richer parts of
the merged region would have to assume the burden of sustaining the poorer economies.

Federal Incentives for Merger as Means to Enhance Connectivity of Russia

In addition to stimulating diversification in regional economIes, the regional
enlargement projects are designed to enhance the connectivity within regions - between
production, manufacturing, and consumption zones, and with the rest of the country. By
connectivity I imply the connectivity of areas of spatial development to which these
zones are confined within regions.

Attempts to connect the outlying provinces of Russia have been made since the
exploration and conquest of Siberia. First, military outposts were established in the new
territories. Later, some roads and railroads were constructed. Some of the most notable
ones include the Siberian Tract (Sibirskii Trakt) constructed by Catherine the Great in
late eighteenth century, the Trans-Siberian Railroad constructed by the last Russian Tsar
Nicholas the Second in early twentieth century, and the BAM (Baikalo-Amurskaya
Magistral ') completed in the Soviet period. These and other smaller transportation

corridors have linked European Russia with Siberia and the Far East, and serve as major
economic engines for the Eastern and Northern Russian regions.

121

Twenty-first century Russia needs new transport corridors in most regions. Like
any other state, it needs new highways, bridges, pipelines, and power lines. These new
corridors are needed to connect the country and not to connect spaces within regions. I
suggest that the policies of regional enlargement are aimed at enhancing the connectivity
of the state as a whole, and not at diversification of economies and stimulating economic
growth.

The vital role connectedness to the infrastructure can play in economies of remote
regions may be inferred from Scheme 4 (p. 168). The budgetary flows between the
Federation and the Siberian FD depict its clear division into donor and recipient regions
(donor-recipient relations are discussed in more detail in the next chapter) Irkutsk Oblast'
along with five other regions is a donor receiving back less than a quarter of the taxes it
transfers to the federal budget. U-OBAO along with nine other regions is a recipient
receiving almost three times as much form the Federal budget as it contributes. An
interesting observation can be made about the types of donor and recipient regions in the
Siberian FD. All six donors are regions with administrative-territorial boundaries oblasts and krais; eight of the ten recipients are regions with ethno-territorial boundaries,
each containing a titular ethnicity - republics and AOs. However, their territorial
characteristics hardly determine their status of donors of recipients.

The oblasts and krais were originally established as larger territorial units than
most of the autonomous okrugs. They are located on the resource-abundant territOIies.
However, resource abundance alone is useless in such a remote area without developed
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infrastructure. Production sites should be connected with the refining and manufacturing
centers, and major roads, railroads, and airports are located in the donor regions.
Recipient regions of the Siberian FD have to rely on the donors for their economic transit
needs of people, resources, products, and capital.

Lack of connectivity may indeed be an obstacle to growth in some regions. At the
same time, the establishment of infrastructural links between the underdeveloped and
developed regions may be a measure short of solving the economic problems of the poor
regions and diversification of their economies. The short-tenn benefits of enhanced
connectivity are limited, as most of the needed infrastructure already exists (connection
of core with "periphery of periphery" is inexpedient). The long-tenn benefits of the
update and reconstruction of the existing infrastructure and the construction of new links
may enhance the economic well-being of some areas in the process of development of
path dependency evident in the example ofthe Siberian FD.

However, I believe the connectivity argument is too weak to justify regional
enlargement. As I have stated previously, connectivity does not require merger of
regions. On the opposite, its enhancement renders the enlargement process useless. There
are two negative scenarios of the implementation of the federal-sponsored new
infrastructural projects. They can be insignificant to produce the declared effects on
regional economy, like the construction of 178.2 kilometers of gravel roads in KP AO.
They can also fail to produce the desired effect if they are aimed at fostering economic
growth in places where it is impossible or costly to do so. Large infrastructural projects
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may impede the stimulus of people to relocate from the Far North. Moreover, they can
attract people to cold and remote areas where the cost of living and production would
always be extremely high compared to areas in Western and Southern Russia. Thus, such
projects may artificially sustain the otherwise unsustainable economies, and the Russian
government may be doomed to repeat the mistakes of Gosplan.

I believe, that among the three cases of enlargement only KhMAO and YaNAO
actually require new infrastructure. It should link new oilfields directly to the City of
Tyumen' in the south. As a result, crews employed at the oilfields would be able to live
in the south, and slowly "drain" the population of the West Siberian oil cities. New
infrastructure may save Tyumen' from shrinking and contain unnecessary investment in
the social infrastructure of the north.

Tyumen' Oblast', the host region for KhMAO and YaNAO in the Soviet times,
has been gradually losing its dominant position in the region to KhMAO and Y aN AO
since late 1960s. Since the breakup of the USSR, KhMAO and YaNAO have established
their independent governing structures. At the same time, as the privatized oil and gas
companies consolidated their positions, they have been moving their headquarters to oil
towns in the AOs and to Moscow, bypassing the City of Tyumen' , the capital of Tyumen'

Oblast', as an intermediate administrative center. 161

There are two primary reasons why Tyumen' is being bypassed. First, it has lost
its role as the capital of the greater region when KhMAO and YaNAO claimed equal
161

This is another example of how the scheme of "core-to periphery-to periphery of periphery" is broken.
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status of the subjects of the Federation. Second, oil revenues have enabled the AOs to
build up their economies and invest in their regions. Large investments outside the oil
and gas industry have been made into the infrastructure of the oversized Northern
cities. 162 Inherited from the planned economy, they require continuous maintenance.
Recently acquired social problems like AIDS and drug abuse force the okrug
governments to invest even more in the social infrastructure - hospitals, schools, activity
centers - all of which could have been built at warmer and less remote locations. In an
enlarged region, this might be possible.

TRENDS OF FISCAL FEDERALISM: SHIFTING THE BUDGETARY
BURDEN TO REGIONS

Following this logic of the masterminds of the regional enlargement, it may be
concluded that the sum of two economies creates a bigger single economy. However, this
assumption may be false. The economy of one of the merging regions may be depressive
and loss-making, while the economy of the other(s) merging region(s) may be very
prosperous. When two economies are summed up, they do not necessarily benefit each
other, unless their merger indeed provides for greater diversification of the larger
economy. The prosperous region may not produce a significant wave effect on the
depressive region as the study of Expert Magazine scholars has demonstrated (see the
first section of the chapter on economy). It is hard to imagine how merger can facilitate
this. The depressive (poor) region may in fact slow down the otherwise healthy economy
of the prosperous (rich) region. Greater economy may absorb the shock of merger, but,
162 KhMAO's governor Aleksandr Filipenko boasted to President Putin that at present he has "a unique opportunity to
develop high-quality social infrastructure." Vladislav Vorobiev and Oleg Galitskih, "Luchshe Vy k Nam na Sever"
(You Better Visit Us in the North), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, August 18,2004. Online at www.rg.rhlGOO±!OS/S!y;;trccha.jltml
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unless the poorer economy Improves on its own or with the help from the federal
government, the economy of the prosperous region may have to perpetually subsidize the
depressive economy in ways the federal government had been doing between the parade
of sovereignties and the present.

Evidence of the notion that the sum of two or more regional economies does not
necessarily lead to growth in either of the two economies may be found by analyzing the
structure of federal-regional budgetary relations of the merging regions. Typically, large
federations have steady donors and steady recipients among their multiple constituencies.

In federations, the function of intergovernmental redistribution of resources and
maintenance of budgetary balance is usually assumed by the federal center. 163 Steady
donors are regions with relatively strong economies, which usually give more money to
the federal government than they receive from the federation to balance their budgets and
for other purposes (grants, aid, loans, donations). Steady recipients, on the opposite, are
regions with weaker economies, which are dependent on transfers from the federal
government to maintain their budgetary balance.

Russian federal-regional budgetary relations demonstrate the above-described
pattern. In Soviet times, horizontal transfers were masked by the command economy. The
last fifteen years of Russia's existence as a federation "under construction" have clearly
exposed the disparity of incomes in regions and identified the steady donors and
recipients of federal transfers.

163

Alastair McAuley, 1997, p. 439.
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Table 8 (p. 127) shows the balance of some of the Russian regions in terms of
financial aid. While Perm', Tyumen', and Irkutsk Oblasts were steady donors in the
period between 1995 and 1999, small AOs like KP AO and U-OBAO have been steady
recipients. Other "traditional" donor regions include the City of Moscow as well as the
oil provinces of KhMAO and YaNAO. The disparity among the regions has only
increased since the rise in commodity prices in 2000. While the donors have further
solidified their positions among Russian regions, most of the recipients have only
experienced more downturn. Also, the population of the steady recipients constitutes only
7.5 percent, and of the steady donors over 80 percent of the total Russian population,
which supports the demographic argument for enlargement.

The table demonstrates that the merger of donors like Perm' and Irkutsk with
recipients KP AO and U-OBAO may be well justified. It may relieve the federal
government from subsidizing the latter regions by transferring this obligation directly to
donors.

Table 8. Donor Regions and Recipient Regions in 1995-1999
Steady Donors

Donors in Some Years

Steady Recipients

Population 117.7 million people (80.7 %),

Population 17.2 million people
(11.8 %)

Population 11.0 million people
(7.5 %)

including:

.-..........................

Oblast', Tyumen' Oblast', Irkutsk
, KhMAO, YaNAO, City of Moscow

...........................•..

KPAO, V-OBAO

Source: Federal Budget and Regions: Structure of Financial Flows (Federal'nyi Budjet i Regiony: Struktllra Finansovykh Potokov),
East-West Institute (Instilyt "Vostok-Zapad), Moscow, MAKS Press, 2001. Online at
http://'Yw\VJ?Jj~trf.lllLr@Ji~jltj9ns/Allalysis/iews/aniewsI20902/alliewsI20902000.htm

The contrast between the donors and the recipients is even more obvious from the
calculations of financial giving and aid per capita (see Table 9, p. 128). The following
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table puts Perm' and Tyumen' Oblasts and the oil provinces of KhMAO and YaNAO in
the category of regions that contribute more than 2,000 rubles per capita (in 1999) as aid
to other regions. Irkutsk Oblast' contributes between 1,000 and 2,000 rubles per capita.
At the same time, KPAO receives aid of up to 1,000 rubles per capita, and U-OBAO
receives over that amount.

Table 9. Typology of Regions by Volume of Balance (by financial aid)
calculated per capita, in 1999
Indicator, rubles per
capita

Population, Million People (Share of
Russia's Population, %)

Including Regions:

Region Contributes more
than 2 000

39.0 (26. 7 %)
__
52.3 (35. 9 %)

YaNAO, KMAO, Perm' Oblast', Tyumen'
Oblast', City of Moscow
..
Irkutsk Oblast'

40.8 (27. 9 %)

Repu blic of Tatarstan

8.5 (5. 8 %)

KPAO

5.3 (3. 7 %)

U-OBAO

_~~~

m~~~~~·~~-~r~"-_~~m

~

Source: Federal Budget and Regions: Structure of Financial Flows (Federa/'nyi Budjer i Regiony: Struktura Finansovvkh Potokov),
East-West Institute ([nstityt "Vostok-Zapad), Moscow, MAKS Press, 200 I. Online at
http://~w,,,,l>\lsl~rflll/Publignlions/ Analvsisiiew§i<lfl iews 120<J()2ian iews 1209020QQJHI11

Thus, pairs of merging regions - Perm' and KPAO and Irkutsk and U-OBAOare asymmetric within their matryoshkas. In 1999 Perm' Oblast' contributed more than
2,000 rubles per capita while KP AO received up to 1,000 rubles per capita. Similarly,
while Irkutsk contributed between 1,000 and 2,000 rubles per capita, U-OBAO received
over 1,000 rubles. Of course, as I have indicated in the section on demographics, the
populations of these two oblasts and two autonomous okrugs are drastically different. For
example, while KPAO's population is only five percent of Perm' Oblast's population, it
receives at least half of what the Oblast' contributes per capita. These figures testify how
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poor KPAO is in relation to Perm'. This population disparity makes asymmetry among
the regions even greater.

The above-described statistical approach strongly supports merger of large donor
oblasts with small recipient AOs. Merger of Perm' and KPAO creates a region that
would statistically fall under category of "steady donor" or "donor in some years," and
remove one region (KPAO) from the category of "steady recipients." However, the
declared goal of the regional enlargement is not to create more symmetry in statistical
terms. In fact, merger only slightly alters the inter-budgetary flows. The volume of
money in the Federation or in a given region does not change. Since late 1990s, the
federal budget has been allocating about 14 percent of its volume as aid to subjects of the
federation (regional budgets). In 2004, the number stood at about 15 percent of the
Russian federal budget. 164

There is no evidence that money would be distributed in a fairer way through a
budget of an enlarged region. Similarly, there is little evidence that fiscal centralization
translates into fair redistributive policies. 165 Therefore, enlargement doesn't necessarily

813,969,815,6 thousand rubles of the total Russian Budget, 2004, was 2,400,751,227,2 thousand rubles.
"Prilozhenie 21 k Federal 'nomy Zakony "0 Federal'nom Budjete na 2004 God. .. Raspredelenie (Jssignovanii iz
federal 'nogo bud/eta n(J 2004 god po razdelam i podrazdelam" tselevym statiyam i vidam raskhodov jjmktsional 'noi
klassifikatsii raskhodov blldjetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (Appendix 21 to the Federal Law "On the Federal Budget for
Year 2004", Allocation of the Resources from the Federal Budget for year 2004 by Articles and Sub-articles, Special
Purposes, and Types of Expenditures of the Functional Classification of the Expenditures of the Budgets of the Russian
Federation ), Online at www,budgetrfru
164

165 According to a 2004 VTSIM Survey, as many as 82 percent of Russians, including the Muscovites, believes that the
City of Moscow lives at the expense of the other regions of Russia, "Moskva I Moskvichi: Vzglyad iz Rossii" (Moscow
and Muscovites: Viewfrom Russia), VTSIOM, Press-Release No 113, September 3,2004,
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alleviate the economic problems of poor regions. Rather, it hides pockets of poverty
within greater and statistically prosperous regions. 166

Enlargement of Tyumen' Oblast' presents a different case. All three of the
subjects proposed for enlargement are the leading donor regions in the Federation, with
Tyumen' Oblast' lagging a little behind the autonomous okrugs in recent years. The
merger of Tyumen' would have resulted in the formation of an even greater region,
which would have further skewed the horizontal asymmetry among Russian regions. Its
gross regional product (GRP) would have been second only to Moscow's in absolute
terms. The region would have ranked first in terms of per capita GRP in Russia (see
Table 10, p. 130).

Table 10. Economic Indicators of the Studied Regions:
Possible Changes after Proposed Mergers
Region

Penn' Ob/as!'
Komi-Pennyatskii AO
Perm' and KPAO
(Permskii Krai)
Tyumen' Ob/as!'
Khanty-Mansiiskii AO
Yamalo-Nenetskii AO
Tyumen' Oblast', KhMAO and
YaNAO
Irkutsk Ob/as!'
Us!' -Ordynskii AO
Irkutsk Oblast' and U-OBAO
Other Regions
Republic of Tatarstan
Republic ofChechnya
City of Moscow
r. _

Income Per
Capita,
Thousands of
Rubles 2003*
60.55
20.85

Income Per
Capita, Moscow
= 100 %**
19.76 (20)
2.07 (85)

GRP per capita, as a
share of average
Russian GRP per
capitat, %
91
28

98912.9
581 777.0
279355.6
960045.5

124.88
154.43
193.17

48.42 (4)
61.59 (3)
78.85 (2)

73
331
444

145818.4
3794.8
149613.2

50.76
16.96

15.40 (28)
0.34 (86)

74
39

50.53
< 16.21
240.63

15.29 (29)
nla, (88 or 89)
\00.00 (I)

87
no data
241

GRP, millions of
Rubles, 2002"

191449.4
2905.7
194355.1

261843.9
No data, very low
1999995.3

GRP in 2004 market plices, GosKomStat, 2002

http://www.gks.l1JJbgdlfreeibOI19/lswPrx.dll!~\liLQ(){iO()()480r.htm

* - AK&M Rating Center, http://www.akm.rulrusirc/roks
** - Rating among Russian regions in parenthesis

040527.stm

t - Average Russian GRP per Capita in 2004 = 90,45 thousands rubles
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See discussion and references in subchapter on Mergers of Regions as Mergers of Capital Cities, p. 29-30.

130

The existing system of fiscal federalism is largely possible through hthe
mechanisms of redistribution of resource rents. The federal enlargement policy is based
on a system of incentives. I characterize it as a system of "carrots and sticks" of
federalism. For the poor regions, "carrot" comes in form of federal investments in regions
in case of their enlargement. "Stick" implies the continuation of the current federal
policies when regions with little bargaining power at the federal level hardly receive
anything from the center except for transfers to balance regional budgets. For the rich
regions, "stick" represents tighter fiscal regime, under which donors are forced to
contribute greater shares of their incomes to the federal budget. The "carrots" of regional
enlargement, which come in form of development aid (primarily infrastructural projects
to enhance connectivity described in previous chapter), are the result of Russia's newly
found oil wealth. The federal government is strengthening fiscal federalism by coercive
methods. In addition to reclaiming taxes from production companies (YUKOS), oil rents
(NDP!) are being reclaimed from regions. With rents and other taxes filling the federal

coffers, the government is able to manage redistributive policies better, and to use the
super-profits to manipulate regions. This process has touched the enlargement of regions,
where the state deploys both "carrots" and "sticks." Once the rich (donor) regions are
subdued into compliance with the fiscal policies, federal revenues steadily increase. With
the increased disposable tax revenues, the state can easily influence the poor (recipient)
regions, which would be least tempted to pursue policies centrifugal to the Federation
since their economic well-being is dependent upon the state and/or the state's relations
with the rich regions. I suggest this compliance of the poor regions enables the federal
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government to tighten its control over constituencies and nominally enhance the
horizontal symmetry of the state.

Horizontal symmetry can be achieved in the short-term by two policies. First, it
can be enhanced through federal redistributive policies given that there are federal
revenues to draw from. Second, it can be enhanced through the enlargement of regions,
particularly if the rich regions are grouped with the poor (steady donors are bTfouped with
steady recipients). As the poor autonomous okrugs continue setting precedents of
enlargement, and it seems it wouldn't be long until poor regions of oblast' status begin to
merge.

Indeed, if merger brings together the rich and the poor subjects of the Federation,
their budgets merge, and some of the taxes collected in one richer part of the greater
region become available for the other poorer part. Thus, regions would retain a greater
share of taxes, and the federal government would have fewer redistributive functions. In
theory, regional enlargement is a scheme for industrialized and/or resource-based
economies to subsidize poor and underdeveloped (usually agricultural) economies

without obvious involvement of the state. The extent to which the different economies of
merging regions would integrate depends on regional economies themselves. The
conditions created by the federal government for the enlargements of regions - greater
regional economic diversification, enhanced connectivity, and budget deficit balance are temporary and superficial solutions. Their alleged positive effects have not been
tested, and would probably be offset by the perpetual characteristics of the Russian
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economy - manufacturing centers in cold climate and geographic location of resource
deposits.

ECONOMIC FACTOR IN THE ENLARGEMENT OF REGIONS

Assessing the economic aspect of federalism, Watts suggests that the "changing
nature of federal relationships can undermine the stability - at least relative to unitary
systems - that is often necessary for a united and productive economy.,,167 However, this
statement might be accurate only for federations at their very early formation stages.
Although Russia is a new state, its territories retain a number of economic ties, not
limited to communications and transportation. In many respects, Russian regions are
interdependent.

I argue that Russia's economic performance can hardly be enhanced on the
regional level as a result of enlargement. Creation of larger regions would eliminate a few
administrative barriers, which are essentially minor inconveniences for the economy. Any
volume of investment committed to the development of regions by the federal
government would only marginally be related to their merger. The scale of Putin's plan
of economic integration into a single economic space, like the plans of all of his
predecessors, is not limited to "conquest" of a few eastern or northern regions. Rather, his

167

Watts, 1996, p. 99-100.
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vision of Russia is primarily that of a connected state. In this sense, the goal of balanced

. I deveIopment IS
. secondary. 168
reglOna

Connectedness of space implies the task of greater control over Russia's vast
Eurasian territory. The aspect of regional enlargement in this grandiose scheme may
become a major contributing factor of economic integration and prosperity only if it is
successfully undertaken on a larger scale. If this assumption were true, all small and poor
regions would be "devoured" in this great scheme; their bad economic performance
masked in the greater regions.

In the Urals and beyond, Putin's and his successors' greatest enemy would still be
the cold and the distance, not the number of political and economic units or even the
degree of diversification or monopolization. 169 The economy of the studied regions will
be affected very marginally as a result of mergers. The promised infrastructural projects
would serve to connect Russia rather than parts of the merging regions. Roads, bridges
and pipelines are built to connect people and places, the production sites with
manufacturing, consumption, and export centers. 170 On the one hand, these projects are
implemented with the long-term goal of overcoming disastrous miscalculations of the
Soviet planned economy. On the other hand, however, their implementation alone cannot
significantly stimulate depressive regional economies unless other plans for economic
168 In other words, the logic is as follows: first, Russia's GOP should be doubled in one decade; then more harmonious
growth would take hold. This Gosplan-style approach to creating the illusion of growth in economies of scale can
hardly provide for sustainable economic growth.
169 See a major recent work on this subject, Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, The Siberian Curse, 2003.
170 See, for example. "Vision for the Northeast Asia Transportation Corridors," Transportation Subcommittee,
Northeast Asia Economic Conference, Full text of the report online at http://www.erina.or.jp!En!Lib!B1!PDFfbll-e.pdf
and E. Boze, A. Fedkin, N. Trunova, D. Yalov, A. Zheltov, "Topical Analysis: Why Does Russia Need a Concept of
Spatial Development? Spatial Development of Russia," Russian Expert Review No 10, onlinc at
http://www.rusrcv,9rg/BlazcScrvcr!pagc.jsp?pk='nodc 1082024278657
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revitalization and build-up are undertaken. The increasing level of state involvement in
the economy already resembles the pre-1991 Gosplan system. Enhancement of
connectivity does not require regional enlargement. Russia's internal ethno-territorial and
administrative-territorial boundaries are nominal in terms of constitutional provisions for
the economy.

On the surface, the enlargement of regions eliminates only minute, if any,
administrative barriers. Therefore, the policy of incentives in form of federal grants and
infrastructural projects is but a trap for the regional elites to make power concessions to
the federation and to the enlarged regions, which would supposedly be easier to govern
and control from the capital. Being an independent subject of the Federation is a high
constitutional status. Its permanent loss is incomparable to the one-time economic
incentives, which themselves are questionable.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There are some similarities and some differences among the three studied regional
enlargement cases. There are a few notable patterns of regional enlargement that are
worth noting in this summary of demographic, political, and economic similarities and

•

differences of the three cases based on the discussions and findings of the previous
chapters.

Demographics

All three cases involve merger of sparsely populated subjects of the Russian
Federation with more populous ones. In all three cases, the more sparsely populated
subjects are autonomous okrugs. However, all the studied constituencies have
experienced net population decline over the last fifteen years. Since the population
decline is likely to continue, enlargement is a temporary means to statistically justify the
existence of regions and enhance horizontal federal symmetry. The argument for efficient
governance may be applicable to cases of Perm' and Irkutsk. Other similar cases of
enlargement are to follow. Tyumen', if merged with AOs, would clearly become an
oversized region like Krasnoyarskii Krai has upon its enlargement in April 2005.
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As a consequence of regional enlargement, the titular ethnicities of autonomous
okrugs lose their ethno-territorial distinction at the federal level, but retain administrativeterritorial status at municipal level. They either become minorities (Komi-Permyaks in

Permskii Krai) or even lose the status of double-minority (Buriats in enlarged Irkutsk
Dblast', Khanty, Mansi, and Nenets in enlarged Tyumen' Dblast ').

Regional enlargement is an easier process in regions dominated by one or few
oversized cities. The phenomenon of "merger of regions as merger of capital cities" is
most visible in Perm', less obvious in Irkutsk, and is not applicable to Tyumen'. The
demographic factor builds a somewhat strong case for political and economic
justification of regional enlargement - both for sparsely populated and poor regions, and
for sparsely populated but rich regions with high GRP per capita. However, population
size is not utilized by the federal and regional governments as rationale for enlargement.

Politics

I assess the regional enlargement as a political process. Although it has been
confined to few specific cases involving oblasts and autonomous okrugs, it may yield
actual results before the next Russian presidential elections in 2008. Its outcome will be
tested in the near future in Permskii Krai, Krasnoyarskii Krai, and, possibly in Koryakskii

AD and Kamchatka Dblast'. Based on the conducted research, I conclude that politics are
central to the process of enlargement. Economics and demographics may only serve as

auxiliary arguments of the enlargement political campaigns.
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Enlargement of regions is a top-down process orchestrated by federal and regional
political elites. Their cohesion among each other is highly important. I have used the case
of Perm' as the only successful enlargement experiment and compared its experience
with two other cases. This allowed me to understand the mechanism of successful
enlargement and to determine what possibly went wrong and slowed down the political
process in other cases. To be successful, the enlargement process required the will of the
elites. It also required synchronized political action - in administrative decision making
in the executive branch and in adoption of relevant legislation in the Russian Duma and
in the regional parliaments. In addition, enlargement initiative campaigns constituted an
important part of enlargement. To yield a yes-vote for merger, it was preferable that
campaigns were supported by a wide spectrum of religious, national (ethnic), and
political leaders and groups.

Enlargement of regions in all three cases is aimed at "containment" the aspirations
of ethnic minorities for their ethno-territorial federal units. It prevents Komi-Permyaks
from joining the Komi Republic, Nenets from the formation of a single Nenets
constituency across the three AOs, and Buriats from establishing a unified and
independent Buriat Republic. The enlargement is aimed at depoliticizing the ethnic factor
in the Russian state-building by creating larger multiethnic constituencies, in which
titular ethnicities (of the AOs) would be diluted. Eventually, the enlargement of
matryoshkas may not only enhance the horizontal symmetry in the Federation, but also

contain ethnic republics. Thus, abolition of autonomous okrugs may also enhance the
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vertical symmetry by creating regions of equal status regardless of their name - oblast',

krai, or republic.

Economy

The analysis of the economic component of the regional enlargement in Perm',
Irkutsk, and Tyumen' has yielded mixed results. However, all three cases have displayed
a pattern of federal strategy of enlargement. In an attempt to make the federation more
symmetrical by merging regions into self-sufficient entities, the federal government has
adopted a policy of incentives - carrots and sticks. While I argue that the ultimate goal of
the federal government is to enhance the connectivity of Russia as a whole and to
stimulate the diversification of economy at the regional level, some rationale for
enlargement may exist from the standpoint of regions as well.

In the case of Permskii Krai, the enlargement creates an economic burden for
Perm' but constitute an economic necessity for KPAO. While federal incentives are given
to both subjects, KP AO, as one of the poorest subjects of the Federation desperate for
investment, agreed for merger. Possibly, people in Perm' voted for merger out of their
solidarity with the Komi-Permyaks, and true hopes to create more equity in the greater
region. A similar pattern is obvious in the case of Irkutsk Dblast' and U-OBAO, where
the single main obstacle to enlargement is the amount of federal economic incentives.

139

The economic, as well as demographic and political, aspect of the enlargement of
Tyumen matryoshka is different from Perm' and Irkutsk. While it may be perceived as a
political ambition for Tyumen', rich AOs appear to be unmotivated to pursue the
enlargement. As the federal government centralizes rents, it competitively gains more
bargaining power vis-a-vis the resource-rich okrugs. To facilitate enlargement, it may
offer federal tax incentives to the okrugs in the near future.

The argument for diversification of economy doesn't hold. Diversification of
economies may create bigger economies, but manufacturing industries should not be
moved north to the autonomous okrugs because of inefficiency of operation in colder and
disconnected areas. Even merged economies would remain polarized in their production
or processing/manufacturing orientation. In terms of enhancement of the connectivity of
Russia, enlargement of regions is also a useless process. Federal infrastructural projects
don't require moving the administrative boundaries.

Finally, the system of fiscal federalism exists to balance the earnmgs and
expenditures of budgets in the system. The federal government promises investments in
exchange for regional enlargement. However, the volume of money in the state remains
the same, and much needed investments can be made without enlargement. Masking the
poorest regions like KPAO and U-OBAO in greater regions would statistically enhance
the horizontal symmetry. Enlargement of Tyumen' only exacerbates the asymmetry, and
will probably be reconsidered.
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CONCLUSIONS

The study of some aspects of regional enlargement in the Russian Federation has
demonstrated how the poorest regions are being convinced to cede their federal status in
exchange for some unclear promise of socioeconomic prosperity. The desired affect is
achieved through a policy of federal incentives offered in form of minute infrastructural
investments. The federal government can afford to offer them as a result of the
continuous oil boom and increased fiscal burden on oil producers and exporters. The
federal government is likely to speed up the process of regional enlargement to make sure
it is complete while the windfall oil profits last. Also, the poor constituencies may realize
that the benefits that regional enlargement brings are temporary incentives which do not
facilitate improvements in their long term socioeconomic status, and, therefore, are not
worth the loss of their federal (constitutional) status.

Regional enlargement starts with matryoshka subjects, gradually abolishing a
whole tier of ethnically defined federal units. Mergers complement the ongoing
administrative reform (Kozak's Reform). They are the direct result of a combination of
federal policy of financial incentives in areas of more redistributive (symmetrical) fiscal
federalism and infrastructural projects for the enlarged regions. However, based on the
fact that regions merge as a result of free expression of the people's rights in regional
referendums, the enlargement is portrayed as a bottom-up process in state media.

The newly created regions are most likely to take the form of oblasts and krais the most common forms of Russian federal territorial division. The federal government
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will not allow for the formation of new (ethnic) republics in Russia. On the opposite, the
number of ethnically defined subjects of the Federation - autonomous okrugs - will
decrease. Ethnic minorities compactly residing in autonomous okrugs would be
effectively excluded from direct participation in the federal political process in Russia as
a result of enlargement. Moreover, their representation would be diluted at the regional
level as well. Their ethnic (national) territorial autonomy would be replaced with cultural
autonomy. The okrugs would be reduced in status from constituencies in a federal system
to ethnically defined administrative-territorial municipal units. 171 The bargaining power
of former autonomous okrugs would dramatically decrease.

The enlargement of regions through incorporation of small ethnically defined
regions and the formation of larger regions would give more bargaining power to the
latter. However, the new regions will not border foreign countries and their ethnic
minorities will be diluted by ethnic Russian and other nationalities, which, unlike the
small aboriginal populations of the autonomous okrugs, may have their ethnic republics
elsewhere in Russia or in the "near abroad."

In the long run, the federal government plans to delegate more authority for
protection of small minorities to larger regions with ethnic Russian majorities. This shift
may take place should the new federative units become financially self-sufficient, and
their administrations remain loyal to the Kremlin and compliant with the federal
legislation. However, if necessary, the federal government would retain its right to

171 According to article 12 of the Russian Constitution, bodies of (cultural) municipal self-government are excluded
from the two-tier system of state (federal and regional) government.
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interfere in regional ethnic policies. As long as the article 72-1-b of the Russian
Constitution is not amended, "ensuring the rights of ethnic minorities" would remain an
area of joint jurisdiction of the federal and regional governments.

Also, major infrastructural projects currently undertaken by the federal
government as part of regional development and enlargement programs will enhance the
connectedness of the state. The new enlarged regions would not only become more
integrated internally, but also with neighboring regions and the state as a whole. In the
1990s, rich regions were relatively independent politically and economically and were
unchecked by the federal government. Poor regions, having won federal status and
become politically independent, developed heavy dependency on federal government for
subsidies, subventions, and grants. The enlarged regions create a new form of
dependence, by which the poor municipalities reduced in their status through merger
become more dependent on their rich regions. The latter, in tum, would develop greater
interdependence with neighboring regions and the Federation. These ethnic, political, and
economic factors combined would minimize chances of secession of the enlarged regions
from the Federation.

The Russian Federation may become more centralized and interlinked. Enhanced
economic exchange would help integrate the horizontal socioeconomic ties, and make
them individually less economically dependent on the federation. "Economic connections
are essential for real political connections to develop.,,172 However, since late 2004,
regional connections at governors' level develop under federal supervision. The institute
172

Hill and Gaddy, 2003, p. 116.
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of polpreds and the procedure of appointment of governors contain the horizontal
symmetry across the regions at economic level. Politically, the system of governance is
formed from the top down. "Vertical of power is being freed of any 'architectural
extravagancies' and is streamlined perpendicularly upwards.,,173 Dilution of a number of
ethnic minorities, the "proliferation" of United Russia centrist party at the executive and
legislative regional levels, and autonomization (coupled with reduction in status) of local
self-governance secure greater federal control over important regional affairs. Vertical
symmetry is skewed towards the federal government, signifying the transition from a
loose federation to a more centralized one.

Federal Symmetry

A degree of asymmetry is a feature of all federated states. In large and cold Russia
the distribution of people and resources is destined to perpetually induce horizontal
asymmetry despite administrative-territorial reorganization. Even as a unitary state,
Russia will remain asymmetrical in terms of West-East and North-South. The critical
factor of Russia's federal symmetry is the distribution of political power. In the end, it is
not geography, geology, or population, but the division of power that provides for a
federative state. From what my study has demonstrated, at least in the near future, the
enlarged regions would receive some preferential treatment from the federal center, but
will not assume additional political functions other than those of administering larger

173

Yekaterina Dobrynina, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 6, 2004.
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territories. On the opposite, the enlarged regions may partially lose their representation in
the Russian Legislative Chambers.

As of August 2005, it is impossible to predict the full political disposition the
regional enlargement would entail. As a process, can be assessed from the standpoint of
federal symmetry, which sheds light on the extent of the Kremlinization of Russia and the
validity of the economic argument for the regional enlargement.

It would be impossible to maintain horizontal federal symmetry in terms of area
and population size due to Russia's geographical constraints. However, the policy of
regional enlargement is capable of partially solving the unequal distribution of oil, gas,
and other deposits. It is no longer a taboo to refer to the resource-related industries as to
the primary drivers of Russia's stability and economic solvency. A more balanced fiscal
policy may facilitate fairer distribution of state-owned resources, but it is unlikely to
serve as a sole guarantor of the future economic growth of poorer regions.

In terms of vertical federal symmetry, given the new law on the appointment of
governors, functioning of the institute of polpreds, and the allocation of taxes, the federal
government is likely to gain more power vis-a.-vis regions. This power would create
greater vertical asymmetry. Harmful to federation as a system of political organization, it
may be useful for the central government's negotiations on the status of Chechnya and
the other twenty republics.
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With the disappearance of most or all ethnically defined autonomous okrugs from
the political map of the Russian Federation, the multinational dimension of federal
politics would be easier to assess and may allow the federal government to route more of
its administrative and financial resources to the ethnicity-related issues which endanger
not just the symmetry of the state, but its security and integrity. The vertical symmetry
would, therefore, be skewed to the advantage of the federal government. Should all
autonomous okrugs indeed cease to exist as federal units in the next three years, President
Putin and his team spearheaded by Dmitry Kozak should be given credit for their ability
to openly implement a significant part of the administrative reform without amending the
Constitution and maintaining and preserving the state. As Vyacheslav Nikonov, the
president of Politika (Politics) Fund puts it, "Putin's strategy is not autocentrism
(autocracy) or anarchy, but a functioning and effective democracy under the
unchangeable Russian Constitution.,,174

Regional enlargement is a process which may facilitate formation of a strong
democratic state or a strong authoritarian state. Both regimes would secure the rule of
law, but through sets of very different mechanisms. Unless Russia becomes a more
symmetrical Federation in terms of political power and economy (including fiscal
federalism), it is more likely to embark on an authoritarian path of development. If
vertical asymmetry decreases, and horizontal symmetry enhances, Russia is more likely
to form a strong democratic state.

174 Vyacheslav Nikonov, "Strategiya Putina. Stremlenie Predotvratit' Raspad Gosudarstva Lezhit v Osnove Federal'noi
Politiki" (Prain's Strategy. Aspiration to Preclude the Breakup of the State is the Foundation of Federal Policy),

Rossiiskaya Gazeta, December 22,2004, Online at www.rg.ru/2004/12/22/putin-strategia.htmland
http://www.polity.ru/articles/strput.htm
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To Putin, such "functioning and effective democracy" first and foremost means
the supremacy of the rule of the (federal) law on the whole territory. He stresses the
importance of political and economic consolidation as a strategy to secure it. In this
regard, the emerging power structure may be characterized as a shift from a weak
democratic (corresponding to loose federation) to a weak authoritarian (corresponding to
centralized federation) regime in its formation stages. 175 Enlargement of regions may not
be the panacea to Russia's state-building challenges, but it is definitely one of the
building blocks of the new Russia as current leadership envisions it.

In light of the ongoing and completed regional enlargements, Russia is only
statistically becoming a more horizontally symmetrical federation. At the same time, its
vertical asymmetry increases. At this stage of the "collection of the Russian Lands," the
changes in the federal system are unlikely to backfire against its architects. However,
regardless of the abolishment of autonomous okrugs from the system of Russian
federalism, the true challenges to the integrity of the Russian Federation are postponed to
a later date, while they have required an urgent solution since early 1990s. The nature of
these challenges lies in the sphere of state security.

175 "In comparison with weak democracies, strong authoritarian regimes have better chances to secure the rule of law,"
in Castaneira and Popov, Framework Paper on the Political Economy of Growth in Russia and Central America.
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SECURITY DILEMMA: REUNIFICATION OR DISINTEGRATION

The security dilemma has always been vital for Russia. One of the earliest
preserved Russian documents is the twelfth-century narrative "The Lay of the Host of
Igor" describing an unsuccessful military campaign of Prince Igor' against the tribes of
Polovets. 176 Russian tsars inferred a lesson from this and other historic encounters that
had resulted in Russia's conquest. Russian territories needed a unified state. Moreover, to
secure its domain such state had to be militarily sound. Before the establishment of a
federal state in the US, the only known form of government to maintain a large military
contingent was a centralized (unitary) state. The bringing together of the Russian lands,
the expansion of the territory through exploration and conquest, and the establishment of
a strong centralized state was undertaken by both the monarchial dynasties and the
communist elites throughout the last millennia.

At present, Russia once again stands up to the external threats in form of the
expansion of radicalized Islam from the South, Chinese growing power in the East, and
NATO expansion in the West. However, Russia is least vulnerable to foreign interference
along its long and porous borders. It is much more vulnerable to centrifugal tendencies in
the CIS and at home. The ongoing war in Chechnya and a chain of terrorist attacks in
Moscow, Mahachkala, Vladikavkaz, Mineral'nye Vody, that culminated in September
2004 Beslan tragedy have intensified the debate of Russia's security. As a consequence,
they raised questions about Russia's territorial integrity. In his late 2004 press conference
President Putin denounced Russia's move away from the federal state to the Soviet-type
"Slovo 0 Polky Igoreve, Syne Svyatoslava, Vnyke Olega," 12th-century narrative. Found in multiple
versions online at http://www.pereplet.rulXPOHOC/slovo
176
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unitary state, arguing that such transition would hinder economic development. At the
same time, to support the reform of the gubernatorial electoral process, he noted that
Russia "has still not emerged... from the danger zone" of disintegration.

177

Viewing

political instability, terrorism, and secessionism as major internal threats of modem
Russia, he contends the president should have greater influence over regional politics. In
light of the terrorist threat, he perceives the construction of a single (unified) vertical of
executive power in Russia as means to counter it. Regional enlargement makes such
strengthening of the executive branch an easier and a more structured process.
Enlargement of regions, if successfully implemented on an all-Russia scale, truly
completes the "construction of the vertical of power, which pierces Russia from top to
bottom, providing for the unity of the state."l78

Russia has a number of "Muslim" republics, and as much as ten percent of its
population is Muslim. Separatist tendencies prevailed in Muslim Republics of Tatarstan
and Chechnya even before the breakup of the USSR. As a result of demands for
autonomy and independence, the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR was split into Chechnya
and Ingushetia. Tatarstan, having unsuccessfully bid for an upgrade from ASSR to
Republican status within the Soviet Union in late 1980s, prospered in bargaining
unrivaled concessions from the federal government during the parade of sovereignties.
Thus, one of the greatest internal challenges to the territorial integrity of Russia lies in the
accommodation of its Muslim Republics in afederated state.

177 Press Conference by President Vladimir Putin, December 23,2004, at p. 12-13. Online at
www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/12/23!l806 type82915 81700.shtml
178 "Kakyu Strany Vyrastil Putin? Vosem' Prostyh Voprosov v Svyazi s Ego Vystypleniem 13 Sentiabrya" (What Kind
of State Has Putin Grown? Eight Questions in Relation to His September J3 Address), Komsomol'skaya Pravda,
September 14, 2004.
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Shireen Hunter, evaluating the Islamic factor in Russia's policy and the war in
Chechnya, notes that "it is difficult to measure the extent to which these challenges
strengthened centralization tendencies in Russia," and that (they) "intensified fears of
Russia's possible fragmentation and provided strong popular support for Putin's
recentralization drive.,,179 Further, she wonders whether ethnic federalism in Russia is
obsolete, and contends that the "resistance to the fading of ethnic-based federalism
remained largely isolated within a few republics.,,18o Indeed, the ongoing war and the
series of terrorist acts have granted Putin's government carte blanche to start the process
of refurbishing Russian federalism. In addition to creation of federal districts and
introduction of the system of appointment of governors, Putin's team has masterfully
manipUlated the disadvantageous position of autonomous okrugs. In an article on the
changing electoral process in Russia, Nikolay Petrov of the Carnegie Center in Moscow
suggests that reform (appointment of governors) starts off with the regions that are easier
to manage. "The Kremlin has a chance to prepare with utmost care for the tougher cases
that lie ahead.,,181 I observe an identical pattern in the reform of Russian federalism.
Enlargement first affects the ethno-territorial constituencies where the state is likely to
meet least resistance, and successfully undertake the reform.

Despite the failures to reach compromise in Tyumen' and Irkutsk, the mergers in
Perm' and Krasnoyarsk in 2003 and 2005 have proven the viability of the enlargement
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Shireen T. Hunter, with Jeffrey L. Thomas and, Alexander Melikishvili, foreword by Collins, James F., Islam in

Russia:
The Politics of
Identity and Security, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2004, at p. 205-206.
IW
.

Shireen T. Hunter, et. aI., p.233.
Nikolay Petrov, 'The Shape of Strings to Come," The Moscow Times, March 4, 2005, p.8. Online at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace website www.ceip.org
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agenda. And despite the achieved changes in state structure, it should be kept in mind that
it has only been fifteen years since the breakup of the USSR: Russian political culture
and system of governance is still susceptible to the legacy of a strong authoritarian state.
If the long-term goal of the government is to create a more centralized, and at the same
time a more symmetrical and stable state, the reform is likely to result in creation of a
unitary state in Russia. This scenario is even more likely if the enlargement process
continues at its current pace. Pauline Jones Luong observes that "the faster the pace of
state-building, the more powerful the legacies of the previous regime and state
structures.,,182 In fact, it is possible that Russia will undergo a process of "recombinance,"
which would result in a symbiosis of old and new state structures. The regional
enlargement and the Kremlinization may enhance the chances of the old institutions to
dominate the new ones.

The first step of Putin's reforms created Federal Districts. The second step is
likely to abolish autonomous okrugs and facilitate a substitution of ethno-territorial with
administrative-territorial federative division. I contend that the third logical step would
encompass renegotiation of power-sharing agreements with ethnic constituencies with the
status of (ethnic) republics, like Tatarstan and Bashkorto stan. A comprehensive
agreement on the status of Chechnya in the Russian Federation may be expected to
follow. 183

Pauline Jones Luong, December 2002, p. 542.
President Putin has been claiming that the federal government is ready to settle the status of Chechnya in the
Russian federation. In a press conference on talks with Silvio Berlusconi on November 5, 2003 Putin claimed his
government had been "ready to sign an agreement with Cehchnya on limiting powers, which gives them wide
autonomous rights" (online at www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2003111/05/2240 55109.shtml). However, few steps
toward this goal have been taken, and the negotiation process has been backsliding. Federal troops are still on the
182
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

The implications of this study are important to in-depth understanding of the
dynamics of the current changes in the federative structure of Russia. The state's
federative division and its formation remain essential elements of the study of the
direction that Russia will undertake in its development in the rapidly changing twentyfirst century political environment. This research is primarily a contribution to drawing
and analyzing vectors and establishing patterns of Russia's future.

Will Russia manage to maintain and develop an effective and balanced federalism
and evolve by the principles of democracy, follow the model of development of
authoritarian South East Asian and Latin American states, or will it produce a new hybrid
or unique system of federalism? To what extent will the Russian internal division be a
factor in such evolution? The enlargement of the Russian regions that, as a consequence,
may create fewer subjects of the Federation will remain the research focus for scholars of
federalism and Russia. The study of this process and its results may help to answer the
above-stated broad question and other narrower questions more accurately and
profoundly.

Whether Russia will succeed in the implementation of the model envisioned by
Putin's administration for its formation, consolidation, and development in its new
division structure would impact its economy and the future domestic and international
ground in Chechnya. Assassination of the Chechen President Ahmad Kadyrov in May 2004 and the recent killing of the
former President of Chechnya (Ichkeria) Asian Maskhadov have further postponed reaching a peaceful compromise.
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policies. The success of failure to constitutionally re-balance the Russian Federation by
changing its administrative divisions is likely to have tremendous implications for its
future. Moreover, if the mergers of regions were indeed a long-term trend, they would
have a direct impact on Russia, and possibly determine the state's overall success or
failure.

First, the mergers would establish Russia as a federative or a unitary state. The
adoption of a unitary state model in Russia would likely impede its development and
reverse the gains of the fifteen years of the post-Soviet change. In other words, the
Russian Federation can return to the starting point of its formation and find itself
structured like RSFSR. Moreover, by establishing fewer regions, such structure in an
undemocratic political setting may actually develop beyond RSFSR, and into a smallscale USSR. However, if Russia were to form a state along the principles of federalism,
the mergers or its constituencies and the subsequent development of interregional and
federal-regional interaction would determine the degree of its federative symmetry or
asymmetry.

Second, smce the state structure is in many respects the framework of its
constitution and vice versa, the size of the constituencies would have implications for
governing Russia. This would be manifested in citizens' rights, including the rights of
numerous ethnic and religious minorities, and their role in the country's politics.
Therefore, it would either impede or enhance the establishment of a pluralist society and

consolidated democracy in Russia.
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Third, the result of the process of the interregional mergers would largely
determine the budgetary and fiscal policy of the state and the nature of Russian
capitalism, which in tum would impact Russia's socioeconomic and demographic
development.

The success or failure of the policy of the enlargement of Russian regions can
help assess the foresightedness of Putin's presidency and administration.

Also, it is unclear to what extent is the Russian Federation likely to reflect its
multi ethnic character in terms of federal division as well as the representation of the
smaller ethnicities at the regional and federal levels. With autonomous okrugs absorbed
by greater regions, and ethnic republics balanced among each other and within federal
districts and the state, the need to maintain a federated structure of the state may
diminish. Thus, should Russia manage to find a solution to the challenges of the ethnic
republics of the Northern Caucasus, federal structure may become obsolete for the
purposes of maintenance of vertical federal symmetry. If so, Russia may indeed revert to
nominal federalism of the RSFSR. Therefore, it is important to monitor the process of
enlargement and the reaction of the Northern indigenous ethnicities to the enlargement
initiatives.

As of August 2005, the vector of Russia's path to statehood remains a dilemma
and a disputed subject among politicians and scholars. Certainly, among the great number
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of debated issues around Russia's development and future, the enlargement of regions
would occupy a prominent place. More research on Russian regional merger, including
the assessment of the enlargements in retrospect, would contribute to studies in state
building, democratization, and federalism.

Finally, the case studies in Russian regional enlargement and their results will
contribute to fundamental research on budgetary federalism, ethnic federalism,
symmetrical federalism, and on state building and evolution of states.
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APPENDIX 1
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TERMINOLOGY

Considering the small number of case studies that I undertake in this paper, I have
chosen to use English transliterations for a number of Russian geographical terms and
titles of the Russian territorial division. The Russian terms that I use are as follows:

•

In translation of proper names, I use the transliteration suggested by Democratizatsiya
magazine. Wherever possible, I provide English equivalents of Russian terms in
parentheses or in footnotes. For example, I only partially translate "Perm' Region,"
and use the term "Perm' Oblast"', and not "Permskaya Ob/ast'" to avoid confusion
with and distinguish from "Perm' Krai" (Permskii Krai). At times, I refer to ob/ast by
name of its capital city. For example, "merger of Perm' and KP AO" refers to merger
of Perm' Oblast' and Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous Okrug. Otherwise, I clearly
identify that I reference Perm', Tyumen', and other locations as cities.

•

I use abbreviations for convenience. For example, Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous
Okrug (KP AO).

•

I use acronyms and transliterate them from Russian. For example, The Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation (Ministerstvo
Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiya i Torgovli (MERl).

•

I specifically describe the term Kremlinization in the Introduction.

•

The terms region, state, constituency, subject (of the federation) are used as
synonyms, which refer to units of the federative constitutional division of Russia,
unless noted otherwise.

•

Terms nation, nationality, ethnos, ethnicity are used as synonyms, which refer to
ethnic groups historically settling the territory of Russia, unless noted otherwise.

* - English equivalents of Russian terms are used where possible in Orttung and Reddaway (Eds.), The Dynamics of
Russian Politics: Putin 's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
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APPENDIX 2
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AO - Autonomous Okrug (avtonomnyi okrug)
FAS - Federal Antimonopoly Service (Federal'naya Antimonopol'naya Sluzhba)
FD - Federal District (Federal'nyi Okrug)
GosKomStat - State Statistical Committee (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Statistike)
Gosplan - State Economic Planning
GRP - Gross Regional Product
KhMAO - Khanty-Mansiiskii Autonomous Okrug
KPAO - Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous Okrug
MERT - Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (Ministerstvo Ekonomicheskogo
Razvitia i Torgovli RF)
MinFin - Ministry of Finance (Ministerstvo Finansov RF)
MinNats - Ministry of Nationalities (Ministerstvo po Delam Natsional 'nostei RF)
NDPI - Tax on Extraction of Mineral Resource (nalog na dobychu poleznykh
iskopaemykh)
Polpred - Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia in a Federal District
(Polnomochnyi Predstavitel' Prezidenta v Federal'nom Okruge)
RF - The Russian Federation
RSFSR - Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
U-OBAO - Ust'-Ordynskii Buriatskii Autonomous Okrug
VPK - Military-Industrial Complex (Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kompleks)
VTSIK - All-Russia Central Electoral Commission (Vserossiiskaya Tsentral 'naya
Izbiratel 'naya Komissiya)
VTSIOM - All-Russia Center for Study of Public Opinion (Vserossiiskii Tsentr
Issledovniya Obshestvennogo Mneniya)
YaNAO - Yamalo-Nenetskii Autonomous Okrug

162

APPENDIX 3
FORMS OF RUSSIAN REGIONS
Republic, krai, oblast', autonomous oblast', federal city, and autonomous okrug (AO) are six forms of the 89 Russian Federation constituencies. Despite the difference in
forms, their nominal status is uniform (Article 65 of the Russian Constitution).
Oblast' - most common Russian form of region; its borders are usually administrativeterritorial; population is predominantly ethnic Russian. Russian Federation contains 49
oblasts (48 upon the formation of Permskii Krai).
Krai - literally means "edge." Formerly frontier regions of Russia; in modem Russia
krais are usually a large oblasts. In the Soviet Union, krais usually incorporated
autonomous okrugs. Thus, their borders combined administrative-territorial and ethnoterritorial charateristics. Russian Federation contains 6 Krais (7 upon the formation of
Permskii Krai).

Republic - region containing a major (usually over one million) titular ethnicity, to
which the region (autonomy) had been assigned in the RSFSR - now the Russian
Federation. Republican borders are ethno-territorial, although ethnic Russians constitute a
majority in most ethnic republics, and the borders no longer reflect a clear ethnic divide.
Republics have a right to adopt their own constitutions to complement and not contradict
the federal Constitution. Other forms of regions adopt charters. Russian Federation
contains 21 Republics.
Autonomous Okrug - region containing a smaller (less than one million) titular
ethnicity. Okrugs are homes to small (indigenous) ethnicities of the Russia's North. Their
borders are ethno-territorial, although, like in the republics, their populations are not
homogeneous and may include sizeable ethnic Russian or other ethnic populations.
Russian Federation contains 10 autonomous okrugs (7 upon enlargement of KomiPermyatskii, Taimyrskii (Dolgano-Nenetskii), and Evenkiiskii Autonomous Okrugs).
Autonomous Oblast' - same as autonomous okrug. Russian Federation contains only
one region of this status - the Jewish Autonomous Okrug.
Federal City - cities of federal importance (significance). Russian Federation contains
only two such regions - the City of Moscow and the City of Saint Petersburg. The
borders of these regions are administrative-territorial.
Source: Constitution of the Russian Federation. Full text available online in English at
http://www.kremlin.ruieng/articles/ConstEngl.shtml
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APPENDIX 4
Article 66 of the Russian Constitution, Adopted by National Referendum on
December 12, 1993

1. The status of a Republic shall be determined by the Constitution of the Russian
Federation and the Constitution of the Republic.
2. The status of a territory, region, city of federal importance, autonomous region and
autonomous area shall be determined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and
the Charter of the territory, region, city of federal importance, autonomous region or
autonomous area, adopted by the legislative (representative) body of the corresponding
subject of the Russian Federation.
3. Upon the proposal of the legislative and executive bodies of the autonomous region or
autonomous area a federal law on autonomous region or autonomous area may be
adopted.
4. The relations between the autonomous area within a territory or region may be
regulated by the federal law or a treaty between the bodies of state authority of the
autonomous area and, accordingly, the bodies of state authority of the territory or region.
5. The status of a subject of the Russian Federation may be changed upon mutual
agreement of the Russian Federation and the subject of the Russian Federation and
according to the federal constitutional law.

Source: http://kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstMain.shtml
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Scheme 1
Federal Symmetry *

A 1. Vertical symmetry in a federation

B 1. Horizontal symmetry in a federation

Vertical Asymmetry: power is skewed towards federation in
a more centralized state. Constituencies have little power in
their own affairs and at the federal level.

Horizontal Symmetry: regions are approximately equal in
power to each other and in relation to federation. They are
equally represented at the federal level. It is also desirable they
are roughly equal in area, population, size of economy.

A2.

Region

Region

Vertical Asymmetry: power is skewed towards regions in a
loose federation with vast regional autonomy. Regions are
semi-independent of the federation. This form may serve as a
transitory form to the breakup of a federation into independent
states or formation of a confederation. Russia is currently
moving from being a loose federation (A 2) to a more
centralized federation (A 1).

* - Scheme drawn by the author
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Horizontal Asymmetry: regions are unequal in power to each
other (and in relation to federation). Some regions have more
leverage at the federal level and over other regions. Others are
marginalized. Russia during the "parade of sovereignties" is a
clear example of this kind of asymmetry.

Scheme 2: Federation as a Dynamic Organizational Structure of States
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Scheme 3. Dynamics of Russian Federalism: 1990-2005
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•

Ratio of the Direct and Reverse Flows between Federal Budget and Siberian Federal District (Per 100 rubles of transfers to
the Federal Budget), January-September 2004 *
Donor Regions of the Siberian
Federal District

I.
2.

-

0\
00

Krasnoyarskii Krai
Irkutsk Db/as!'
3. Kemerovskaya Dblas!'
4. Novosibirsk Dblas!'
5. Omsk Ob/as!'
6. Tomsk Dblas!'

Federal Budget

100 rubles

<8-r-rub_le_s_ _..J

Recipient Regions of the
Siberian Federal District

100 rubles

I.
2.
3.
4.

Republic of Altai
Republic ofBurialia
Republic ofTuva
Republic of
Kbakasia
5. A1taiskii Krai
6. Chita Dblas!'
7. Aginskii Buriatskii
AO
8. Taimyrskii AO
9. Ust'-Ordynskii
Burialskii AO
10. Evenkiiskii AO

Source: (Sootnosheniya Pryamykh i Obratnykh P%~~kay mezhdy Federal'nym budjelom f SFO), January-September 2004, in Boris Lavrovskii, "One more Year of Unstable Development," (Eshyo Odin
God Neystoichivogo Razvitiya), Expert-Sibir' Magazine, No 15 (67) April IS, 2005

* - On average, a transfer of 100 rubles from the territory of Siberian Federal District to the federal budget relates to 57.6 rubles ; same average for transfers from all federal districts is 22.5 rubles.
Note that all ethnically defined subjects of the Federation in the Siberian Federal District (republics and autonomous okrugs) are recipients. All ob/asts, except Chita, are, on the opposite, donors.
Also note the path dependency of regions of the Siberian Federal Districts. All donor regions, unlike recipients, have direct access to the Trans-Siberian Railroad (BAM), and are also major airport hubs.

Poster 1

Bb 6MP H

Georgii Kho roshevski i, " Vybirai v Tuzemnyi Soviet Tryduashihsa - Ne Py skai Shamana i Kylaka " (Elect
the Native Workers ' Soviet: Don 't Let Shaman and Kulak in), 193 I
Source: http://orel.rsl. ruImeetingonfr/plakat2/077,htm
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Table 1. Dynamics of Russian Federal Division

Time Period

Type ofBorder
EthnoAdministrativeTerritorial
Territorial
16 (+15)

*

Total
Number of
Subjects

**

RSFSR before 1990
(one of 15 constituencies of the
USSR)

57

Russian Federation in 19902003 (Breakup of the USSR,
Yeltsin's Presidency,
devolution)

57

32

89

Russian Federation in 20002005 (Putin's Presidency,
recentralization)

57

29

86 ***

88 (73)

* - The total number of ethno-territorial constituencies equaled 31, including 16 autonomous constituencies
(ASSR), and 15 second-tier autonomous units, included in other first-tier constituencies (matryoshka).
** - 73 refers to firs-tier units, some of them containing the 15 second-tier autonomous units.
*** - Should regional enlargement continue throughout Putin's second term, I suggest the total number of
ethno-territorial constituencies is likely to decrease to 20-25, and the total number of constituencies
to 75-80.
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Table 2. General Political and Administrative Information on the Studied Regions
Region

Incorporation Constituinto Russia tional Status
(RSFSR)

Perm' Region

Ob/ast'

1938
Komi-Permyatskii
AO
Permskii Krai
After Merger

Avtonomnyi
Qk,.ug
Krai

1925

Federal
Power-sharing
District
Agreement with the
(Federal'nyi
Federation, Current
Status
_JJkrug)
NE part of East European Plain. Borders 5 Agreement Cancelled,
Volga
regions. Includes I AD, 37 regions, 25 cities, 2001
(Privo/zhskii)
55 towns. 1400 km NE of Moscow
Preduralie, Kama river upstream, 1 400 km Agreement Cancelled, 2002Volga
NEofMoscow
Merger Agreement
Volga
signed, February 17,2003
Geographic Location

Military
District
(Voennyi
Okrug)
Volga-Urals
(Privo/zhskoUra/skii)
Volga-Urals
Volga-Urals

Head of
Economic Region
(Ekonomicheskii Region, May
Raion)
2005
Urals (Ura/skii
Raion)

Oleg Chirkunov

Urals

Gennady
Savel'iev
To be elected
December 1,
2005
Sergey
Sobyanin

Urals

2005

~4--

Tyumen' Region

.......
-..l
0'1

Khanty-MansilskiC'
AO
Yamalo-Nenetskii
AO ___ _ _
Tyumen' and AOs

1930
1930

~fMerge

!Irkutsk Region
1937
1937

Ust' -Ordynskii AO
Irkutsk and AO if
Merxe ______ _
Other Il_egi()n~
Republic of
Tatarstan
Republic of
Chechnya
City of Moscow

Ob/as(---- W- Siberian Plain. Borders Kazakhstan and 7 Agreement Cancelled,
Ural (UraFikfi) Volga:Urals --West- Siberian
(ZapadnoRussian regions. Includes 2 ADs, 5 cities of November 29,2001
ob/ast', 15 of Okrug, and I rayon
Sibirskii)
subordination. 2 100 km E of Moscow
- Volga=Urals
west: Siberian - -Aleksandr
Avtono-";nyiW Siberian Plain. 2 800-km E of Moscow-Agreement Cancelled, 2001 Urae
_.2!I]lK___ __ _
._____
Filipenko ___
,4vtonomnyi W. Siberian Plain, ~b' river downstream. 2 Agreement Cancelled, 200 I Ural
Volga-Urals
Yuri Neyelov
West- Siberian
Okrug
400 km. NEofMosc_.._ocoow'-----_ _
---Ural
West- Siberian
Volga-Urals

- --;S of Central Siberia. BorderS 5 regions.
Includes I AD. 22 cities, 60 villages. 5 000
km SE of Moscow
Avtonomnyi S Part of Leno-AD.gaisk Plain. Inside Irkutsk
Okrug
Ob/ast'. 5 100 km SE of Moscow

Respub/ika

is iberian

Agreement signed, May 27,Siberian
1996 (cancellation in
(Sibirskii)
progress since 200~) _ __
Agreement signed together Siberian
\vith Irkutsk,
JMay27,1996
Siberian

E part of the E European Plain; Middle Volga Agreement signed,
Volga
River current. Borders 8 regions, 700 km E ofFebruary 15, 1994
Moscow
NsiopeOf Caucasus Mountainsan,fCheehenAgreement signed~ August Southern
(Yuzhnyi)
Plain. Borders Georgia and 4 Russian
31, 1996
Regions. 2 000 km S of Moscow

(Sibirskii)

East -Siberian
(VostochnoSibirskii)

Boris Govorin

Siberian--~East:S""i~be'--n~'a-n-- Valeriy Malee~

Siberian
-

East-Siberian

Volga-UrniS-----VOlga
(Povo/zhskii)

1920
1922, as
Respublika
Northern
Chechenskaya
Caucasus
Avtonomnaya
(SeveroOb/ast'
Kavkazskii)
Agreement signed, June 16:Central- -Moscow --Gorod
. 'Center-bfthe European Russia. Inside
Federa/'nogo Moscow ob/as!'. Includes 10 districts and 4 1998, for 10 years
(Tsentra/ 'nyi) (Moskovskii)
Znachenia
posyo/ki.
1929
(Federa/ City)

Mintimer
Shaimiev

Northern Caucasus Alu Alkhanov
(SeveroKavkazskii)
Central
(Tsentra/ 'nyi)

Yuri Luzhkov

Table 3. Number of Ethnic Russians and Other Large Ethnic Groups in Studied Regions
Region
Penn' Db/ast'
Komi-Pennyatskii AO

- ..l
-..l

Perm' and AO after Merger
(Permskii Krai) '"
Tyumen'Db/ast'
Khanty-Mansiiskii AO"
Yamalo-Nenetskii AO""
Tyumen' and AOs after
Merger"""
Irkutsk Db/ast'
Us!' -Ordynskii AO
Irkutsk and AOs after Merger
Other RC2ions
Republic ofTatarstan
Republic of Chechnya
City of Moscow

Total
Population of
Region
2683345
136076

Number of
Ethnic
Russians*
2349713
51946

28]942]

Largest Ethnicity

Second Largest
Ethnicity
Tatar, 135497
Russian

240] 659

Russian
Komi-Pennyak** ,
80327
Russian

Tatar, 136597

1325018
1432817
507006
3264 841

1091571
946590
298359
2336520

Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian

2446378
135327
258] 705

2246847
73646
2320493

3779265
I 103686
10382754

1492602
40645
8 808 009

I

I

Proportion of Ethnicities
Third Largest
Ethnicity
Bashkir, 40 690
Tatar, I 100

Fourth Largest
Ethnicity
Udmurt, 26 073
Ukrainian, 706

All Other
Ethnicities
131372
1952

Bashkir, 40 740

136920

Tatar, 106954
Ukrainian, 123 238
Ukrainian, 66 080
Tatars, 242 325

Komi-Permyak,
103505
Ukrainian, 22054
Tatar, 107637
Tatar, 27 734
Ukrainian, 211372

Gennan, 16 320
Bashkir, 35 807
Nenets**, 26 435
Bashkir, 46575

88119
219545
88398
428049

Russia
Russian
Russian

Ukrainian, 52 331
Byruat**, 53 649
Byruat, 80 565

Tatar, 26 966
Tatar, 4 102
Ukrainian, 53 631

Byruat, 26 916
Ukrainian, I 300
Tatar, 31068

93318
2630
95948

Tatar**, 2 000 116
Chechen**, I 031 647
Russian

Russian
Russian
Ukrainian, 253644

Chuvash, 126532
Kymyk, 8 883
Tatar, 166 083

Udmurt, 24 016
135999
Avartsy,4 133
18378
Annenian, 124±~ 1030593

I

I

I

Source: Census 2002, GosKomStat data, http://www.perepis2002.ruictldoc!ALL 00 Ol.doc Russia's total population is 145 166 731 (January 2005 GosKomStat estimates the Russian population
at 143 400 000). For statistics on small indigenous groups of Russia's North, Siberia, and the Far East and their population distribution in Russian regions, see
h.ttJ!;iL~wv.:.raipon.org/russian site/people/people perepis 2002 rus.htn1 The tenn small indigenous groups includes Nenets, Khanty, and Mansi. It does not include Komi-Pennyaks and Buriats,
because their total number exceeds 50 000.
* - For overall proportion of ethnic Russians and other ethnicities in the Russian Federation see Map 2-A

** - Titular Ethnicity

'" - In addition, Pennskii Krai will be home to the following nationalities (over 10000): Udmurt - 26 272, Ukrainian - 25948, Byelorussian - 10 989, and Gennan - 10 152

" - In addition, Khanty-Mansiiskii Autonomous Dkrug is home to the following nationalities (over 10000 people): Azerbaijani - 25 088, Byelorussian - 20518, Khanty** - 17 128, Chuvash - IS
261, Mansi** - 9 894, and Nenets - I 290
"" - In addition, Yamalo-Nenetskii Autonomous Dkrug is home to the following nationalities (over 5 000 people): Byelorussian - 8 989, Khanty - 8 760, Azerbaijani - 8 353, Bashkir - 7 932,
Komi - 6 177, Moldovan - 5 400
""" - In addition, Tyumen' with the AOs is home to the following nationalities (over 10 000 people): Azerbaijani - 42359, Byelorussian - 35996, Chuvash - 30 205, Nenets - 27 965, Gennan27196, Khanty - 26694, Kazakh - 18 639, Moldovan - 17938, Kymyk - 12 343, Mariitsy - II 023, Lezgin - 10 630, Chechen - 10 623, Mansi - 10 561, and Komi - 10 555

The threshold for other nationalities listed in footnotes is different for Penn' and Tyumen' Regions after merger and for Khanty-Mansiiskii and Yamalo-Nenetskii Autonomous Okrug because the
latter two include small ethnic groups indigenous to these particular area only. For Penn', I list groups over 10 000 people, because I consider their numbers are close to fourth largest ethnicity that
I list in the table. Additional figures emphasize the historically diverse ethnic composition of the studied regions.

Table 3-A. Proportion of Ethnic Russians and Other Large Ethnic Groups in Studied Regions

Penn' Region

Population of
Region before
Merger, (Pop. of
Merged
Region= 100%), %
95

Population
Increase for
Merged Region
(Oblast' pop.
=100%)
100

Komi-Pennyatskii AD

0,09

4,8

5

38

Perm' and AO after
Merger
(Permskii Krai)
Tyumen'Region

1,9

100

105

85

0,9

40,6

100

82

Khanty-Mansiiskii AOA

0.987

43,9

108

66

Yama10-Nenetskii
AOAA
Tyumen' and AOs
after Mel'2er AAA
Irkutsk Region

0,35

15,5

38

58,8

2,2

100

246

71,6

1,685

94,8

100

91,8

Ust' -Ordynskii AO

0,09

5,2

5,5

54,4

Irkutsk and AO after
Merger
Other RC2ions
Republic ofTatarstan

1,78

100

105,5

89,9

2,6

--

--

39,S

Republic ofChechnya

0,8

--

--

3,68

City of Moscow

7,2

--

--

84,8

Region

.......
-....l
00

% of Ethnic

Region
Population as
Share in
Russia's
population, %
1,85

Russians in
total region's
population
87,6

Proportion of Ethnicities in Region's
Population, %
Second
Largest
Third
Ethnicity
Largest
Largest
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
1,6
87,6
5
(Tatar)
(Bashkir)
59
38
0,8
(Tatar)
(Komi)
3,7
85
4,9
(Tatar)
{KomiPermyak)
1,7
82
8
(Tatar)
(Ukrainian)
7,5
66
8,7
(Tatar)
(Ukrainian)
5,5
13
58,8
(Tatar)
(Ukrainian)
6,47
71,6
7,4
(Tatars)
(Ukrainian)
2,1
1,1
91,8
(Tatar)
(Ukrainian)
39,6
3,03
54,5
(Tatar)
(Byruat)
2,08
3,1
89,9
(Byruat)
(Ukrainian)
52,9
(Tatar)
93,47
(Chechen)
84,8

39,5
(Russian)
3,68
2,4
(Ukrainian)

3,3
(Chuvash)
0,8
(Kymyk)
1,6
(Tatar)

Fourth
Largest
Ethnicity
0,97
(Udmurt)
0,7
(Ukrainian)
1,4
(Bashkir)

All Other
Ethnicities

1,5
(Gennan)
2,5
(Bashkir)
5,2
(Nenets)
1,4
(Bashkir)
1,1
(Byruat)
0,96
(Ukrainian)
1,2
(Tatar)

6,7

0,6
(Udmurt)
0,37
(Avartsy)
1,2
(Annenian)

4,9
1,5
4,9

15,3
17,2
13

3,8
1,9
3,7

3,6

Source: All-Russia Census Data, 2002 Online at GosKomStat, hrtp://www.rerepis2002.ru!ctldoc/ALL 00 Ol.doc Russia's total population (100 %) is 145 166. For statistics on small
indigenous groups of Russia's North, Siberia, and the Far East and their population distribution in Russian regions, see
http://www.mipon.org/russian site/people/people perepis 2002 rus.htm Tenn Small indigenous groups includes Nenets, Khanty, and Mansi. It does not include Komi-Permyaks and
Buriats, because their total number exceeds 50 000.

5,3
9,9

Table 4. Representation in Legislature in Relation to Landmass and Population of Regions *
Region

Region's Area,
km'

Total Population,
2002 Census

Number of Citizens per I
Number of
Representatives in representative in Regional
Regional Legislature
Legislature

Number of Representatives in the Federal
Assembly of Russia**

N umber of km' per I
Representative

Lower House

_LI>t1_Il1i1) _
Perm' Ob/ast'
Komi-Permyatskii AO

ferm' and AO after
:Merger (Permskii
,Kra=iL.)_ _
TYlimen' Ob/ast' __ _
Khanty-Mansiiskii AoT----

160237

26~3JiL_

40

67084

4006

32900

1360761
-------t

15

9072

2193

193137
28194211
16CS:O:L ___I_325018i _
523800

--.J
'-0

1432817:

55***
51262
-- -----5-3-001
25

3512
6472

2

---~--

-------

--~------

57313 _ _ ~ _

20952

25

20280

30024

75
45

43531
54364

19149
17065

_ 2i..__________

3

Upper House
(Federation Council)

'---2

4
2

4
2

-------

Yamalo-Neuetskii AO.
750 60OL _____
Tyumen' and AOs
~fter Merger
[Irkutsk Ob/ast'
Ust' -Ordynskii AO
Irkutsk and AO after
Merger

143620d
76790()

507006
3264 841:
2 446 37( __ -~

- - - - -

~

6
3

6
2

-----

,

i

- r-

-t

22400

135321

15

9022

1493

790300

25817~

60

43028

l3172

Source: websites of regional legislatures. Available through http://www.gov.ru/mainlregions/regioni-44.html
Area of Russian regions available online at http://www.wgeo.ruirussia/table.shtml?id=22
Other sources of information on Russian regions are available online at h!.);p.:f!~YWW.J~.91.11!]ll:!~;!nt...~QI!!i.t!'..~~.fl.~P}l¥hlli:-=~ and h!.);p:!i.',yw_,,:,m,,_sifltr<ek..fQ!IlLi!1.Q.<:)l:J;htm!
* - Note that figures in table are relative estimates because, according to Table X - Mergers of Regions as Mergers of Capital Cities, more than two thirds of population in the
studied regions (except Ust'-Ordynskii AD) is urban.
** - Figures for merged regions are sums of representatives in respective regions that are proposed for merger. It is likely that the total numbers of representatives would be
smaller. For example, for Tyumen' and AOs after merger they would be not 6, but rather 2 to 4.
*** - The law on Elections of Representatives in the legislature (Zakonodate/ 'noe Sobranie) of Permskii Krai sets the number at 60. However, it is still being disputed. The
current proposal from Perm' and KP AO increases it to 80.

Table 5. Mergers of Regions as Mergers of Regional Capital Cities
"'"

Region

Total
Population

Total Urban
Population

Capital City and its
Population

~'''~'''~,~~'''''''''''''~''''''''~''''''''''~.-~'''~''''-"."

Perm' Ob/ast'

Komi-Permyatskii AO
Perm' and KPAO after
Merger (Permskii Krai)

2683345

2085907

136076

35740

2819421

2 121647

TYumen' Obl;~?----------T325OTf----

801383

'"

""""~,-''''''--''''''''''''-~~

Perm', I 001 653

00

,,,.,, "

H"m~~

w

•••••••• " " ••• ,

••• , , " " . . . . . . _ ••• " ' " . , , . - _ " " _ _ " "__ " ' , ••••••••••• ,

" •• ~,,_,_._,_

•••••••••••••••

""

Other Cities with Population of 50000 or more
........
..
- ..
Berezniki, 173077; Solikamsk, 102531; Tchaikovsky, 86714;
Lys'va,71 148, Kungur, 68 943; Krasnokamsk, 53 724;
Chusovoi, 51 615
Total (excl. Perm') 607 752

'''~~~"~,~-,,.

'"'."'.,

''''''-'''''~,-~-'''-,,~~.

"~".-""",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,-,,, ,~.

-.'

. . . _ " ' _ " " _. ., " " _ ' ' ' ' _ " . " . . .

,

"

,,~

Capital City Pop. as Total Urban Pop. as
% of Region's Pop. % of Region's Pop.

"''''''''''''''''~

Kudymkar, 31 914
Berezniki, 173077; Solikamsk, 1()2 531; Tchaikovsky, 86714;
Lys'va,71 148; Kungur, 68943; Krasnokamsk, 53 724;
Chusovoi, 51615
-Tyumen',511r7i9-Tobol'sk,92 880; ishim, 67 757
Total (excl. Tuymen') 160637
Perm', I 001 653

37,3

73,9

23,5

26,3

35,5

75,3

38,5

60,5

Khanty-Mansiiskii AO"

1432817

1 301 924

Surgut, 285 027

NlznnevanovsK, 239 044; Nefteyugansk, 107830; KhantyMansiisk, 53953; Kogalym, 55367; Nyagan', 52 610
Total (excl. Surgut) 508 804

19,9

90,9

Yamalo-Nenetskii AO""

507006

422826

Salekhard, 36 827

Noyabr'sk, 96440; Novyi Urengoi, 94456
Total (excL Salekhard) 190 896

7,3

83,4

Tyumen', KhMAO, and
YaNAO after Merger

3264841

2526133

Tyumen', 510719

Surgut, 285027; Nizhnevartovsk, 239 044; Nefteyugansk, 107
830; Tobol'sk, 92 880; ishim, 67 757; Khanty-Mansiisk, 53
953; Kogalym, 55 367; Nyagan', 52 610; Salekhard, 36 827;
Noyabr'sk, 96 440; Novyi Urengoi, 94456

15,6

77,4

......
o

,.

*

24,3
83,7
Bratsk, 259 335; Angarsk, 247118; Tulun, 51848; Ust'-llimsk,
100592; Usolie-Sibirskoe, 90161; Cheremhovo, 60107
Total (excL Irkutsk) 809 161
Tist' -OrdynskiiAO '-'-'-T35327'-----O-'--~Usf -Ordynskii, 13 200 No cities---~------~----'-'- --~,-,--~-,-,-------~,--"-,--,---"---~-,,----,~-,------,,,-,,
Irkutsk Oblast'

2446378

hl-;tsk~'udU~OBAO-- '-:f58r70S'--

after Merger

2047614

Irkutsk, 593 604

(no city status)
2047-61r-Tikutsk, 593 604-----B~tsk, 259335; AngaiSk 2471'18; TulWi:-S1848; U;t;::iii;ii~I
100592; Usolie-Sibirskoe, 90161; Cheremhovo, 60107

Source: Census 2002, GosKomStat data, http:/.·www.perepis2002.ru/ct!doc!ALL 00 0 I ,doc,

* - This pattern can also be inferred through calculation ofuman and rural population density and their ratio

22,9

79,3

Table 6. Major Enterprises with Significant Presence in the Region, 2003 and Share of Revenues from Extractive
Industries in Consolidated Budgets
Region

Penn' Ob/ast'

----

Major Entetprises with Significant
Presence in the Region (excluding oil
production companies), 2003 *
Uralsvyazinfonn (24)t, UraIkalii (58),
Silvinit (71)
--

Komi-Pennyatskii AO
Perm' Oblast' and KPAO
(Permskii Krai)
Tyumen' Ob/ast'

Airline Utair (94)

Khanty-Mansiiskii AO

--

Yamalo-Nenetskii AO

--

Tyumen' Oblast', KhMAO,
and YaNAO

00

Irkutsk Ob/ast'

Irkutskenergo (37), Bratsk Aluminum
Plant (67)

Ust'-Ordynskii AO
Irkutsk Oblast' and UOBAO
Republic ofTatarstan

--

Republic ofChechnya
City of Moscow

Tatenergo (33), Nizhnekamskneftekhim
(40), KAMAZ (47), Nizhnekamskshina
(66), Kazanorgsintez (74)
-TVEL (13), Rostelecom (19), Aeroflot
(29), MGTS (43), Moscow Oil Refinery
(83), Mikoyanovskii Meat Plant (92)

Major Oil Production Companies in
Region, 2003

LUKoil

-----"

------

Oil Production, as Share
in Total Russia's Oil
Production, tnt and %
**
10107 (2,2 %)

-LUKoil

0
10107 (2,2 %)

Surgutneftegaz, Var'eganneftegaz,
RITEK, TNK-BP
YUKOS, Surgutneftegaz,
Gazprom, TNK-BP
Sibneft, Gazprom, TNK-BP,
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*- Top 100 Russian Entetprises, AK&M Rating Center, (2003) http://www.akm.ru!rusirc.rpinver 040913 tab2.stm Number in parenthesis represents the company's rating in the top 100.
** Total Production of oil (including gas condensate) for Russia in 2004=458069 metric tons (mt). Based on calculations by Clifford G. Gaddy, Brookings Institution (total error within 0,5
mt). Of that, according to GosKomStat, exports amounted to 257,4 mt or 56,1 %.
*** - Integrated Level of Relative Creditworthiness ofthe Subjects ofthe RF, AK&M Rating Center, http://www.akm.mirusirc'roks 04Q~.J.stm
t - Company operates in the greater Ural region; it is headquartered in Perm' since 2004.
::: - Russia's average Regional Share =6,5. Structure of Incomes of Consolidated Budgets of the Subjects ofthe Russian Federation in 200 I (Struktura Dohodov Konsolidirovannykh Budjetov
Sub 'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2001 Godu), Statistical Digest "Finansy Rossii, " GosKomStat Rossii, Moscow, 2002, in section "State Finances", at p. 45.
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EDUCATION
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
Department of Political Science, 2005, M.A.
Thesis: The Process of the Enlargement of Russian Regions: Economic Balancing or
Landmark of "Kremlinization"?
Perm' State University, Perm', Russia
Major in Civil and International Law, 2000, B.A.
English-Specialized School # 7, Perm', Russia, 1996
Slidell High School, New Orleans, LA, 1995

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Lawyer, Translator
"Complex Systems" Scientific Technical Center, LLC; Chelyabinsk, Russia (08/20020712003)
Organized and maintained contractual database, wrote purchase and sale contracts, and
performed other legal duties for a company active in field of heat power plant
operation software programs for Russian energy companies JSC Tyumenenergo,
Chelyabenergo, Permenergo.

Lawyer, Logistics Engineer, Production Supervisor
"Khashin Trading House", LLC; Perm', Russia (10/2002-05/2003)
Wrote land sales-purchase contracts, international sales contracts with EU, and Middle
Eastern States, and supervised and provided logistical services to a saw mill operation
complex for a company specializing in timber sales-purchase and processing.

Lawyer, Translator
nYapitek Construction and Troika Trade & Logistics" JV; Perm', Russia, Istanbul,
Turkey (05-08/2002)
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Wrote contracts, conducted negotiations, and concluded agreements for construction of
housing complexes between Yapitek & Troika, JVand Penn' City Administration.
• Estimated cost and conducted project feasibility analysis
• Collected and analyzed infonnation on Penn' housing market, conditions of facilities
and utilities networks
• Compiled bilingual reports
• Successfully negotiated financing of the project with banks Sobinbank and Sberbank

Lawyer for International Issues, Translator, Official Representative in Iran
"Uralsibspetsstroy, " Construction Industrial Concern; Penn', Russia (101199905/2002)
Translated Company's legal documents, wrote bilingual construction, service, and salespurchase contracts, carried out legal duties in establishing a joint-venture construction
company between Uralsibspetsstroy and branches of the Iranian Ministry of
Construction, Ministry ofMining and Ministry ofPetroleum. Served as representative
in Iran between July 2000 and May 2001, where facilitated contracts and projects for
strip mining in Sungun Copper Quarry in Ahar (NW Iran), construction of TehranShomal Freeway (Caspian Sea), construction of pipe manufacturing plant for
Assaluyeh-Aghajari gas pipeline (Persian Gulf), housing construction in Evin (Tehran)
and in Mashad and Tabriz (NW and NE Iran).
In Penn', Russia office, conducted business correspondence with foreign partners,
prefonned various PR and legal work, and worked on establishing a Russian-Turkish
alkaline battery plant Saglam Jv.

Contract Administrator
"Permtex" Oil Joint Venture LLC; Penn', Russia (0511998 - 0311999)
Wrote contracts (survey, service, sales-purchase, supply, other) in Russian and English
languages, organized and conducted bidding procedures, amended, prolonged,
cancelled contracts, created and maintained contractual database, interacted with
company's departments to assign contracts to employees in charge of execution.
• Initiated and implemented a new procedure of concordance of contracts within
company
• Implemented a new bidding procedure for contractors
• Created a contract database for easy access to and control over contractual infonnation
• Organized contract department within the financial department

Logistics Engineer
"Permtex" Oil Joint Venture LLC; Penn', Russia (07/1997 - 0411998)
Found suppliers of materials, equipment for oil production and conducted contractual
negotiations, maintained databases of purchased materials and crude oil sales and
pipeline shipment schedules.

183

• Integrated data on purchased materials: developed and sorted data for overall control
over company's purchasing process, and optimized purchasing procedure to cut red
tape and to create control over and transparency of purchasing and storage processes
• Sold excess pipes to reduce storage costs and conducted market research on pipe
manufacturers in Russia, CIS, and Eastern Europe to lower lV's expenses on casing
and compressor pipes

OTHER EXPERIENCE
Open World Russian Leadership Program, U.S. Library of Congress
Translatorlinterpreter, facilitator for Russian Delegations in:
New York, NY, Houston, College Station, TX (08-0911999); Washington, DC,
Louisville, KY, Chicago, IL (11-12/2001); Washington, DC, Sacramento, San
Francisco, CA (04-05/2002); Washington, DC, Asheville, NC, Dearborn, MI (1011/2003); Louisville, KY, USA (06,09-1112004)

Perm' Motovilikha District Police Department, Perm', Russia
Criminal Investigator, Assistant Investigator for a variety of cases (06-07/1998, 060711999)

City Conference on Civil Contractual Law, Perm', Russia
Participant (0711998, 0711999)

US Department of State Russian Elections Observation Mission, Perm', Russia
Translator, assistant (06-07/1997, 06-07/1998)

Kentucky Country Day High School, Louisville, KY
Student exchange program participant (4-5/1994)

Downside School, Somerset, England
Student exchange program participant (10-1111993)

HONORS, AWARDS, AND ORGANIZATIONS
• Political Science Department, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, Graduate
Teaching Assistantship, (8/2003-6/2005)
• Open World Russian Leadership Program of the Library of Congress, Washington,
DC, Certificate of achievement, (11/2001, OS/2002)
• British and American Literary Conference, Perm', 1st prize for research on T. S.
Eliot's Wasteland, (03/1996)
• Poetry Publications (2), (2000, 2001)
• Freedom Support Act/Bradley Program: High school exchange student in New
Orleans, LA; Fall, Winter, and Spring Honor Rolls, graduation with honors (07/19940611995)
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• American Close-Up Foundation Program, Washington, DC, Participant, (1111994)
• Honorary Citizen of Louisville, KY (04/1994)
• Geography Olympiad of Perm' Region, 1st prize, diploma, (01/1993)

PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS
•

Russian natural resources and energy industry, its political and economic aspects;
Russian oil policy and its domestic and international implications; Russian-US energy
cooperation; relations between OPEC and non-OPEC states;
Russian politics, federal-regional relations in Russia and symmetry of Russian
federalism, Russian-Former Soviet Union relations, development of civil society in
Russia;
Migration in Russia and CIS;
Other areas of interest include former Yugoslavia and the Middle East, particularly
Iran.

•

•
•

LANGUAGES
•
•
•

Native: Russian
Wholly fluent written/oral: English
Beginner level: Persian, Spanish

REFERENCES
Furnished upon request
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